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Abstract
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted by Congress in order to
streamline the legislative and regulatory framework governing oil spill
prevention, liability, and response. However, in the six years s' ce this law
was enacted, a proliferation of oil pollution prevention laws have been enacted
at the state level. Many of these state laws directly target the oil
transportation industry, and such legislation has ignited controversy among
marine safety experts as to the appropriate role of state government in
preventing oil spills through industry regulation. This thesis examines one
such law, recently enacted by the State of Rhode I~la1Hl in respunse Lv Lhe
North Cape oil spill. Contents of the new Rhode Island law will be analyzed and
compared to contents of oil pollution statutes in place in other states, in order
to determine whether the contents of such legislation may be used to indicate
areas in which the federal Oil Pollution Act requires amendment.
This analysis of pollution prevention strategies in place at both the
state and federal level will facilitate a discussion of how to balance effectively
the need for pollution prevention at the state level with the need for uniformity
in regulations governing industries involved in interstate commerce. This thesis
attempts to clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal
regulatory authority in order to establish whether the body of state-level oil
polution legislation enacted since 1990 has undermined the intent of the Oil
Pollution Act to provide a comprehensive, national scheme for oil spill
prevention.
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L INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince
William Sound, Alaska. The tanker struck a well-known navigational hazard,
and began to discharge 11 million gallons ofcrude oil into the pristine waters of
Prince William Sound. The Valdez event was followed, within months, by three
additional serious spills in U.S. coastal waters, and the cumulative effect of
these environmental disasters spurred the U.S. Congress to pass the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).1 The passage of OPA 90 represented a
breakthrough in U.S. pollution prevention legislation by introducing a
comprehensive scheme for oil spill liability and response.2 The Exxon Valdez
event, followed by the trilogy of smaller spills, served to break the gridlock in
Congress which for fourteen years had precluded the passage of a federal oil
pollution statute.3
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was developed in an attempt to streamline
the statutory framework governing oil spill pollution which had existed in the
United States previous to the passage of this law. Before OPA 90 was
enacted, water pollution and oil spill regulation involved a complicated array of
overlapping federal and state statutes as well as general principles of maritime
1 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, P.L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484.
2 Thomas J. Wagner, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An analysis," The Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce 4 (1990): 569.
3 Jeffery D. Morgan, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990; A look at its impacts on the oil
industry," Fordham Environmental Law Journal 6(1994):1. See also 135 Congo Rec. H
7954 (1989). Comprehensive oil spill prevention, liability, and response legislation was
introduced into Congress several times between 1975 and 1989. Such legislation had
passed the House of Representatives, however it always died in the U.S. Senate. OPA 90,
by comparison, actually passed the Senate first, by a vote of 99 to O.
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law.4 While a primary goal of Congress in passing the Oil Pollution Act was to
establish one comprehensive national policy which addressed oil spill
prevention, liability, compensation,and response, many states feared that this
sweeping federal law would preempt the ability of individual states to enforce
their own environmental protection and liability standards. 5 Senator Majority
Leader George Mitchell and Representative Gerry Studds led these states in
arguing before Congress that OPA 90 should contain provisions which allow for
the preservation of states' rights to develop standards and liability schemes in
addition to the requirements set by OPA6
Despite a great deal of division on this issue, the argument against
preemption was successful, resulting in the inclusion of the following non-
preemption language in the Act: "...nothing in this Act shall affect or be
construed or interpreted as preempting the authority of any state or political
subdivision from imposing any additional liability or requirements respecting
the discharge ofoil..."7 These "requirements respecting the discharge of oil," as
they have been implemented by various states since OPA was enacted, include
a vast array of preventative measures, including vessel safety standards
4 Before OPA 90 was enacted, several federal laws regulated the discharge of oil into state
and federal waters. These laws include the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA or
Clean Water Act), P.L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, P.L.
93-627,88 Stat. 2126 (1975); the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), P.L.
93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973); the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, P.L. 95-372, 92 Stat.
629 (1978); and the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, ch, 43, 9 Stat. 635.
5 John M. Mitchell, "The U.S. Coast Guard's proposed regulation of Certificates of Financial
Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990," Administrative Law Journal
7(1993):124.
6 135 Cong. Rec. H 7954 (1989), 136 Congo Rec. S 11536 (1990), 136 Congo Ree. H 6920
(1990), 136 Congo Rec. 6933 (1990). See also James E. Beaver, James N. Butler, and Susan
E. Myster, "Stormy Seas? Analysis of new oil pollution laws in the west coast states," Santa
Clara Law Review 34(1994): 791.
733 U.S.C. sec, 2718 (a), (c).
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which target the industry responsible for the coastwise transport of petroleum
products.8
The preservation of state regulatory authority provided by the Oil
Pollution Act has enhanced the ability of states to prevent oil spills in their
territorial waters by developing regulations and policies which recognize
environmentally sensitive areas and other regionally specific concerns. The
non-preemption provision in OPA 90 has also been crucial to the ability of
individual states to recover damages and removal costs and to settle claims
following oil spills.9 Since individual states have chosen to exercise this
regulatory authority through a wide variety of legislative actions, a condition
has begun to develop in this country which can be described as a piecemeal
adoption, state by state, of pollution prevention strategies that are far more
aggressive and, many argue, effective, than the federal oil pollution statute.10
One author has characterized this situation as representing a fundamental
shortcoming in OPA, a law which was originally intended to provide one
comprehensive federal standard. Instead, by providing for non-preemption of
state laws, the Oil Pollution Act has created a situation which one author has
describe as a "new hodgepodge of one federal statute overlapping numerous
provisions and general maritime and common law remedies."ll
8 See also Antonio J. Rodriguez and Paul AC. Jaffe, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990," The
Maritime Lawyer 15 (1990): 4.
9 David M. Bovet and Charles R. Corbett, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Key provisions and
implications," National Council of State Legislatures 1991 Oil Spill Conference (Denver, CO,
1991).
10 Stephen R. Eubank, "Patchwork Justice: State unlimited liability laws in the wake of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990," The Maryland Journal ofInternational Law & Trade 18 (1994):
154.
11 Wagner, 585.
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On January 19, 1996, the single-hulled tank barge North Cape grounded
within a few hundred yards of the Rhode Island shoreline and spilled over
800,000 gallons of fuel oil into that state's coastal environment. 12 The State of
Rhode Island responded to the spill by drafting an oil pollution prevention
statute which directly targets the coastal tug and tank barge industry. 13 The
introduction and eventual passage of this legislation opened the debate
between industry representatives, state government, and environmental
experts as to the appropriate role of the state as a regulatory body in the oil
transportation industry. 14 The controversy which has surrounded this
legislative initiative provides an opportune example of the jurisdictional
conflicts which may occur when an individual state assumes a proactive role in
oil pollution prevention by attempting to regulate those industries involved in
the interstate transport of the petroleum products.
12 The North Cape spill occurred on January 19, 1996, when the tugboat Scandia, which
carried the barge in tow, caught fire and began sinking. Both vessels were forced toward
shore and grounded only hundreds of yards from Moonstone Beach, a pristine beach on
Rhode Island's southern shore which protects several coastal ponds. This area contains
part of a federal wildlife preserve, and is also home to the piping plover, a threatened shore
bird which nests on Moonstone Beach. See Gerald Goldstein, "Tug, oil barge go aground:
Leaking oil threatens South County shore," The Providence Journal-Bulletin 20 January
(1996):Al, A6.
13 Senate Bill 96-3304 and its sister bill 96S-3299 were introduced into the Rhode Island
legislature in May, 1996. The bill was signed into law by Governor Lincoln Almond on
August 9, 1996. See Christopher Rowland, "R.I. toughens oil-barge rules," The Provide~ce
Journal-Bulletin 10 August (1996):Al.
14 This controversy has been documented in the local Rhode Island press, and has also been
can-ied out within various tug and barge industry publications. See, for example, Elizabeth
Abbott and Christopher Rowland, "North Cape spill: tugs, barges face few regulations;
Congress, Coast Guard slow to push for reforms," Providence Journal 28 January (1996),
AI; Thomas Allegretti, "American Waterways Operators Introductory Remarks," in
Proceedings of Tank BargelTowing Vessel Safety Workshop. Massachusetts Maritime
Academy. June 5-6, 1979, sponsored by United States Coast Guard, Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, American Waterways Operators, and the Northeast States, tab 8.; Kate
Thomas, "Spill response: legislators set sights on tank barge operators," Workboat
July/August (1996): 72.
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This thesis examines the evolution of state regulatory authority over
industries involved in interstate oil transportation as it has occurred since the
passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. In so doing, this thesis utilizes the
controversy and debate which has surrounded the State of Rhode Island's
legislative response to the North Cape oil spill as a model through which to
explore the implications of the non-preemption language included in OPA 90 to
the jurisdictional framework for oil spill prevention in the United States today.
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ll. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
There has been a great deal of debate among marine safety experts as
to the appropriate role of the state government as a regulatory agent within
the oil transportation industries.15 The jurisdictional limits of a state's
regulatory authority over industries involved in interstate commerce have
expanded and evolved over time 16 as coastal states have attempted to
balance local interests, including prevention of oil spills and pollution, with the
well-recognized need to maintain the free and unimpeded flow of interstate
commerce17 • The legislative response to the North Cape oil spill which was
crafted by the Rhode Island Senate effectively tested those jurisdictional
limits by attempting to impose structural and operational requirements for all
tank barges entering state waters.
Traditionally, the federal government has reserved exclusive jurisdiction
over all issues which impact upon interstate commerce, including standards
and operating procedures for all U.S. vessels. The Ports and Waterways
Safety Act(PWSA) of 197218 delegates authority to the Secretary of
15 Thomas, "Spill response," 72.
16 This expansion of state regulatory authority will be discussed at length in the body of this
paper, beginning with a discussion ofthe non-preemption language in the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, and followed by a discussion of a line of Federal Court holdings which have
effectively expanded the interpretation of the state police powers. See also Eubank, 149-
176, and Beaver, et. al, "Stormy Seas: Analysis of new oil pollution laws in the west coast
states," 791-845.
17 The U.S. Constitution recognizes the need! for uniformity in regulations governing
interstate commerce in several sections. The first and third clauses of the eighth section,
first article; the first and second clause of the tenth section, article one; and the fifth clause
of the ninth section of article one all address this need for uniformity by providing the federal
government with regulatory and legislative authority in areas which impact upon the flow of
goods and services among states.
1846 U.S.C. 3703 (1994).
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Transportation to regulate the design standards of U.S. vessels. This Act
further designates the U.S. Coast Guard as the federal agency responsible for
enforcement of these regulations. The Coast Guard is responsible for carrying
out all of the rulemaking mandates in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 which
involve vessel construction and design standards. The Coast Guard, however,
is years behind schedule19 in developing and implementing many of the
rulemaking directives contained in OPA which are intended to improve the level
of safety within the industries responsible for the coastwise transport of oil and
other petroleum products. 20
The Rhode Island legislature, in the wake of the North Cape spill,
attempted to remedy several of the shortcomings in the federal regulatory
structure governing vessel standards for pollution prevention by enacting a law
which requires more stringent safety standards aboard tank vessels operating
in state waters than are currently required under federal law.21 Although on
the surface such action appears clearly inconsistent with the federal authority
19 The Coast Guard did, in 1993, submit a notice of proposed rulemaking which would raise
safety standards and equipment requirements on uninspected towing vessels, however this
notice was eventually withdrawn, and the new rules were never implemented. The Coast
Guard admitted that this effort was cut short due to extreme industry opposition. See 60
Fed. Reg. 55904.
20 Several environmental protection organizations have brought suit against the Coast
Guard and NOAA for failing to implement OPA mandates according to statutory
requirements. See amended complaint No. CV-94 4892 (RJD): Natural Resources Defense
Council et. al. v. United States Coast Guard et al.
21 The Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Response Act requires that aU oil
barges operating in state waters carry at least crew members onboard and have an operable
anchor system. The law also requires that as of January 1, 1997, all tank barges operating
in state waters during conditions oflimited visibility must be of double hull construction,
unless accompanied by an escort tug, and that by January 1,2001, all tank vessels
operating in state waters must be of double hull construction unless accompanied by an
escort tug. The federal double hull phase-in requirements set by OPA 90 do not require
double hulls on oil barges until 2015, and there are currently no federal requirements for
manning of tank barges or anchoring equipment on tank barges. See discussion of contents
of Rhode Island oil spill prevention law in subsequent chapters of this text.
7
derived from the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, several other legal
precedents suggest that Rhode Island's oil spill legislation is indeed a legal
expression of that state's regulatory authority as provided by the non-
preemption language in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, as well as a long line of
Federal Court rulings. 22 Likewise, Rhode Island is only one of several states to
enact aggressive oil pollution prevention statutes in the years since the
passage of OPA 90. Taken in context, this body of state-level oil spill
prevention laws may be interpreted as an indication that the federal
government has failed to regulate the oil transportation industries in a manner
which satisfies the needs ofD.S. states to prevent the occurrence of oil spills in
their own coastal waters.
22 These rulings include Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City ofDetroit et al. (362 U.S. 440
(1960)), Askew v. American Waterways Operators (411 U.S. 325 (1973)), Ray v. Arco (435
U.S. 151 (1978)), and Chevron v. Hammond (726 F.2d. 483 (1984)). The
courts' rulings in these cases suggest that the federal interest in environmental protection is
not so dominant as to preclude the enforcement of state environmental protection laws, even
in areas which may impact upon interstate commerce.
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ill. SCOPE OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The research objectives of this project are threefold. The first goal of this
study is to clarify the regulatory authority of the state government over
industries involved in the interstate transport of oil. Although the oil spill law
recently enacted in Rhode Island has thus far not been challenged in court, the
State of Washington was recently sued by an international tanker
organization which asserted that components of Washington's oil spill
prevention law are unconstitutional and overstep the regulatory authority of
the state government. 23 An examination of the jurisdictional issues common
to these and other such debates may help to avoid future litigation in this area
ofmaritime law.
A second research objective is to document the evolution of regulatory
control over oil transportation industries as it has occurred since the passage
of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. A third goal of this research is to analyze the
contents of and intent behind state-level pollution prevention laws in an effort
to identify areas in which OPA 90 is perceived by state governments as
offering insufficient preventative measures, particularly involving industry
regulation. The results of this study may be used to identify whether or not
23 Intertanko u. Lowry, case no. C 95-1096 was filed in Washington State on July 17, 1995.
When the original draft of this thesis was first completed, no decision had been rendered in
that case. However, shortly after this thesis was first completed, on November 18, 1996,
the United States District Court in Seattle, Washington, granted the motions for summary
judgment filed by the State ofWashington and several interveners (primarily environmental
organizations) upholding the Washington State Best Achievable Protection Standards as
constitutionally valid. The content of this thesis has been amended slightly to reflect this
decision, which supports many of the conclusions drawn herein regarding the expanding
regulatory authority of the state over oil transportation industries.
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recently enacted amendments to the Oil Pollution Act24 adequately address
the concerns of state governments regarding the level of safety aboard vessels
which transport oil through state waters. By comparing provisions contained
in state legislation, and particularly in the new Rhode Island law, with the
contents of the OPA 90 amendments as passed, it will be possible to identify
whether these amendments effectively reduce the need for further legislation
by state governments, or whether additional improvements to the federal law
are necessary in order to reduce the need for overlapping state and federal
regulations. This study win attempt to balance the need for local
environmental protection with the need to maintain national consistency in
areas involving interstate commerce. In so doing, this thesis may facilitate a
redefInition of the regulatory paradigm for oil spill prevention in this country
today.
24 Several months after the North Cape oil spill, U.S. Senator John Chafee introduced
legislation during the second session of the 104th Congress which was intended to improve
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. S.1730, the Chafee Oil Spill Prevention and Response
Improvement Act was passed as a part of the Coast Guard Authorization Act, however
several provisions which were present in the original bill were not included in the version
signed into law. A discussion of the details of this legislation will be presented in the
analysis which follows in the body of this paper.
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Research Questions
The following research questions shall be considered in the text of this
study.
1. Can Rhode Island's legislative response to the North Cape oil spill be
considered as part of a larger trend whereby individual state governments have
assumed a more aggressive regulatory presence in the coastal oil
transportation industries since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990?
In considering this first research question, this thesis will also pose the
following related questions.
A. Does the legislative package which was adopted by the State of
Rhode Island in response to the North Cape oil spill expand the
role of the state as regulator of oil transportation by the coastal
tug and tank barge industry?
B. Are the contents ofthe newly enacted Rhode Island oil spill law
similar to legislative approaches taken by other states since
1990?
C. Has the passage ofaggressive oil spill prevention legislation in
states such as Rhode Island caused other states to propose or
introduce similar legislation?
2. Would the Rhode Island oil spill legislation withstand preemptive
challenge based on careful consideration ofthe jurisdictional boundary between
state and federal regulatory authority, the non-preemption language in OPA
90, and relevant court rulings and case law?
11
3. Does the proliferation of state level oil pollution prevention laws which
have been enacted since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
undermine the effectiveness of that federal law as a comprehensive, unified
framework for oil pollution prevention in this country?
Within the framework ofexamining this final research question, the
following, related research questions will also be posed.
A. Do the contents of or legislative intent behind state level oil
pollution prevention statutes enacted since 1990 suggest areas
in which the federal law offers insufficient protection against
coastal oil spills?
B. Do the contents of the Chafee provisions for improvement of the
Oil Pollution Act of 199025 address the concerns of coastal
states as reflected by the contents of state-level oil pollution
prevention statutes enacted since 1990?
25 These provisions, which originated as 8.1730, The Oil 8pill Prevention and Response
Improvement Act, were incorporated into 8. 1004, '!be Coast Guard Authorization Act,
which passed Congress and were signed into law in October, 1996.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
The research questions listed above will be considered by using the
historical and conceptual analysis methodologies described in Mayer and
Greenwood's The Design of Social Policy Research,26 as well as the qualitative
case study methodology as presented in Robert Stake's The Art of Case Study
Research.27 These are both commonly accepted research methods for non-
experimental projects involving legal and policy analysis.
This project begins with a historical analysis of the statutory framework
governing oil pollution prevention in the United States. This historical analysis
provides the foundation for discussion of the three research questions which
are central to the topic of this thesis. The first research question is considered,
in this context, using a qualitative case study of the North Cape oil spill and the
legislative response to that event within the Rhode Island General Assembly.
The contents of the Rhode Island legislation will be summarized and analyzed
qualitatively in order to determine the effect which the law has had on Rhode
Island's regulatory presence in the coastal tug and barge industry. The
contents of and legislative intent behind the Rhode Island law, as determined
by the case study of the bill's legislative history, will then be compared! to the
contents of other state oil spill laws. Oil pollution legislation from other states
will be analyzed qualitatively and preventative policies adopted in other states
will be highlighted and then compared to the contents of the Rhode Island law.
The results of these collective analyses will be used to characterize the extent
to which a trend is occurring nationally whereby the role of the state
26 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980): 79-167.
27 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1995).
13
government as regulator of oil transportation industries has expanded for the
purpose ofpollution prevention.
The second major research question reviews scholarly writings on the
subjects of preemption, admiralty jurisdiction, police power, and federal
supremacy. An historical case study28 ofthe legislative intent behind the non-
preemption language in the Oil Pollution Act is presented. This discussion
focuses specifically on Congressional debates surrounding the inclusion of non-
preemption language in OPA 90, and a consideration of the impact which that
language has had in terms of expanding the role of state governments as
regulators of oil transportation industries. This collective data is analyzed
using the conceptual analysis methodology described by Mayer and
Greenwood.29 A brief synopsis of relevant court rulings will follow this
literature review and brief case study.
The final research question involves another historical case study of the
legislative intent behind the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, this time focusing on the
stated goals of pollution prevention and national consistency. This analysis
builds upon the discussion ofvarious legal doctrines and jurisdictional conflicts
presented in the context of the second research question. The final research
q,uestion is considered by comparing the conclusions of the first research
question, regarding the content of various state oil pollution statutes, with an
analysis of recently enacted amendments to the Oil Pollution Act. The
analysis of this third research question, which is accomplished using a
conceptual analysis methodology, reexamines many of the issues brought to
light by the first two research questions. Discussion of the third research
28 Stake, 71-90.
29 (1980): 79-104.
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question shall lead to the formation ofrecommendations for strengthening OPA
90 such that the need for supplementary state oil spill laws is diminished.
The materials and resources required to complete this project were
obtained through a variety of sources. A number of legislative documents,
memoranda, and briefing papers prepared by the Rhode Island Senate Fiscal
and Policy Office were compiled and analyzed in order to draw conclusions
regarding the legislative intent behind various provisions in the Rhode Island
law. Likewise, similar documents from other state legislatures were often
acquired directly from their respective policy offices. This thesis also relies
heavily on information and statements contained in testimony which has been
given both in the United States Congress and the Rhode Island legislature.3o
30 A great deal of the printed information which was utilized for the purpose of this research
is unpublished, and was compiled by the author upon attending numerous hearings,
meetings, and workshops which have addressed many of the topics central to this thesis.
Whenever possible, refernces to unpublished works have included citations of published
material where supplementary information may be obtained.
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v. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR OIL POLLUTION
PREVENTION
Legislative "Patchwork" prior to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The threat ofmarine oil spills and pollution is one which will exist for as
long as petroleum products are transported by seagoing vessels. Although the
underlying causes of marine accidents which result in oil pollution vary, in the
words of one author, "ships have been hitting rocks, and each other, since
people began using water for transportation."31 Likewise, ships have been
spilling oil and hazardous substances into the marine environment for as long
as there have been tank vessels transporting oil.32 It has been estimated that
one third of all petroleum products transported through the world's oceans pass
through United States territorial waters.33 Therefore, the threat of oil spills is
a very real one in this country, in offshore as well as coastal waters and inland
waterways.
Despite the pervasive threat of vessel-source oil pollution, it was 1990
before the United States finally enacted a comprehensive law designed
specifically to address issues of oil spill prevention, response, and liability.
Prior to the Oil Pollution Act, a complicated tangle of state and federal
regulations existed which governed the marine transport of oil through U.S.
31Tammy Alcock, "Ecology Tankers and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A history of efforts to
require double hulls on oil tankers. Ecology Law Quarterly 19 no. 1 (1992): 99.
32 Ibid.
33Robert H. Boyle, "Troubled waters," Sports Illustrated 80 no. 3 (1994): 10.
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federal and state waters. 34 This web of overlapping laws and regulations
focused primarily on liability and were generally considered inadequate in terms
of oil spill prevention. Likewise, these laws contained few provisions which
specifically addressed response or damage assessment issues.35 The Oil
Pollution Act was intended to streamline the statutory framework for oil spill
prevention, liability, and response by borrowing from, unifying, and amending
various components of preexisting oil pollution laws into one comprehensive
statute.36 The contents and focus of these earlier laws, then, are to some
extent reflected in the provisions contained in OPA. Therefore, before the
contents of and intent behind the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are presented, this
series of overlapping federal laws which governed marine oil transportation
before OPA 90 will be summarized.
The Clean Water Act37 and Supplementary Federal Oil Spill Laws
prior to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more commonly known as the
Clean Water Act, was adopted in 1972 in response to public outcry over severe
pollution of U.S. rivers and coastal waters. 38 The Clean Water Act was the
34 Rodriguez and Jaffe, 2.
35 John M. Mitchell, "The United States Coast Guard's proposed regulation of Certificated
ofFinancial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Fostering a continued
market of insurance for shipowners?" Administrative Law Journal, 7 (Summer 1993): 125.
36 Rodriguez and Jaffe, 7.
37 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or FWPCA, P .L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
38 The "focusing event" which ignited public concern and is generally credited with
precipitating the passage of the Clean Water Act occurred when a severely polluted river
actually caught on fire. See Wagner, 489.
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primary law governing marine oil pollution prior to OPA 90. Oil pollution
prevention and cleanup provisions in the Clean Water Act were complemented
by requirements set forth by several other federal laws, including the
Deepwater Ports Act of 1974,39 the Outer Continental ShelfLands Act, 40 and
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act. 41 Before the "polluter pays"
principle of OPA 90 was enacted, federal liability and damage recovery policies
were also contained in two other federal laws, the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899 (also known as the Refuse Act)42 and the Shipowners' Limitation of
Liability Act.43
The Clean Water Act prohibited the discharge of any hazardous
substances or oil into the navigable waters of the United States, its contiguous
zone, or its shorelines, except under special circumstances. 44 When a
prohibited amount of oil or hazardous substance was discharged by a vessel,
onshore, or offshore facility, civil penalties were assessed against the violator
regardless offault. 45 In addition, criminal penalties could be assessed against
polluters under the Clean Water Act as well as the Rivers and Harbors Act of
39P.L. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (1975).
40P.L. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
41 P.L. 93-153, 87 stat. 584 (1973).
42 Chapter 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899).
43 Chapter 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851).
44 33 U.S.C. sec. 1321 (b)(3). The Clean Water Act allowed for discharge only when the
quantities were less than those deemed to be harmful by regulation, and when such
discharges were permitted by the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL Protocol), See Rodriguez and
Jaffe, Supra note 6.
45 33 U.S.C. sec. 1321 (b)(6)(a).
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1899. The Clean Water Act imposes criminal penalties only in cases of "willful
or negligent" violations,46 whereas the Rivers and Harbors Act imposed strict
liability against polluters.47 The dollar amount of criminal penalties assessed
under the Clean Water Act were sometimes significant,48 however the Rivers
and Harbors Act held little value in terms of oil pollution prevention because
the courts have refused to apply the statute to oil discharges.49
One aspect of the Clean Water Act that was considered by many to be a
strength of the law was that the Act did not preempt the ability of states,
foreign governments, or citizens to recover clean up costs after a spill.50
However, when the violator was a vessel, oil spill recovery claims could be
limited by the. Limitation of Liability Act,51 and this situation was often
considered unsatisfactory by local, state, and federal government agencies, as
well as by environmental advocates. Likewise, industry representatives found
fault with many aspects of the Clean Water Act, such as the fact that in the
aftermath of a spill, initial cleanup efforts which were funded by the
46 33 U.S.C. sec. 1319 (c).
47 33 U.S.C. sec. 407. Strict liability holds the polluter accountable for the monetary value
of damages caused by the pollution event.
48 For example, the United States government assessed a two million dollar criminal
penalty against Ashland Oil in 1989 for an oil spill.
49 The Rivers and Harbors, or Refuse, Act made it unlawful to discharge refuse other than
sewage into the navigable waters of the United States unless statutorily permitted to do so.
33 U.S.C. sec. 407. For discussion of applicability of this law to oil discharges, see United
States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
50 Mitchell, 125. The preservation of state liability policies which is provided by the Clean
Water Act has been cited as a precursor to the non-preemption provisions which were
ultimately incorporated into the Oil Pollution Act.
51 46 U.S.C. sees. 181-188.
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responsible party could not be credited against the amount of money the
government sought for reimbursement of government clean~up costs. 52 For
these reasons, among others, the Clean Water Act was considered by
legislators, industry, and environmental groups to contain significant flaws
with respect to oil pollution prevention and liability schemes.
One year after the Clean Water Act was adopted, Congress enacted the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA),53 in an attempt to address
the increased risk of oil spills which existed in Alaska as a result of the
construction of the Trans-Alaskan pipeline. 54 TAPAA effects owners and
operators of vessels which transport oil from the Valdez pipeline terminal by
holding them liable for spills which occur during transport. TAPAA limits the
liability of vessel owners to $14 million,55 and the Act also authorizes the
creation of a fund for federally mandated spill cleanup. The Trans-Alaska
Pipeline (TAP) Fund is created from a 5 cent per barrel tax on all oil which is
loaded onto tankers at the Valdez terminal.56 The TAP fund is intended to pay
for cleanup costs and damage claims which exceed the $14 million liability cap
52 Rodriguez and Jaffe, 5.
53 The Clean Water Act was passed in 1972, TAPAA in 1973.
54 43 U.S.C. sec. 1653. The Alaska pipeline was constructed and is operated by the
Alyeska consortium, which includes companies such as Exxon, Mobile, Phillips, and Unocal.
The consortium agreed to accept strict liability for damages, under TAPAA, in exchange for a
promise by Congress to forego certain aspects of the environmental impact analysis of the
Pipeline which are required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
P.L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347 (1970).
5543 U.S.C. sec. 1653 (c)(3).
56 43 U.S.C. sec. 1653 (b).
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afforded to vessel owners, up to $100 million.57
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act supplements the ability to
recover for damages incurred as a result of vessel traffic created by the
pipeline. TAPAA does not allow for a direct action against insurers, as does
the Clean Water Act, however vessels subject to TAPAA liability are also still
subject to liability under the Clean Water Act. In addition, claims which exceed
the TAPAA liability limit may be brought under applicable state laws or under
general maritime law. 58 The Limitation of Liability Act is considered to be
completely repealed in cases where TAPAA applies.59
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (OCSLA)
also address oil pollution by regulating the discharges of oil from offshore
facilities or vessels that transport oil from facilities on the Outer Continental
Shelf. The OCSLA imposes several liability schemes60 on offshore facilities
and vessels, with liability limits for vessels established based on tonnage of the
vesse1.61 The OCSLA does not preempt other liability requirements imposed
by state and federal law,62 and the liability limits set by OCSLA do not apply
when a spill is caused by "gross negligence or willful misconduct...within the
privity or knowledge of the owner or operator."63 The OCSLA does provide for
57 43 U.S.C. sec 1653 (c)(3).
58lnRe the Glacier Bay, 741 F. Supp. 800, (1990).
59 43 U.S.C. 1653(c).
60 These include strict, severe, and joint liability structures. 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1814(a).
61 43 U.S.C. sec. 1814(c).
62 43 U.S.C. sec" 1820(a).
63 43 U.S.C. sec. 1814(b).
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direct action by a claimant against the insurer or owner/operator of a vessel or
facility. 64
The Deepwater Ports Act of 1974 (DWPA) adds yet another layer of
complexity and confusion to this already complicated array of overlapping
federal statutes. The DWPA made owners and operators of vessels or deep-
water ports65 strictly liable for costs associated with oil spills from a
deepwater port itselfor from vessels carrying oil to a deepwater port or located
within a deepwater port's safety zone. 66 The Deepwater Ports Act established
a cleanup fund and established liability limits which are both similar to
provisions of the Clean Water Act.67 The DWPA, however, also allows the
United States government to pursue class action suits for damage to property,
and to recover damages for injuries to the marine environment.68
While most of the legislation governing oil pollution prior to OPA 90
contained various liability schemes and limitation, the 1851 Shipowners'
Limitation of Liability Act (SLLA) was still considered valid in the cases of
certain oil pollution claims. The SLLA limited a vessel owner's liability for loss
or damage which occurred as the result of an incident beyond the vessel
64 43 U.S.C. 1815(c)(I).
65The Act defines a deepwater port as a fixed or floating manmade structure other than a
vessel, or any group of such structures, located beyond the territorial sea and off the coast of
the United States which are used or intended for use as a port or terminal for the loading or
unloading and further handling of oil for transportation to any state. This includes all
associated components and equipment, such as pipelines, pmnping stations, service
platforms, mooring buoys, and similar objects to the extent that they are located seaward of
the high-water mark. 33 U.S.C. sec. 1501.
66 33 U.S.C. sec. 1517(a)(I).
67 33 U.S.C. sec. 1517(d-e), (f)(3).
68 33 U.S.C. sec. 1517(i).
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owner's "privity or knowledge" to the value of the vessel and cargo at the time
of the incident.69 This law was enacted over a century ago, when maritime
commerce was vital to the national economy, and the Act was intended as an
incentive for maritime trade and commerce. Although the intent and
provisions of this law were considered outdated for many years previous to
OPA 90, it was still occasionally invoked to limit oil spill damage recovery.70
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
On March 16,1989, Congressman Walter B. Jones from North Carolina
introduced H.R. 1465, The Oil Pollution Prevention and Liability Act of 1989. 71
This was not the first occasion on which oil spill legislation was introduced in
Congress. On the contrary, almost every Congress since 1975 had considered
some form of a comprehensive oil pollution control bil1.72 Many have
speculated that had it not been for the events which occurred eight days after
H.R. 1465 was introduced, this bill may have suffered the same fate as its
many predecessors and died in Committee in the Senate.73 On March 24,
69 46 U.S.C. app. sec. 183(a). Judicial interpretation has determined that valuation is
actually based on the vessel and cargo's condition after the accident, which in some cases
may be virtually nothing. See Place u. Norwich & N.Y. Transport Co., 118 U.S. 468, 492
(1886).
70 See In Re. Barracuda tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp., 228, 230-33, (1968).
71 Bowen Brown, "Preemption and other obstacles to oil spill liability legislation," Water Log
9 no. 2 (1989): 9.
72 Alcock, 136.
73 Comprehensive oil spill prevention, liability, and response legislation was introduced into
Congress several times between 1975 and 1989. Such legislation had passed the House of
Representatives, however it always died in the U.S. Senate. OPA 90, by comparison,
actually passed the Senate first, by a vote of 99 to O. See 135 Congo Rec. H 7954 (1989).
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1989, however, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William
Sound, Alaska. The tanker struck a well-known navigational hazard, and
began to discharge 11 million gallons of crude oil into the pristine waters of
Prince William Sound. The Valdez event was followed, within months, by three
additional serious spills in U.S. coastal waters, and the cumulative effect of
these environmental disasters served to break the gridlock in Congress which
for fourteen years had precluded the passage of a federal oil! pollution statute.74
On August 18, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90).75
Overview ofContents ofthe Oil Pollution Act
The overall success of OPA 90 has been called into question by many.
Critics of the bill include representatives of a variety of interests, such as state
and federal legislators and agency personnel, officers in the United States
Coast Guard, environmental protection groups, and the oil transportation
industry.76 The overall focus of this project is to identify areas in which the Oil
Pollution Act may be considered deficient in spill prevention through industry
regulation, and to offer suggestions for amendments to the federal law which
74 Jeffery D. Morgan, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990; A look at its impacts on the oil
industry," Fordham Environmental Law Journal 6 (1994):1.
75 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, P.L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484. see also Thomas J. Wagner, "The
Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An analysis," The Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 569
(990).
76 It should be noted that after passage ofOPA 90, a backlash occurred: among
representatives of the oil transportation industries, who charged that the financial
responsibility requirements contained in the act would make it virtually impossible to
obtain insurance, and that the industry would never be able to comply with such
requirements. However, the final rules for Certificates of Financial Responsibility were
adopted in 1993, and thus far the oil transportation industries have continued to operate
with a consistent profit margin. See "Crippling burden seen in OPA," Oil and Gas Journal
92 no. 1 (1994):22.
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may eliminate such deficiencies. However, before any shortcomings in the Oil
Pollution Act can be effectively identified, it is important first to summarize
the contents and highlight the accomplishments of the Act.
The Oil Pollution Act of1990 is divided into nine titles, each ofwhich sets
forth a different category ofprovisions. Title I of the Act addresses liability and
compensation issues.77 This section imposes upon each responsible party
strict liability for the costs of removal and damages for discharges of oil from
vessels and facilities "into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines
or the exclusive economic zone."78 Under Title I, the responsible party is
liable not only for removal costs, but also for injury to natural resources. 79
Liability also extends to injury to personal or real property, including economic
losses, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, loss of earnings on the use
of natural resources and real or personal property, impairment of earning
potential and profits resulting from pollution, and for the costs associated with
providing extra public services during or after the removal procedures.8o This
is a significant expansion upon recovery for damages which was previously
allowed under maritime tort law. Under traditional maritime law, claimants
were allowed recovery only for those economic losses associated with direct
physical damage to proprietary interests. OPA expands greatly upon these
traditional limits to recovery by allowing for recovery for lost profits or
77 46 U.S.C. sees. 1001-1020.
78Id., sec. 1002(a).
79 Id., sec. 1006.
80 Id., sec. 1002(b)(2).
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impairment of earning capacity.81 The law, however, does not clarify the
classes of claimants who may recover such damages.82
Another important component of Title I of OPA 90 establishes Ii liability
limitation scheme, except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 83
For tank vessels greater than 3,000 gross tons, liability is limited to $1,200 per
gross ton or $10 million, whichever is greater. Liability is limited to the greater
of $1,200 per gross ton or $2 million for vessels under 3,000 gross tons. For all
other vessels, OPA liability is limited to $600 per gross ton or $500,000,
whichever is greater. For offshore facilities, the liability limit is $75 million plus
removal costs, and for onshore facilities and deepwater ports, the liability limit
is $350 milliOn.84
Title II of OPA contains conforming amendments which repeal various
preexisting funds and which preempt provisions of other federallaws. 85 Title
III defines the role of the United States in international pollution prevention
and removal, requiring the Secretary of State to review existing international
agreements and treaties regarding oil spills. This Title suggests that the
81 The principle of maritime law which governed recovery of damages in admiralty previous
to OPA 90 is the Robin's Drydock Bright Line Rille, which states that a claimant must be in
a "direct line" of, or physically touched by, an event in order to recover damages. While
Robin's Drydock still holds in other aspects of maritime law, the removal of this principle in
instances of oil pollution vastly expands the potential liability which a polluter faces.
82 See Rodriguez and Jaffe, 14. This exception to the Robin's Drydock principle was
developed in order to protect commercial fishermen, who may recover lost profits as the
result of a n oil spill. However, other parties who suffer economic losses following an oil spill
may not recover. These may include shipping interests who can not travel their routes,
marina and boat rental operators, wholesale and seafood businesses, tackle and bait shops,
seafood restaurants, and recreational fishermen.
83 46 U.S.C. sec. 1004(c)(1).
84 Id., sec. 1004(a).
85 Id., secs. 2001-2004.
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United States should participate in an international oil pollution liability and
compensation regime that is at least as effective as federal and state laws.86
Title IV of the Oil PoUution Act contains an assortment of provisions
which address both the prevention and clean up ofoil spills.87 With respect to
prevention, this section establishes policies relating to alcohol and drug use,
and requires rille making by the Secretary of Transportation regarding
manning, training, and watch keeping standards aboard tank vessels.88 This
Title also calls for several studies and ru1emaking responsibilities, such as a
Coast Guard study and recommendations regarding the use of Vessel Traffic
Services (VTS) in various U.S. ports. 89 The highlight ofTitle IV, however, and
undoubtedly one of the most controversial components of the Oil Pollution Act,
is the double hu11 requirement. This provision requires a double hilll on any
new, or substantially converted tank vessel which is constructed after June
30, 1990. This section establishes a phase-out period for existing single-hillied
tank vessels which exempts most classes of tank vessels from the double hull
86 46 U.S.C. sees. 3001-3005. One of the largest sources of debate surrounding the Oil
Pollution Act in Congress was whether to ratify the International Protocol of 1984 to amend
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, and the
Protocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention for the Establishment of a Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971. These conventions were not ratified, and
instead this section was included, which established a general philosophy that recognizes
the importance of international pollution prevention, but mandates no specific action in this
regard.
87 46 U.S.C. sees. 4101-4306.
88 ld, sees. 4102(b);(d).
89 Id, sec. 4114.
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rule until 2010 or 2015, depending on size and construction.9o
Title V of the Oil Pollution Act relates specifically to Prince William
Sound in Alaska,91 and Title VI is considered a "miscellaneous" section,92
providing for appropriations, and for various activities including cooperative
development of common hydrocarbon-bearing areas and for restricted drilling
on the Outer Banks of North Carolina.93 Title VII of OPA creates the Oil
Pollution Research and Development Program, which is a government
interagency coordinating committee to pursue a comprehensive program of oil
pollution research and technology development, and to foster research
mechanisms in cooperation with industry, academia, and government. 94 Title
VIII is specific to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline system, amending provisions of
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and creating new provisions
which conform to OPA. 95 Finally, Title IX defines the funding and spending
procedures for the newly designated Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 96 This fund
consolidates several previously established federal funds for the purpose of
90 Id., sec. 4115(a). For example, vessels over 5,000 gross tons are exempt until 2010.
Vessels under 5,000 gross tons are exempted until 2015. Existing double-sided or double-
bottomed vessels may continue to operate in United States waters until 2015. similarly,
vessels unloading oil at deepwater ports more than 60 miles offshore are also not required
to have double hulls until the year 2015.
91 46 U.S.C. sees. 5001-5007.
92 American Bureau of Shipping, U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A summary (Paramus, N.J.:
American Bureau of Shipping, 1990).
93 46 U.S.C. sees. 6001-6004.
94 Id., sec. 7001.
95 Id., sees. 8001-8302.
96 Id., sees. 1012, 9001.
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paying claims or removal costs when the responsible party is unable or
unwillingtodoso.97 The fund may not be used to pay claims which result from
a claimant's gross negligence of willful misconduct. 98 A claimant must usually
present his claim first to the responsible party or guarantor of the source of
discharge before attempting to recover from the fund.99
Perceived Successes and Failures ofthe Oil Pollution Act
The passage of OPA 90 represented a breakthrough in U.S. pollution
prevention legislation by introducing a comprehensive scheme for oil spill
liability and response. The main purpose of the Oil Pollution Act was to
prevent future spills and to force responsible parties to pay for cleanup costs
and environmental damage. lOO Among the contents of OPA are provisions
addressing liability of responsible parties, removal responsibilities, civil and
criminal penalties, claims procedures, natural resource damage assessment
protocol, establishment of a federal oil spIll response fund, and structural and
operational measures for improving safety in the oil transportation industries.
While the Oil Pollution Act clarifies many ofthe redundant and confusing
aspects ofoil pollution prevention and liability which existed under the previous
statutory patchwork of the Clean Water Act and other federal laws, OPA 90
has been criticized on a number of levels, one of those being that the Act does
not completely remove the possibility for legislative duplication or
inconsistencies. Oil pollution bills which were introduced in Congress in earlier
97 Id., sec l012(f).
98 Id., sec. 1012(b).
99 Id., sees. l013(a); (c).
100 Mitchell, 127.
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years generally cited as their primary objective streamlining the existing
statutory framework governing oil spills. OPA 90, however, was drafted with a
non-preemption provision that allows for preservation of state regulatory
authority and additional liability schemes. This change is attributed at least
partially to public reaction to the Valdez spill, which helped to shift legislative
priorities from simplifying the existing system to simply adding a new layer of
protection.101 Many members of Congress were willing to accept some
continued inconsistency and duplication in return for a "safety net" which
would ensure increased protection and appropriate victims' compensation.
One author has characterized this as a "pile it on" strategy, aimed at ensuring
that plenty of legal remedy and compensation is available in the event of a
future oil spill. 102 Therefore, while the Oil Pollution Act does successfully
clarify many of the formerly inconsistent provisions of earlier pollution laws,
the non-preemption provisions in the Act have allowed for confusion between
state and federaljurisdiction.103
One author has described the situation in the following manner.
"The most glaring deficiency of the Oil Pollution Act is its
failure to promote a uniform national and international approach
through its relationship with domestic and international laws...
The Act replaces the former patchwork of inconsistent federal
programs with a new hodgepodge of one federal statute
overlapping numerous state provisions and general maritime
law and common law remedies."104
101 Benjamin H. Grumbles. "Federal oil spill legislation in the wake of the Exxon Valdez."
MTS Journal 24 no. 5 (1991):7.
102 Benjamin H. Grumbles and Joan M. Manley. "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Legislation
in the wake of a crisis," Natural Resources and Environment 10 no. 2 (1995): p. 37-38.
103Wagner. 585.
104 Ibid.
30
The non-preemption provisions in the Oil Pollution Act have certainly
had a significant impact upon the perceived success of the law, 105 however,
these provisions are not the only aspect of the federal law which have been
criticized as flawed. One author has cited the failure to implement key aspects
of the federal oil spill law as another cause for failure,106 and critics of the Act
commonly refer to the exceedingly long phase-in period 107 for certain structural
improvements to tank vessels as another shortcoming of OPA.108 The Coast
Guard has also been widely criticized as contributing to the weakness of the
Act as a preventative strategy, by failing to implement interim safety
measures for single-hulled tank vessels until nearly five years after the OPA-
mandateddeadline. 109 Shortly after the Oil Pollution Act was signed into law,
105 In general, state governments and environmental advocates felt that the inclusion of
non-preemption language in OPA was a victory in terms of protecting the environment.
Industry representatives fought against non-preemption, claiming that dual regulatory and
liability schemes at the state and federal level unduly burden industry. A more detailed
discussion of the implications of non-preemption for state legislators isdiscussed in later
sections of this thesis. See also Grumbles and Manley, 38-40.
106 Nina Sankovitch, "Craft Warnings," The Amicus Journal, 15 no. 1 (1993):43.
107The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that all new U.S. oil transportation vessels (tank
barges and tankers over 5000 gross tons) constructed after enactment of that law be of
double hull construction. The law contains a phase-out period for existing single-hull vessels
which marine safety experts have generally criticized as far too liberal, with a final deadline
of 2010 for tank vessels and 2015 for tankers. P.L. 101-380, sec. 4115 (c), 4116 (b), 4111,
1006 (e). See, for example, Rodriguez and Jaffe, 7.
1080PA mandated that double hulls be phased into the U.S. fleet unless another technology
for preventing oil spills was identified as more cost-effective. In 1991, the National Research
Council undertook a study to investigate alternatives to double hull construction, and based
on this study the Coast Guard, in 1992, determined that double hulls are the most effective
technology for preventing spills caused by groundings. P. Britton, "New designs for oil
tankers," Popular Science. 242: 28, (1993).
109 OPA 90 instructed the Coast Guard to develop interim safety measures for single-hulled
tank vessels by August 18, 1991. At the time of the North Cape spill, the Coast Guard had
still not satisfied this requirement. See 136 Congo Rec. H6271 (Aug. 1, 1990).
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one author described its contents as "so riddled with problems that unless
several serious faults are corrected, it may only worsen an already confused
situation."110 More recent discussions of the success of the Oil Pollution Act
often paint a similarly bleak picture.111
Issues of jurisdictional overlap aside, the Oil Pollution Act has been
praised, in the professional literature, for various accomplishments, including
its establishment of a more effective framework for oil spill response than
existed under the previous web of overlapping federallaws. 112 Likewise, the
Act, through its rulemaking requirements, has provided for the development of
a unified protocol for natural resource damage assessment. 113 The Oil Pollution
Act has also imposed financial responsibility requirements which force vessel
owners to provide evidence that they carry enough insurance to cover their
potential liability under OPA in the event of an oil spill. 114 This financial
responsibility requirement is often cited as an important accomplishment of
110Brown, 9.
111 See e.g. Abbott and Rowland; Natural Resources Defense Council, "Prepared testimony
before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works," (Washington, D.C.: 27
March, 1996).
112 See Wagner; see also Rodriguez and Jaffe.
113 The final rules for Natural Resource Damages Assessment (NRDA) protocol were, in fact,
published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association within weeks of the North
Cape oil spill, in January of 1996.
1140PA requires that tank vessel operators possess Certificates of Financial Responsibility
(COFR) which document that the vessel owner carries enough insurance to cover potential
liability. When these COFR requirements were first implemented, vessel owners and
protection and indemnity clubs (P&I clubs, or marine insurance syndicates) complained that
these financial responsibility requirements would cripple the industry. However, the final
rules on COFR's were issued in 1993, and oil transportation companies have continued to
operate successfully in the United States since that time. See John Mitchell, "The United
States Coast Guard's proposed regulation of Certificates of Financial Responsibility under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Fostering a continued market of insurance for shipowners?"
Administrative Law Journal 7(1993): 121-139.
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the Act.115
In general, then, reviews of the Oil Pollution Act's preventative policies
have been widely mixed. The long phase-in for double hulls and failure to
implement important interim safety rules have compromised the effectiveness
of the Act in terms of vessel-source oil pollution prevention. However,
provisions such as the financial responsibility requirements and the
preservation of state unlimited liability laws are viewed by many as providing
effective incentives for safer operating procedures aboard tank vessels.116
This briefdiscussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 is meant to provide a context for consideration of the nature and content
of the state-level oil pollution prevention statutes which shall be discussed in
subsequent sections of this text.
115 Mitchell, 127.
116Wagner,2013. Several authors have noted that in the years since OPA 90 was enacted,
the amount of oil spilled into the marine environment has decreased substantially when
compared to average amounts spilled before 1990. It is not unreasonable to cite this
reduction in oil spills as evidence of the success of the preventative measures contained in
OPA 90. However, since the double-hull phase-ins required by that law will not begin to
occur for several more years, and because many of the interim preventative measures
required by OPA 90 were not implemented until several years after the law was enacted, it
is difficult to draw conclusions about causation for this reduction in the amount of oil spill.
Many authors speculate that the increase in potential liability has had some intangible
effect on operating procedures and general level of safety precautions taken aboard tank
vessels. Again, such a discussion involves primarily anecdotal evidence. However, in
discussing the successes and failures of OPA 90, it would be unfair not to note that, if
success is determined by the number of gallons of oil spilled annually, then OPA has
perhaps been successful in this manner.
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VI. THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL
The Grounding of the Scandia andNorth Cape
At 6:00 pm on Thursday, January 18, the tugboat Scandia left port in
Bayonne, New Jersey, bound for Providence, Rhode Island.1l7 The Scandia
towed behind her, at the end of 1,800 feet of tow wire, the 340-foot single-hulled
barge North Cape, laden with four million gallons ofnumber two home heating
oil. The tug and barge began their journey in the face of a severe winter storm,
which had been forecasted to hit southern New England the following day. By
2:00 pm on Friday, January 19, when a fire broke out in the engine room of the
Scandia as it traveled five miles off the Rhode Island coastline, seas were at
fifteen to twenty feet, and winds were gusting over 50 knots.1lS The tug and
barge were approximately five miles southwest of Point Judith, R.I. when the
fire broke out and one hour later, when the crew sent out a distress call to the
Coast Guard, they reported that the tug had begun to sink. When the Coast
Guard arrived on-scene, the crew of six aboard the Scandia were huddled on
the bow in survival suits. An explosion onboard forced them to abandon ship,
and all six crewmembers were successfully rescued by the Coast Guard as
they floated in the churning winter sea.119
As the rescue of the Scandia crew progressed, the tug and barge, still
tethered by the tow line, began to drift toward the Rhode Island shoreline.
117 "Maritime casualties: North Cape grounding caused by fire, weather, anchoring
problems, Professional Mariner 18 (April!May 1996):49.
118 Matt Bai, "Barge lacked critical gear; spill might have been avoided, official says,"
Boston Globe (January 26, 1996): 21.
119 "Maritime casualties," 49.
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Once the crew had been returned to shore, a Coast Guard patrol boat returned
to the North Cape barge with two of the Scandia crewmembers, in an attempt
to deploy the barge's anchor and slow its progress toward shore.120 At 4:45
pm, the Coast Guard put the two crewmembers aboard the drifting barge,
where they attempted to deploy the anchor. The North Cape's anchor,
however, was affixed to the deck due to a broken windlass, and despite the
valiant efforts of the two crewmembers aboard, they were unsuccessful. The
high seas and gusting winds made it virtually impossible to unbolt the anchor
from its steel sled, and the anchor remained in its casing as the barge made its
way toward shore. 121
At 6:17 pm, less than four hours after the initial distress call from the
Scandia, the tug grounded on Brownings Beach. Soon after, the barge hit
ground as well. Both tug and barge were soon dislodged from their initial
grounding point, and drifted further down shore until they reached their final
resting point on Moonstone Beach, within a few hundred yards of the National
Wildlife Preserve at Trustem Pond. At 8:40 pm, the Coast Guard reported that
the North Cape had begun to leak Oil.122
Due to the series of events just described, approximately 828,000
gallons of home heating oil spilled into Rhode Island's coastal waters,
constituting the largest oil spill ever in that state. The leaking oil traveled
quickly, threatening miles of pristine coastline and several coastal ponds in
120 "Maritime casualties," 50.
121 Ibid.
122 Goldstein, A6.
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southern Rhode Island,123 as well as the coastal environment of Block Island,
R.I., twelve miles from the site of the grounding.124 Over three miles of
containment booms were deployed in attempt to slow the spreading of the oil
and to ,protect vulnerable coastal ponds.125 Many of the tidal ponds along the
southern beaches had breached during the storm, therefore with each high tide,
ocean water and the oil which now saturated it poured into these ponds.
Marine life kills in many ofthese ponds were devastating.126
Economic and Environmental Impacts of the North Cape Spill
Despite the efforts of hundreds of cleanup workers, little was
accomplished in terms of containing the spill or recovering oil from the marine
environment.127 The type of oil which the North Cape carried does not float like
crude oil does; rather, it dissipates quickly and mixes with seawater. The windy
weather and rough seas sped up both the dissipation and evaporation of the
123 The southern shore of Rhode Island consists of a series of barrier beaches. Coastal
ponds are located immediately inland from several of these beaches, and the ponds
occasionally breach, allowing for ocean water to enter the pond. The ponds may later close,
as the breaches fill in with sand, and once again become isolated from the ocean for a period
of time. This cycling makes coastal ponds extremely vulnerable to spilled oil, which may be
washed in by the tide while the pond is breached, and later the breachway may close,
entrapping contaminated water in the pond.
124 Thomas J. Morgan, "A trail of death litters the beach," The Providence Journal-Bulletin
(22 January, 1996):A3.
125 Frank F. Baker, "Blustery weather delays towing of oil barge," The Narragansett Times
(25 January, 1996):1.
126 Goldstein, A6.
127Tom Mooney, "Most of the oil got away: Cleanup 'not as sophisticated as one might
think," Providence Journal (29 January 1996):A1. Coast Guard CAPT and Captain of the
Port of Providence Barney Turlo reported to the media that booming efforts were undertaken
despite the knowledge that booming is generally unsuccessful in containing light oil, such as
#2 home heating oil.
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large quantity ofoil spilled, and it is estimated that between 60 and 80 per cent
of the oil that spilled became suspended in the water column. This fact helps to
explain why booming efforts failed, because booms are only effective in
catching oil as it floats on the surface.128 The Coast Guard estimates that
much less than 10 per cent of the 828,000 gallons spilled by the North Cape
were actually recovered.129
The long-range natural resource damages caused by the North Cape
spill are still being tallied, however the immediate toxic effects of the spill on
local wildlife were quite dramatic. Thousands ofdead and dying lobsters, clams,
and starfish washed ashore in the days following the spill.130 Over one hundred
oiled sea birds were treated by wildlife rehabilitators, although the vast
majority of those birds did not survive.13l Cards Pond, one oithe coastal ponds
which breached during the spill and then dosed, trapping in large amounts of
oil, experienced a massive wildlife kill. Thousands ofdead fish, crabs, sand fleas
and other crustaceans were reported, and scientists characterized the
situation as a "massive die-off. "132
The local fishing industry, and particularly the inshore lobster fishery,
were devastated by the oil spill. A 250-square mile area of Block Island Sound
was closed to all seafood harvesting for several weeks, and shellfish harvest
was banned in all coastal ponds. An estimated 2,000 workers, primarily
128 Peter B. Lord, "Grounded barge leaks 700,000 gallons of oil," The Providence Journal
(21 January 1996): A17. -
129 Mooney, "Most of the oil got away," Al.
130 Baker, 8.
131 Michael S. Lelyveld, " Oil cleanup faces sticky problems: rescue plans change as gale
bears down on barge," Journal of Commerce (24 January, 1996): SA.
132 Tom Mooney, "Wildlife deaths horrify u.s. scientists," Providence Journal (1 February
1996): Al.
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fishermen and seafood retailers, suffered economic losses due to the closures
and public perception problems associated with the spill. 133 The commercial
fishing industry in Rhode Island employs between 3,000 and 4,000 workers,
and generates $500 million in economic activity annually. 134 Even those
fishermen who fished well beyond the closed areas suffered from the spill, both
due to consumer fears regarding any Rhode island seafood product, and
because ships which intake seawater for their fish holds were forced to avoid
even traveling through the closed areas. 135 During the weeks following the
spill, the Rhode Island Department of Health embargoed over 43,000 pounds of
lobster and 9,000 pounds of crab. Seafood harvested from beyond closed areas
was vigorously inspected as well. 136
As the environmental damage and fish kills caused by the spill were
graphically displayed in local and national media accounts, the North Cape and
Scandia both sat grounded just offMoonstone Beach. Removal ofboth tug and
barge were complicated by the rough weather which continued for days after
the spill. On January 26, the North Cape was finally removed froID its
grounding site, both the fire-torn Scandia remained within public sight until
February 12, serving as a constant reminder of the past few weeks' events. 137
133 Mooney, "Barge hard to budge: crews scramble for overnight refloating," Providence
Journal (26 January 1996): AI.
134 Elizabeth Abbott, "Fishing, lobster industries crippled," Providence Journal (22 January
1996): AI.
135 Ibid, A4.
136 Baker, 8.
137 Lelyveld, "Oil cleanup faces sticky problems," 1.
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VII. THE RHODE ISLAND SENATE'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO
THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL
The Special Senate Commission
While the Scandia and North Cape lay grounded off Moonstone Beach,
Rhode Island's political leadership had already begun to consider how and
whether the state would respond to the oil spill legislatively.138 On January
23, 1996, Senate Majority Leader Paul S. Kelly convened a Special Senate
Commission to investigate the events which led up to the North Cape oil spill,
and to identify measures which might be taken to prevent future spills in
Rhode Island waters. The Special Senate Commission Investigating the North
Cape Oil Spill was composed of eight members, and was chaired by Senator
Domenic DiSandro.139 The bipartisan committee was charged with conducting
a series of investigative hearings focused on identifying the causes of the oil
spill and evaluating the effectiveness of state-level response to the spill. The
information brought to light through these hearings was to be used by the
Commission members to determine whether the state should develop a
legislative proposal designed to protect the state against the threat of futw'e
138 See Rhode Island Senate Briefing Papel', "Legislative Response to the North Cape Oil
Spill," (Providence, R.I.:R.I. Senate Fiscal and Policy Office, 22 January 1996).
139 Senator DiSandro represented Narragansett and South Kingstown, and many of his
constituents are commercial fishermen. The other seven senators on the Special Committee
were Sen. Charles J. Fogarty (BurriviUe/Glocester), Sen. John M. Roney (Providence), Sen.
Dennis L. Algiere (Westerly), Sen. Edward F. Holland (South KingstownlNew Shoreham),
Sen. M. Teresa Paiva-Weed (NewportlJamestownlMiddletown), Sen. J. Clement Cicilline
(Newport), and Sen. Eleanor C. Sasso (Cranston).
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spills,140
The Commission conducted a series of three investigative hearings. The
first hearing occlli'red on February 2, 1996, at the Rhode Island Statehouse in
Providence, R.I., where testimony was provided by representatives of various
state and federal agencies, as well as by members of the academic
community.141 The first hearing was well-attended, and was covered
extensively by local television news stations as well as the local press. 142
After opening remarks by Senator DiSandro, stating the intention of the
Commission investigation, extensive testimony was presented by the first
witnesses, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
(DEM). DEM Director Tim Keeney coorclinated testimony which was
presented by several attorneys for the Department, as well as by personnel
who wel'e involved with the on-scene response to the North Cape spill. The
DEM testimony skirted the issue of damage assessments, noting that with
several lawsuits pending, no affirmative statements about natural resource
damages could be made. Instead, the testimony provided by DEM was
primarily descriptive, recounting the protocol followed during the response
effort.143
140 Rhode Island Special Senate Commission Investigation the North Cape oil spill, "Final
Report," (Providence, RJ.:R.I. Senate Fiscal and Policy Office, 1996),2-3.
141 Specifically, faculty members from the University of Rhode Island and the Graduate
School of Oceanography at D.R.I. were invited to testify throughout the hearing process
regarding issues within their respective areas of expertise.
142 Local television news crews representing all three of the major networks dispatched
cameras to the first hearing. In addition, press coverage was extensive in the Providence
paper as well as in other, smaller, local papers. See, for example, Mooney, "Senate
commission opens hearings on preventing spills," Providence Journal 29 January (1996): AI;
"State weighs tougher shipping regulations," The Newport CR.!.) Daily News 29 January
(1996): Cl-2.
143 Rhode Island Senate Special Commission, "Final Report," 16.
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The DEM testimony was followed by testimony from U.S. Congressman
Jack Reed, who together with Congressman Patrick Kennedy144 reintroduced
the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996 into the House of Representatives on
February 1, 1996. 145 This legislation contained safety equipment
requirements and personnel standards for uninspected towing vessels
opeTating in U.S. waters, and would have required basic safety and
navigational equipment aboard vessels such as the Scandia. In his testimony,
Congressman Reed noted that the Towing Vessel Safety Act was only the first
step, and that there was room for the state to proceed with its own course of
action to further strengthen the regulatory framework governing vessels which
transport oil through state waters.146
During the first investigative hearing, testimony was also presented by
Bruce Banks, President of Jamestown Marine Services, regarding suggested
improvements to the state's contingency planning and response preparedness.
Likewise, John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper for Save the Bay, testified
regarding the role of his organization and various volunteers working through
Save the Bay during the initial response to the North Cape Spill)47 However,
the testimony provided by Professor Dennis Nixon, from the Department of
Marine Affairs at the University of Rhode Island, served to focus the legislative
efforts of the Special Senate Commission more than any other statements
144 Congressmen Kennedy and Reed both represent the State of Rhode Island in the U.S.
House of Representatives.
145In 1994, identical legislation had been introduced by Massachusetts Congressman Gerry
Studds, however the bill never made it through Congress.
146 "Final Report," 18
147 Ibid., 16-19.
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made that day.148
In his testimony, Professor Nixon posed three questions which he
suggested that the legislators consider in designing their response to the oil
spill. Professor Nixon's first query considered why the Scandia would even
leave the safety ofport in the face of a well-forecasted, severe winter storm.149
The second question posed by Professor Nixon asked why a vessel such as the
Scandia, which had itself suffered another serious engine fire less than one
year earlier, was not equipped with a fire suppression system which could be
operated! remotely from the wheelhouse or galley,150 Finally, Professor
Nixon's testimony questioned why an unmanned, single-hulled tank barge, with
an inoperable anchor system, should be permitted to travel through state
waters loaded with four million gallons ofheating Oil.151 In discussion of this last
point, Professor Nixon noted that by operating under the conditions which led
to the spill, neither the Scandia nor the North Cape were in violation of a single
federal law. The sum effect of this testimony focused the attention of the
Commission on several key regulatory issues, including double hull
requirements for tank barges, requirements which would mandate that basic
equipment such as anchors be aboard all vessels, personnel considerations
such as placing crew aboard a tank vessel so that a spill might be avoided in
the event that a tug is disabled, and ensuring that fire suppression systems
148 Senator Domenic DiSandro and Senator Charles Fogarty, personal communication, 3
February, 1996.
149 The weather forecast had for several days prior to the Scandia's departure indicated
that a violent storm would hit southern New England on January 19,1996.
150 See Abbott, "Grounded tug has seen bottom before," Providence Journal 25 January
(1996):Cl.
151 "Final Report," 19.
42
may be remotely operated from various locations aboard towing vessels.152
Professor Nixon also suggested, in his testimony, that the Coast Guard
consider redesignating the waters of Block Island Sound as offshore rather
than "inland" waters. In inland waters, vessels may be more heavily loaded so
that they sit deeper in the water with less freeboard. Vessels that travel
through offshore waters are required to carry less cargo so that they have a
higher level of reserve buoyancy. Professor Nixon asserted that if the Coast
Guard were to change the designation of Block Island Sound, vessels which
transited Rhode Island waters would be prepared for an open-ocean journey
and be better prepared to react to the harsh winter storms such as the one
which occWTed on the 19th ofJanuary.153
The first hearing of the Special Senate Commission established a
legislative agenda for the Rhode Island Senate. Largely due to the testimony of
Professor Nixon, the legislators had now focused upon the possibility of
creating legislation which would require stricter safety standards aboard the
towing vessels and tank barges which transport oil through state waters.154
The second investigative hearing conducted by the Special Senate
Commission occurred on February 7, 1996. The testimony presented at this
hearing focused on identifying and attempting to quantify the environmental
and economic impacts of the spill. Marcel Valois, Executive Director of the
Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation (EDC), discussed the
considerable efforts which the EDC had undertaken to provide short and long-
term financial relief for those individuals and businesses who had suffered
152 Ibid., 19.
153 Ibid., 20.
154 Ibid, 21.
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losses as a result of the North Cape oil spill. Representatives of the lobster
industry and shellfish aquaculture industry testified regarding the anticipated
effects of the spill on various fisheries, especially the inshore lobster fishery. 155
Testimony was provided by Marguerite Matera of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Association (NOAA), regarding the Natural Resource Damage
Assessment protocol which is mandated by federal law.156 A representative of
the Graduate School of Oceanography at the University of Rhode Island also
read testimony regarding the various .North Cape-related research endeavors
which had been undertaken by faculty since the spill occurred. 157
The second hearing of the Special Commission helped to identify several
important issues related to the North Cape spill, such as the need for a uniform
protocol for determining whether seafood is safe for human consumption, and
providing for short-term economic relief for fishermen, similar to
unemployment benefits for which other workers qualify. However, by the time
the second Commission hearing had occurred, the Senators had already drafted
an outline of what was to become the state's legislative response to the spill.
In fact, Senator DiSandro opened the second hearing by announcing that in
response to the testimony presented at the first hearing, the Commission had
identified three major directives. The first two legislative actions proposed by
the Commission were both memorializations to the U.S. Congress, one calling
for passage of the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996, and the other asking that
155 The North Cape spill caused massive die-otis ofjuvenile lobster populations. Estimates
of the number of lobsters killed ranged from 10,000 to 100,000. It is estimated that the
impact of the North Cape lobster kill will be felt for many seasons to come, due to the large
number of juvenile or immature lobsters that washed ashore. See Abbott, "Fishing, lobster
industries crippled," Providence Journal 22 January (1996): AI.
156 "Final Report," 25.
157Assistant Dean Ken Hinga, Ibid., 26.
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the Coast Guard change the designation of Rhode Island Sound from inland to
offshore waters. The third legislative initiative identified by Senator DiSandro
in his opening remarks was to draft state legislation which would address
safety standards and operating procedures within the coastal tug and tank
barge industry. 158 All three of these directives, which followed from the
testimony at the first investigative hearing, were ultimately incorporated into
Rhode Island's legislate response to the North Cape spill.
The legislative agenda thus established, the third hearing of the Special
Senate Commission focused on specific safety measures and strategies which
might be incorporated into state legislation. Josh Fenton, a lobbyist from the
Department of Environmental Management, presented several suggestions for
regulatory and legislative action. Mr. Fenton's testimony set the tone for the
position which the DEM would assume during the course of the legislative
response. The position of the DEM, and indirectly of the Governor of Rhode
Island,159 was that any legislative action taken should not overstep the
regulatory authority of the state, and that Rhode Island should not attempt to
implement standards that would cripple the industry responsible for supplying
the state with much-needed petroleum products. Mr. Fenton suggested that
the state consider designating traffic lanes for barge traffic, and that tug
escorts be considered as one method of spill prevention, provided they could be
acquired at a reasonable rate to the vessel operator. Mr. Fenton suggested
158 "Final Report," 22.
159 In Rhode Island, the Department of Environmental Management operates at the
direction of the Executive Office. Governor Lincoln Almond is generally considered to have
significant input into policy decisions made by DEM. Because Governor Almond is a
member of the Republican party, and both houses of the Rhode Island General Assembly
have a Democratic majority, the relationship between the Executive Office and the State
legislature is often less than cooperative.
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that the state designate certain areas of the marine environment as off-limits
based on their ecological sensitivity and vulnerability to oil pollution. Mr.
Fenton's testimony contained a stern warning regarding any state-level
requirement for manning of tank bro'ges, noting that such unilateral action by
the state could lead to an embargo of Rhode Island ports by the tug and barge
industry.160
Mike Rubin, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island,
testified before the Commission regarding the contents of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, and the relationship of the federal law to the North Cape spill. Mr.
Rubin focused specifically on the claims process for individuals impacted by
the spill. The Senators questioned Mr. Rubin specifically about the legal
implications of state action in attempting to regulate the tug and barge
industry. Mr. Rubin indicated that as long as a state law or requirement does
not directly conflict with an existing federal standard, it would likely withstand
legal challenge. Mr. Rubin also indicated that, contrary to the assertions ofMr.
Fenton, anti-trust laws would preclude any industry embargo of Rhode Island
should the state implement stricter safety requirements.161
The U.S. Coast GUal"d had been invited to testify at the first hearing of
the Special Commission, however they had declined this invitation based on
advice from the U.S. Attorney regarding pending investigations and
lawsuits.162 However, at the third hearing, Captain of the Port of Providence,
CAPT Barney Turlo, U.s. Coast Guard, did present testimony regarding the
role of the Coast Guard in oil spill response efforts. Captain Turlo prefaced his
160 "Final Report," 29-30.
161 Ibid., 30-31.
162 Ibid, 16.
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remarks with the statement that he could offer very little specific commentary
regarding the North Cape spill due to pending lawsuits. In addition to describing
response protocol, Captain Turlo also discussed rulemaking initiatives
regarding towing vessel and tank barge safety, and echoed a statement made
by Vice Admiral Henn163 that a set of final rules for safety requirements
aboard U.S. towing vessels should be issued iby the Coast Guard in the summer
of 1996. Captain TurIo's testimony suggested that the federal government,
and specifically the U.S. Coast Guard, is the proper arena for creating and
enforcing vessel safety standards, and that state legislative efforts are best
focused elsewhere.164
A panel of experts from the University of Rhode Island also presented
testimony at the third hearing, as did the Manager of the Trustem National
Wildlife Refuge. Members ofthe U.R.I. panel165 discussed their assessment of
the level of natural resource injury, and Charles Hebert, from the Trustem
Wildlife Refuge recounted the natural resource injuries which he had witnessed
as well. 166 One of the experts from U.R.I., Dr. Niels West, testified regarding
163 Vice Admiral Henn is the Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. His
remarks regarding future rulemaking were issued in the context of a U.S. Senate hearing
conducted by the Committee for the Environment and Public Works. This hearing, like the
state hearings, focused on the North Cape oil spill. However, the U.S. Senate hearing
concentrated on identifying measures which would strengthen the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
A summary of this federal hearing is presented in Chapter XI, and a discussion ofthe
amendments to OPA which resulted from that hearing is presented in subsequent sections
of this chapter.
164 "Final Report," 32-33.
165 The panel from U.R.l included Professor Peter Payton, an ornithologist and resident
expert on seabird ecology, as well as Professor Joseph DeAlteris, a fisheries biologist who
conducted extensive sampling following the spill, testing the level of hydrocarbons in the
seawater and sediments at different time intervals after the oil spill.
166 Charles Hebert is the Manager of the Trustem National Wildlife Refuge, parts of which
were severely impacted by the North Cape spilt Mr. Hebert provided detailed testimony
regarding his perception of the impacts of the spilled oil on migratory bird populations, as
well as on the various species which inhabit the coastal ponds near Moonstone Beach.
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the utility of Harbor Safety Committees in promulgating safety regulations,
and many of the suggestions offered by Dr. West were ultimately incorporated
into the oil spill legislation drafted by the Commission.167
During the entire hearing process, and for many months thereafter, the
staff for the Special Senate Commission conducted extensive research into oil
pollution prevention statutes currently in place in other states. 168 The results
of this research, combined with the information gleaned through the
investigative hearing process, were compiled by the Special Commission staff
into a final document. This document is referred to as the "Final Report of the
Special Senate Commission Investigating the Implications of the North Cape
OilSpill."169 In their final report, the Special Commission describes the findings
of the investigation in terms of four major issues. 170 The Final Report then
goes on to outline the legislative proposals developed by the Commission based
on their findings. 171
The Special Senate Commission investigation yielded four significant
findings. First, the Commission determined that the coastal tug and barge
industry, as it currently operates in the United States, is highly under-
regulated.172 The Commission also notes in their findings that although it is
primarily the duty of the United States Coast Guard to promulgate regulations
167 "Final Report," 33-37.
168 Ibid., II.
169 (Providence, R.I.: Rhode Island Senate Fiscal and Policy Office, 1996).
170 "Final Report," 6-1I.
171 Ibid., 12-15.
172 Ibid., 6.
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that affect the tug and barge industry, there are important legal precedents
which allow for states such as Rhode Island to develop aggressive legislation in
order to protect valuable marine resources from the threat of oil spills.173 The
third finding of the Commission asserts that Rhode Island should follow the
example set by states such as California, Alaska, Wisconsin and Washington,
all of which have enacted aggressive pollution prevention statutes. 174 The
Commission's final finding maintains that the legislation which Rhode Island
shall propose in response to the North Cape spill should not take the place of
federal law, but that in order for the marine environment to be sufficiently
protected from the threat of future spills, tougher laws must be enacted
regionally until stricter and more effective national standards are enacted.175
Components of the Special Commission Legislative Package
The legislative package which was dI'afted in response to the North Cape
oil spill actually includes four distinct pieces of legislation. Two of the bills176
are memorializations to U.S. Congress, the first regarding reclassification of
Rhode Island coastal waters as offshore rather than inland, and the second
encouraging Congress to pass the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996.177 The
third bill included in the Rhode Island oil spill legislation expands the allowable
173 Ibid., 7.
174 Ibid., 7.
175 Ibid., 8.
176 96-S 3300 and 96-S 3301.
1n Introduced by Rhode Island Congressmen Jack Reed and Patrick Kennedy, this bill was
ultimately absorbed by the Chafee amendments to the Oil PoUution Act. See discussion in
subsequent sections of this chapter, as well as in Chapter XI of this text.
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uses ofthe Rhode Island Oil Release Response Fund to provide reliefbenefits to
individuals and industries, such as commel'cial fishermen, severely impacted
by an oil spill. 178 The amended uses of the Oil Release Response Fund would
allow for immediate availability of funding for response efforts,179 and would
also fund the development of a Safety Committee for Narragansett Bay and
Long Island Sound. 180 The newly expanded Fund, which is capped at $100
million,181 is partially financed by a five cent per barrel tax on all petroleum
products enteIing Rhode Island ports. 182
These first three legislative initiatives are considered by the Special
Senate Commission Investigating the North Cape Spill to be integI'al
components of the comprehensive oil spill prevention strategy designed by the
state.183 However, the fourth bill drafted by the Special Commission, The Oil
Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act,184 is by far the most aggressive
and controversial bill. This bill contains several equipment and manning
requirements which exceed federal standards, and these specific provisions
have ignited the greatest amount ofcontroversy regarding the appropriate role
ofstate legislation in oil pollution prevention.
17896-S 3299, See also "Final Report," 14.
179R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.7-5.1.
180R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.7-13(2).
181 R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.7-4.1(5).
182R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.7-4.1(4).
183 "Final Report," 11.
184 Hereafter, the Act shall be referred to as The Oil Spill Act.
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The Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act185
On August 9, 1996, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond signed into
law the Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act. The Governor sat at a
folding table on Moonstone Beach, near the site where t.he North Cape sat,
grounded and leaking oil, less than eight months earlier. l86 The GDvernor
characterized the new legislation as making Rhode Island tougher on the barge
industry than the federal government, and that the passage of the law set an
example for other New England states to follow. 187 Although the signing
ceremony was well-publicized and was attended by members of the Special
Senate Commission and the Department of Environmental Management,
among others, the bill caused considerable controversy as it moved through the
Rhode Island General Assembly, and came very close to dying in the House of
Representatives.188 Although all individuals in attendance at the signing
ceremony offered strong support for the new Rhode Island law, many
provisions of the law were harshly criticized by the American Waterways
Operators, an organization representing the coastal tug and barge industry.
Even the Department of Environmental Management has indicated in the
months since the law was passed that they consider certain provisions of the
185 968-3304 sub-A as amended, Rhode Island General Laws Ch. 46-12.5 (1996).
186 The signing ceremony was attended by Senators Di8andro and Fogarty, the bills' two
primary supporters, as well as Curt Spaulding, Executive Director of Save the Bay; Tim
Keeney, Director of the Department of Environmental Management; and Dennis NixOn,
Professor of Marine Affairs at the University of Rhode Island and one of the biB's most vocal
supporters. See Rowland, "R.I. toughens oil-barge rules," AI.
187 Rowland. "R.I. toughens oil-barge rules," AI.
188 Rowland, "House approves petroleum barge safety regulations," B4.
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Oil Spill Act to be flawed or inappropriate.1S9
Components o(tlie Rhode Island Oil Spill Act
Before describing the more cuntroversial elements of the Rhode Island
Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act, other compunents uf the
legislation will be su.m.mari~ed.,in urd.er to illustr-ate the comprehensive nature
of the bill. In drafting this legislation, the membeJ's of the Special Commissiun
staff were determined. tu create a document which uf'fel'ed a variety of
pleventative strategies, and which amounted to mure than a tal"geted reaction
to one specific pollutiun evellt.190 AHhough media attention generally
cOficentrated on the most controversial aspects of the Act, labeling them as
"knee-jerk" reactiOl1lS to the NOrth Cape spill,191 a brief d.escriptiun uf its
legislative cutnponerrts should demonstrate that the Oil Spill Act dues indeed.
include all assurtment of preventative ~trategies deslg1H:~d. to be effective In a
variety of scenarios.192
The Rhod.e Island Oil Spill Act begins by cteating an event l'eportillg
j'equl1-ement at the state level, whlch requires that all vessel uwneI'S ()"
opel'ators notify the Rhude Island. Department uf Environmental Ivlanagement
of SA P , te T ,«T ' ,. t to' k .• fi' "P . , . T • - J .
I ... e r Lora, aSK rorce!le up 100 aL oarge sa eLy, . rOVlaence .Journal, I une
(1996): B4. Before the Rhode Island legislation was enacted, A\'.10, in cooperation with the
Coast Guard, had organized a task force to examine towing vessel and tank barge safety
issues. One of the driving factors behind the fOi1llation of this group was the desire, on the
part of the industry, the Coast Guard, and the Rr'1ode Island DEM:, to develop tug and barge
safety measures which were more acceptable to the industry and the Coast Guard than the
Pl.l'1ode Island oil spill legislation_
190 "Final Report," 16.
191 Mooney, "Panel proposes stiffer barge rules," Providence Journal Ii February (1996):
A 1
.M..l.
192roid, 16-17.
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in the event ofany collision, allision, grounding, or discharge of oil which occurs'
when a vessel is traversing state waters.193 The Act establishes personnel
policies for vessels operating in state waters, including drug and alcohol use
prohibitions, and provisions for random testing of crewmembers for drug and
alcohol use. l94 The Act also has record-keeping requirements, which require
maintenance of personnel training and shipboard drill records aboard all
vessels operating in state waters.195
The Oil Spill Act also calls for a variety of operating procedures to be
followed by vessels which transit state waters. These include navigational
watch practices,196 the preparation of voyage plans,197 and technology
requirements which mandate that certain equipment, such as functional radar
and a global positioning systems, be present onboard all towing vessels
operating in state waters.198 The Rhode Island Oil Spill Act creates a
Narragansett BayIRhode Island Sound Safety Committee, which is an
advisory committee charged with planning for and overseeing the safe
navigation and operation of tank vessels in state waters.199
Although all of these legislative components were viewed. by the Special
Senate Commission as essential to the success of the Act as a comprehensive
193 RI.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-5.
194 R.I.G.L. ch. 46-1.2.5-18.
195 RI.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-19.
196R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-21.
197 RI.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-22.
198R.I.G.L. ch. 46-1.2.5-23.
199R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-25(5).
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pollution prevention law, there are four specific provisions which were viewed
by the legislation's creators as crucial to the Oil Spill Act's effectiveness.
These four provisions caused a great deal of protest among tug and barge
industry representatives, and remain to this day a source of controversy
among industry representatives. 200 More specifically, these provisions have
been at the center of many debates regarding the delimitation ofjurisdictional
boundaries between state and federal governments.
The first such provision requires that, as of June 1, 1997, "no tank
vessel shall transport oil or hazardous material on or over waters of the state
in conditions of limited visibility" unless the tank vessel either possesses a
double hull, or is accompanied by an escort tugboat. 201 Effective January 1,
2001, no tank vessel may transport oil through state waters in any weather
conditions unless fitted with a double hull or accompanied by a tug escort.202
This requirement exceeds the federal regulations regarding double hulls, which
do not require double hulls on most tank vessels until 2015.203
200 See discussion in Chapter XI regarding Towing Vessel Safety Quality Action Team, and
continuing efforts of the American Waterways Operators to bypass the requirements set
forth by the Rhode Island law.
201 R.LG.L. ch. 46-12.5-24(a). It should be noted that nowhere in the law is the phrase
"limited visibility" quantified or defined, and that this fact has been cited as potentially
complicating implementation of the regulation by the state.
202 R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-24(b).
203 See discussion of contents of Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Chapter V. The Act establishes
phase-in requirements for double hulls on tank vessels which would not require double hulls
on tank barges like the North Cape until 2015.
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The second controversial component of the Rhode Island oil spill law
requires that tank barges204 operating in state waters must carry two
crewmembers aboard the barge at an times. 205 At the time the legislation was
drafted, there existed no federal requirements for crewmembers aboard tank
barges during normal operations. 206 Surprisingly, one ofthe most controversial
provisions of the Rhode Island law simply requires that all tank barges
operating in state waters have an operable anchor system which may be
deployed by a crewmember. 207 This provision was so controversial among
representatives of the tug and barge industry that they successfully lobbied to
insert a provision which requires either an anchor or "another method of
retrieving a lost tow."208 The final provision of the Rhode Island law which
elicited strong industry protest requires that all towing vessels transporting
tank barges through state waters have on board functioning automated fire
and flood detection and suppression systems which may be activated by the
master or crew in event of an emergency.209
204 The law only applies to those tank barges with capacity of greater than 7500 barrels of
oil. R.I.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-21(d).
205 RI.G.L. ch. 46-12.5-21(b)(ii).
206 Approximately one month after the Rhode Island law was adopted, the Chafee
Improvements to the Oil Pollution Act were signed into law by the President. These
amendments to OPA require that tank barges can"y either two crewmembers and an
operable anchor or a barge retrieval device or comparable safety system. This new federal
regulation still falls short of an actual crew requirement aboard barges.
207RI.G.L ch. 46-12.5-23.2.
208RI.G.L ch. 46-12.5-23.2. This provision was inserted into the law during final
reconciliation of the bill between the House and Senate versions. See discussion of
differences between support for the bill in the Senate and House, supra note 211, below.
The law contains no suggestions of what "another method of retrieving a lost tow" might
include.
209 RI.G.L ch. 46-12.5-23.l(e).
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Despite the controversy which surrounded the Rhode Island oil spill bill,
only a few substantive changes were made to the legislation between May 5,
1996, when the bill was introduced into the Rhode Island Senate and August 9,
when it was signed into law by the governor. 210 However, certain provisions in
the Rhode Island law were indeed weakened due to significant protest and
lobbying by the American Waterways Operators.211 For example, the original
draft of the bill offered no phase-in period for double hulls, but required double
hulls or tug escorts for all tank vessels immediately upon enactment of the
law, which was to be January 1, 1997. Likewise, criminal penalties for
violation of requirements such as event reporting were included in the original
bill, but were omitted from the version which Governor Almond signed into law.
The changes to the language regarding anchor requirements also weakened the
law. However, the overall objective of the Special Senate Commission, to
increase the level of safety standards which apply to vessels transiting Rhode
Island waters, was reached, even by the weakened version ofthe bil1.2J?
210 Bromley, R, Rhode Island Senate Deputy Policy Advisor, personal communication, 20
August, 1996. See also Rowland, "R.I. toughens oil-barge rules," Al.
211 The Oil Spill Act easily passed the Rhode Island Senate, where it enjoyed broad~based
support from the Special Senate Commission as well as many members of the Senate
leadership. However, in the House of Representatives, where the bill had fewer vocal
supporters, industry representatives came close to completely forestalling passage of the
legislation. Instead, they were successful in convincing the House Committee which heard
the bill to soften certain provisions and change language such that the bill was considered to
most to be less aggressive than as originally written. Robert Bromley, personal
communication, 20 August (1996).
212 Robert Bromley, personal communication, 20 August, 1996.
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VITI. LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN OTHER NEW ENGLAND
STATES AND IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS IN RESPONSE
TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL
The Rhode Island General Assembly was not the only legislative body to
fashion a response to the North Cape oil spilL As the Rhode Island Oil Spill
Pollution Prevention and Control Act was being drafted by the Special Senate
Commission, a "flurry oflegislative activity" had ensued in other New England
States.213 During the 1996 legislative session, Connecticut and
Massachusetts both introduced oil spiU prevention targeting the coastal tug
and tank barge industry. In addition to these state proposals, three pieces of
federal legislation were introduced into U.S. Congress by Representatives and
Senators from the State of Rhode Island who sought to strengthen federal
regulations governing oil transportation. In reality, then, the legislative
response to the North Cape oil spin occurred on a national scale.
Massachusetts
On April 8, 1996, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs responded to the North Cape oil spill with legislation introduced into the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts General Assembly by Governor William R.
Weld. The legislation, entitled "An Act Establishing Safety Requirements for
Tank Barges," was characterized by Governor Weld as "provide[ing] the coast
and waters of Massachusetts with enhanced protection by requiring barges
213 Thomas, " Spill response: legislators set sights on tank barge operators," Workboat
July/August, (1996): 36.
57
transporting petroleum and other hazardous materials to be manned and to
have operating anchor systems."214 This description effectively summarizes
the contents of the Massachusetts oil spill bill, House Bill 5938, which contains
only two requirements: that all tank barges operating in Massachusetts
waters be equipped with and operable anchor system215 and that all such tank
barges also be manned.216 The manning requirement in the Massachusetts
bill, which does not specify how many crewmembers must be aboard the
vessel, does not apply to tank barges which are equipped with double hulls.217
On May 7, 1996, a hearing was held on House Bill 5938 by the
Massachusetts General Assembly Joint Committee on Natural Resources and
Agriculture. Testimony was presented by various environmental
organizations, including the Conservation Law Foundation and Save the Bay.
Likewise, representatives of the Rhode Island Senate Fiscal and Policy Office,
as well as the University of Rhode Island Department of Marine Mfairs
presented testimony regarding the contents of the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act,
and amendments which would make the Massachusetts bill more compatible
with certain aspects of the Rhode Island bil1.218
A representatives of the American Waterways Operators, Vice
President Linda O'Leary, presented testimony maintaining, as she had before
214 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of EnvironmentaI Affairs, "Letter of
Submittal accompanying House Bill No. 5938," (Commonwealth of Massachusetts General
Assembly, 4 April, 1996).
215 House Bill No. 5938, to amend Chapter 21 of the (',-eneral Laws of Massachusetts, sec.
50C(a)(1).
216 Ibid, sec. 50C(a)(2).
217 Ibid, sec. 50C(b).
218 The author was among the witnesses invited to testify at this hearing, and therefore
heard firsthand the testimony summarized herein.
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the Rhode Island legislature, that any attempts by state government to
regulate the tug and barge industry were unconstitutional intrusions into an
area of maritime law strictly reserved for federal jurisdiction.219 The AWO
representative also maintained that the coastal tug and barge industry is
highly self-regulated, and that although there are no statutory requirements
for double hulls or anchors, most barge operators already posses such safety
equipment. This assertion by the industry representative prompted
Representative Barbara Gray, chairwoman of the Joint Committee on
Natural Resources and Agriculture, to question why the tug and barge industry
so vehemently opposed the Massachusetts and Rhode Island bins, when many
of the requirements of the Massachusetts bill represent common operating
procedure. Ms. O'Leary responded to this inquiry by reasserting the AWO
position that the federal government should be the sole source of regulation for
the coastal tug and barge industry. 220 The issues raised during the hearing on
the Massachusetts bill were generally similar in nature to those raised during
hearings on the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act.
The Massachusetts tank barge legislation never passed the General
Assembly, and in fact was not considered a legislative priority by the
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs(EOEA). There are two reasons why
House Bill 5938 was not aggressively pushed through the Massachusetts
General Assembly. First, another piece of environmentally significant
21 9 Linda O'Leary, "Statement of the American Waterways Operators before the
Massachusetts General Assembly Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture,"
(Boston, Massachusetts: 7 May, 1996).
220 Ibid.
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legislation was given top priority by the EOEA.221 More importantly to the
discussion at hand, one of the most significant outcomes of the Joint
Committee hearing on House Bill 5938 was the realization by the Committee
members in Massachusetts that the Rhode Island oil spill bill was more
broadly focused than the Massachusetts bill, and that Massachusetts might
be best served by adopting additional oil spin prevention policies similar to
those contained in the Rhode Island bill. The unofficial decision, then, within
the Massachusetts General Assembly, was to watch closely the progress of
the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act through that state's General Assembly. Once a
final version of the Rhode Island bill was enacted, Massachusetts would
consider drafting a more comprehensive bill which complemented the
provisions of the Rhode Island Act.222 Unfortunately, the Rhode Island bill was
not enacted until very late in the 1996 legislative session, at which point the
final date for introduction of new legislation into the Massachusetts General
Assembly had passed.223
Connecticut
The State of Connecticut General Assembly initially responded to the
North Cape spill with an aggTessive bill entitled "An Act Concerning Pilotage
221 The Rivers Bill, as it was known, was a legislative priority of the Mass. EOEA, and the
efforts of staffmembers as well as environmental lobbyists were primarily focused on
passing the Rivers Bill. The tank barge legislation was considered a secondary priority.
Martin Suuberg, General Counsel for Mass. EOEA, personal communication, 29 May (1996).
222 Suuberg, personal communication, 29 May (1996).
223 Ibid.
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and Safety Requirements for Certain Tank Vessels."224 This bill required that
all tank barges transporting oil or petroleum liquids through state waters be
equipped with a double hu1l225 and a "redundant working ground tackle," or
anchor, which was of sufficient quality to hold a fully-laden barge during a
storm.226 The bill also required that all tank vessels operating in state waters
be equipped with an emergency response positioning beacon which could
transmit information regarding a vessel's position in case of a lost-barge
emergency.227 In addition to these navigational aids, the Connecticut bill
required that towing vessels and tank barges transporting oil through state
waters both be equipped with fire suppression systems.228 The final provision
of the bill required that no towing vessel or tank barge should refuse the
assistance of another vessel if the towing vessel or tank barge was in distress
and posed an imminent threat to the public health or safety due to the
possibilityofgrounding, sinking, or spilling oiL 229
224 Raised bill no. 365, February, (1996).
225 Ibid., Sec. 1(1).
226 Ibid., Sec. 1(2).
227 Ibid., Sec. 1(3).
228 Ibid., Sec. 2.
229 Ibid., Sec. 3. Following the North Cape spill, there was considerable public concern as to
whether assist tugs were dispatched readily to the scene of the accident. Local media
accounts reported that the burning Scandia had refused the assistance of a tug which was
docked in nearby Jamestown, R.I. In fact, the Captain of the Port of Providence, who was in
charge of the response command, reports that the severe weather forced several assist tugs
which had been dispatched to the scene of the Scandia to turn back, and that the burning
tug had not, in fact, refused the assistance of a rescue tug. See Thomas, "Spill response,"
36.
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This Connecticut bill, which contained a stronger double-hull
requirement than either Massachusetts or Rhode Island,23o was significantly
modified by the Connecticut General Assembly. The legislature ultimately
passed a bill231 which simply calls for the formation of a standing committee
to evaluate the feasibility of developing state regulations which target towing
vessels and tank barges operating in state waters.232
The Kennedy-Reed Bills
While legislative activity abounded in the New England states in the
months following the North Cape oil spill, several legislative initiatives were
introduced into the United States Congress as well. Two such legislative
proposals which focused specifically on operational and structural measures on
board towing vessels and tank barges were introduced into the 104th Congress
by the Representatives from Rhode Island. The Reed-Kennedy bills, which
include the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996 and the Barge Safety Act of
1996, were introduced into the House of Representatives by Representatives
Jack Reed and Patrick Kennedy.233
230 Massachusetts did not have an explicit double hull requirement, although the
Commonwealth exempted operators of double hull vessels from manning and anchor
requirements. The Rhode Island law, as originally drafted, required double-hulls unless
vessels were accompanied by an escort tug, and this provision was eventually weakened by
a phase-in period. The Connecticut bill offered no alternative to double hulls and did not
provide for any phase-in period.
231 Substitute Senate Bill No. 365.
232Mooney, "Three states look for ways to stop oil spills," Providence Journal 11 March
91996): Bl.
233 Congressmen Reed and Kennedy both represent the State of Rhode Island in the House
of Representatives.
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On January 31, 1996, Reed and Kennedy introduced their first
legislative response to the North Cape spill, the Towing Vessel Safety Act of
1996. The 1996 version of this bill represented the third time that towing
vessel safety legislation had been introduced into the United States Congress.
Representative Gerry Studds had introduced bills in both 1993 234 and 1994235
which would have increased safety l'equil'ements for towing vessels. The
Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996 was identical to the version introduced in
1994, and contains both equipment and licensing requirements for towing
vessels.236
The Reed-Kennedy Towing Vessel Safety Act required that towing
vessels be equipped with navigational equipment such as a functioning radar,
elecemnic posisiton-fixing device, and a compass or swing meter.237 The Act
contained expedited casualty reporting requirements which raised the
maximum penalty for not reporting a marine casualty from $1,000 to
$25,000.238 The Towing Vessel Safety Act also directs the Secretary of
234 The 1993 initiative to introduce towing vessel safety legislation was a response to two
recent tug and barge casualties. The first occurred when a towing vessel pushing a hopper
barge in New Orleans, Louisiana, struck a bridge, casing the bridge to collapse and kill a
pregnant woman. The second casualty involved an Amtrak train accident near Mobile,
Alabama earlier that year when a towing vessel struck a railroad bridge. The bridge
collapse from the impact of he allision, and shortly thereafter an AMTRAK passenger train
plunged off the bridge and into the water killing forty-seven people.
235 After an unsuccessful at.tempt to pass the towing vessel safety legislation in 1993,
Congressman Studds reintroduced similar legislation during the following year. Again, the
need for such legislation was punctuated by a January, 1994 oil spill which occun'ed off the
coast of Puerto Rico when a barge broke away from its towing vessel twice during one tow,
and ultimately grounded on a coral reef, spilling 750,000 gallons of heavy oil onto six miles
of pristine beaches.
236 John Mulligan, "Reed, Kennedy offer bill tightening tugboat rules," Providence Journal 1
February (1996): C3.
237 Towing Vessel Safety Ad of 1996, Sec. 2(f)(1)(C).
238Ibid., Sec.3(b).
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Transportation to develop licensing requirements for masters and mates of
towing vessels, and requires that all tugboats have a licensed operator
onboard.239 Finally, the Towing Vessel Safety Act mandates that the Coast
Guard conduct inspection of towing vessels.24o Such inspections are currently
conducted by other members of the towing vessel industry.241
In the press release which announced the introduction of the Towing
Vessel Safety Act of 1996, Representative Reed stated that "the owners of
tugboats must be held more accountable regarding safety procedures...These
regulations are long overdue. Similar legislation has been introduced in the
past, but it has not been approved."242 Representative Kennedy added, "This
legislation is an important first step in prevention accidents like the North
Cape oil spill."243
On March 5, 1996, Representatives Kennedy and Reed introduced a
second bill into Congress which responded to issues raised by the North Cape
spill.244 The Barge Safety Act of 1996 was intended to complement the
provisions of the Towing Vessel Safety Act, by instituting safety measures for
the tank barges transported by towing vessels. This bill targeted tank barges
239Id., Sec.6.
240Id., Sec.7.
241 Various Class Societies, such as the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), currently
conduct inspections of towing vessels, however the ABS and other vessel class societies are
private organizations which conduct voluntary inspections, and which have no regulatory
authOlity.
242 "Legislation Introduced to establish regulations for safety, licensing, inspecting of
tugboats," 31 January (1996). Press Release.
243 Ibid.
244 Mooney, "Precautionary Step: Reed, Kennedy seek more oil-barge controls," Providence
Journal 2 March (1996): A3.
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which carry oil or hazardous material through U.S. waters, requiring that all
such vessels be equipped with an operable anchor system245 and be
manned.246 The manning requirement in the Barge Safety Act does not apply
to double-hulled barges. 247 The Act also directs the Secretary of
Transportation to issue regulations regarding dimensions for anchoring
equipment and training requirements for individuals manning tank barges.248
Neither the Towing Vessel Safety Act nor the Barge Safety Act ever
made it through Congress as such. Both bills were effectively absorbed by the
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act249 introduced by Senator
Chafee in an attempt to amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The Oil Spill
Prevention and Response Improvement Act was, in turn, incorporated into the
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996.250 By the time the two Reed-Kennedy
bills were incorporated into the Coast Guard Authorization Act, most of the
strongest legislative provisions originally contained in the bills had been
removed or altered. A discussion of the oil spill prevention measures which
were ultimately enacted as part of the Coast Guard Authorization Act will
follow. First, however, a brief summary win be presented of the history and
contents of the Chafee amendments to the OPA 90.
245 Barge Safety Act, Sec. 2(a)(1).
246 Ibid., Sec. 2(a)(2).
247 Id.,Sec. 2(b).
248 Id., Sec. 2(c). It is interesting to note that the tank barge bill which was introduced in
the Massachusetts legislature is identical in working to the Barge Safety Act introduced into
Congress by Kennedy and Reed.
249 S. 1730 (1996).
250 S. 1004 (1996).
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The Chafee Amendments to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
"Mr. President, with passage ofthe Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, the environment in which shippers ofoil
[operate]will change dramatically.. J am very pleased
that we are not waiting for another World Prodigy251,
which next time...may occur in the midst of a winter
storm, instead of on a sunny afternoon. This legislation
will help us prevent and respond more effectively to oil
spills and represents a major legislative achievement
of this Congress."252
The above statement, offered by Rhode Island Senator John Chafee in
1990 in support of the Oil Pollution Act, is wrought with ironies which the
Senator could scarcely imagine as he made this remark. The irony lies in the
fact that, six and a half years after the World Prodigy spill, "in the midst of a
winter storm," the State of Rhode Island experienced a spill the size and
impact of which has effectively eclipsed the World Prodigy event. Less than
six years after the U.S. Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the
tank barge North Cape grounded off ofMoonstone Beach, within direct sight of
Senator Chafee's Rhode Island summer home.
The state and federal agencies who were involved in the cleanup and
response effort following the North Cape spill generally agree that the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 provided for response protocol which led to a more
efficient and effective response than was provided after the World Prodigy
2510n June 23, 1989, the Greek-flagged tanker World Prodigy hit Brenton Reef and spilled
almost 300,000 gallons of home heating oil into the waters of Narragansett By, R.l. The
World Prodigy was one of three spills in U.S. waters which occurred during that weekend in
June, 1989. The cumulative effect of these three spills which occUlTed within months of the
Exxon Valdez spill, helped to maintain the momentum in Congress which led to the passage
ofOPA 90.
252 Statement of Rhode Island Senator John Chafee, OPA 90 Conference Report, 10 July,
1990. 136 Cong. Rec. S 11536 (1990).
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event.253 Likewise, the many residents and businesses within the state which
were negatively impacted by the North Cape spill may fIle claims against the
responsible party and may recover damages more readily today than before
OPA was passed.254 In these respects, then, Senator Chafee's confidence in
the improvements which OPA would bring about in the wake of a serious spill
wasjustified. 255 However, as many experts in the fields of maritime law and
policy, environmental protection, and pollution prevention, have asserted, OPA
90 did virtually nothing to prevent this and other tank barge spills from
occurring in U.S. waters.256 This assertion is central to the legislative
response which the state of Rhode Island has drafted in the wake of the North
Cape spill.
At the same time that the Rhode Island Senate was designing a
legislative package to strengthen oil pollution prevention laws in that state,
Senator Chafee began his own investigation into different mechanisms for
improving the federal Oil Pollution Act. On February 14, 1996, Senator Chafee
253Charles Hebert, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Tim Keeney, Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management, and Captain Barney Turlo, U.S. Coast Guard, formal
testimony before the Rhode Island Special Senate Commission investigating the North Cape
Oil spill. Providence, R.I.: (February 2, 1996), unpublished. See also Morgan, 16.
254 OPA 90 allows for more expansive categories of claims than were generally recognized by
the courts before this law was enacted. For example, the responsible party is now liable for
claims resulting in purely economic losses. (33 U.S.C. 2702(b)(2)(E). Before OPA, the courts
generally applied the Robin's Dry Dock rule, which is a general principle of admiralty law
which prevents the recovery of purely economic or financial injury when there has been no
injury to property. See Eubank, 154, for discussion of this issue.
255 The author is aware that in May, 1996, Senator Chafee introduced legislation which
would amend OPA90. This biB contains equipment requirements, incentives for early
phase-in of double hulled vessels, and stronger mandates for development of Coast Guard
towing vessel safety regulations. This author recognizes that if passed, the Chafee bill will
make certain state policies redundant of federal law, and therefore eliminate the need for
certain state requirements.
256 Dennis Nixon, formal testimony before the Rhode Island Special Senate Commission
investigating the North Cape on spill. Providence, R.I.: (February 2, 1996), unpublished.
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held a field hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Environment and
Public Works, which the Rhode Island Senator chairs. The field hearing was
held in the Narragansett, R.I., town haH, and Senator Chafee, together with his
feBow Committee member Senator Joseph Lieberman from Connecticut,
convened three panels of experts from the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Association, the American Waterways Operator, the
University of Rhode Island, Save the Bay, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Se1"Vice, among others.257 Senator Chafee's mission in conducting the field
hearing was similar to the mission of the Rhode Island Senate Special
Commission: to identify the causes of the North Cape oil spill and to improve
the ability to respond to and prevent future oil spills. 258 Senator Chafee
sought specifically to identify mechanisms for strengthening the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990.259
Senator Chafee began the hearing with an opening statement which
emphasized the connection between a healthy environment and a healthy
economy. For this reason, Senator Chafee suggested that the committee would
like to focus the hearing on identifying any legislative response that might
strengthen the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 COPA) and aid in the
prevention offurther devastating spills.260 Representative Jack Reed was also
in attendance at the Senate hearing, and offered opening remarks to the effect
257 Kolo Kerest, "Federal Hearing in Narragansett seeks answers from oil spill,"~
Island Times 17 February (1996): A7.
258 Statement ofU.S. Senator John H. Chafee before the Field Hearing of the U.S. Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, Narragansett, R.I.: 14 February (1996).
Photocopied.
2591bid.
260ld.
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that the North Cape spill had provided the Committee with an opportunity to
assess the effectiveness of OPA 90, and that the Senate Committee should
take advantage of that opportunity.261
Among the first witnesses to testify before the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee were Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond, and
DEM Director Tim Keeney. Both commented on the overall success of
response efforts, and the Governor expressed his concerns that commercial
fishermen be duly compensated for their losses due to the oil spill. Director
Keeney presented testimony regarding hydrocarbon testing protocol for
reopening ofclosed areas to shellfishing.
Vice Admiral Artur E. Henn, Vice Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard, testified next, responding to questions from the Senators
regarding the rulemaking record of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Admiral
attempted to explain how the Coast Guard has fallen so far behind in meeting
the rulemaking deadlines specified by OPA 90.262 The Senator asked the Vice
Admiral why the Coast Guard is almost five years late 263 in implementing
interim regulations for single-hulled tank vessels.264 The Vice Commandant
responded to the Senator's questioning by assuring the Senator that new rules
for safety standards aboard uninspected towing vessels would be issued by the
261 Statement of U.S. Representative Jack Reed before the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee field hearing, 14 February (1996), photocopied.
262 Kerest, A7.
263 OPA 90 directed the Coast Guard to develop interim rules for oil-carrying vessels by
August, 1991.
264 Mooney, "Committee grills Coast Guard over delay in new safety rules," Providence
Journal 15 February (1996): Bl.
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summer of 1996, and indeed this goal has been at least partially satisfied.265
Senators Chafee and Lieberman heard testimony from many other
witnesses during the February field hearing, and the general tone of the
testimony provided seemed to suggest that, although the response to the North
Cape oil spill was far more organized than the response to the World Prodigy
spill, which occuned before OPA 90, there is still room for improvement of the
federallaw. 266 Senator Chafee held other follow-up hearings in Washington,
D.C., during the next few months. 267 The end result of this hearing process
was the introduction of The Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement
Act, S. 1730, into the second session of the 104th Congress. The Act directly
responded to many of the issues brought to light by the North Cape spill, and
specifically attempted to improve federal regulations governing towing vessels
and tank barges.268
The stated purpose of the Oil Spill Prevention and Response
Improvement Act, as originally drafted, was "to amend the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 to enhance prevention and improve response to oil spills and to ensure
that citizens and communities affected by an oil spill receive prompt and fuB
265A final rule on navigational safety equipment for towing vessels was issued on July 3,
1996. A proposed rule was also issued by the Coast Guard in June of 1996 regarding
licensing requirements for towing vessel mates and masters (33 CFR Part 164). However,
the Coast Guard has not issued any rules, to date, on structural measures for improving
towing vessel safety.
266 Crow, "Spill Response," Oil and Gas Journal 94 no. 13 (1996): 33.
267 Both hearings were held in Washington, D.C., one on March 27,1996, and the next on
June 4, 1996.
268 Crow, "Spill Response," 33.
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compensation."269 The Improvement Act was organized into two titles, the
first270 addressing prevention measures and the second 271 focusing on
improving response capabilities. It is the contents of the first title of the
Chafee Improvement Act which is relevant to this discussion of federal
regulation ofoil transportation industries.
The first section includes interim measures for single-hull tank vessels
which are in excess of 5,000 gross tons. This section primarily focuses on
ensuring a timely implementation offinal rules for operational and structural
measures aboard single-hulled tank vessels over 5,000 gross tons. The
Improvement Act contained deadlines of July 18, 1996 for issuance of a final
operational rule, and December 18, 1996, for issuance of a final structural rule
for single-hulled vessels. 272 The language in 8.1730 stated that if the
Secretary of Transportation did not issue these final rules within 59 months of
the July 18 deadline and within 64 months of the December 18 deadline, then
the proposed rules for each of these measures would automatically go into
effect.273 This automatic triggering ofproposed rules ifno final rules are issued
was intended to serve as an incentive to the Coast Guard to develop final rules
269 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, "Outline of Oil
Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act," May 6 (996), photocopied.
270U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, S. 1730, Title I,
"Enhancing Spill Prevention," (1996).
271 S. 1730, Title II, "Improving Response to Oil Spills," (1996).
272 The deadline for operational measures has been satisfied, at least in part, with the
issuance of the Final Rule on navigational safety equipment for towing vessels issued July
3, 1996. See supra note 266.
273 S. 1730, Title I sec. 101 0-2).
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in accordance with these new deadlines.274
Title I of S.1730 also contained a requirement that single-hull tank
vessels have either a crew member and operable anchor on board the vessel, or
have an emergency barge retrieval system or some "other measure" which
provides "comparable protection."275 This language, of course, is quite a bit
weaker than the manning and anchor requirements in the Rhode Island law,
however it at least addresses the issue of crew and anchors aboard single-
hulled tank vessels. Previous to the Improvement Act, there existed no federal
standards for crew and anchors on barges. 276 Finally, Section 101 of Title I of
the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act directs the Secretary
of Transportation to consider, in issuing rules, not only those measures which
are determined to be cost-effective, but also measures which protect human
safety, prevent collisions, and reduce oil outflow after a collision has occurred.
Although this is not a specific rulemaking directive, it reinforces the idea that
Congressional intent is to provide for effective oil spill prevention and that
economic feasibility should not be the deciding factor in issuing safety
directives.277
The second section of Title I of the OPA Improvement Bill creates an
incentive for shippers to convert to double-hulled vessels. The environmental
274 Odell, Steve, General Counsel for Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
personal communication, 24 May, (1996).
275 S. 1730, Title I, Sec. 101(3).
276 Odell, "Draft outline of OPA oil Spill Prevention, Enhancement and Response
Improvement Bill," February (1996), photocopied.
277 Odell, personal communication, 24 May, (1996). The Coast Guard is often criticized for
tending to weight economic considerations of the impact of proposed rules on the oil
transportation industry more heavily than environmental protection concerns. See Alcock.
124-140.
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protection community responded particularly favorably to this prOVISIOn
because it attempts to speed up the phase-in process for double hulls by
providing for liability incentives for operators of double-hulled vessels.
Specifically, this section states that shippers who operate double-hull vessels
are not subject to liability above a $5 million cap unless they engage in gross
negligence or willful misconduct. The liability cap cannot be pierced for
operators of double hull tankers in cases of violation of applicable safety,
construction, or operating requirements.278
Title I of S.1730 also contains a section which addresses towing vessel
safety issues. Again, the focus of this section is on ensuring that the Coast
Guard meet final rulemaking requirements. In the case of safety rules for
uninspected towing vessels, the OPA Improvement Bill requires that the
Secretary of Transportation issue a final rule by September 30, 1996. This
section further requires that in developing this final rule, the Secretary
consider requirements for fire-suppression equipment.279 The final section of
the OPA Improvement Act which addresses oil spill prevention cans for
additional studies and research by the Secretary of Transportation and the
Army Corps of Engineers. 280 Specifically, the bill calls for the Secretary to
direct a study regarding the designation of shipping lanes for oil transportation
as one method of reducing the risk of oil spills to the coastal environment. The
Army Corp of Engineers are also directed by Congress to study the findings of
a Rhode Island Commission studying the feasibility ofdredging the Providence
River Channel, in order to identify whether such dredging would reduce the level
278 S. 1730, Title I, Sec. 102 (1).
279 S. 1730, Title I, Sec. 101(2).
280 S. 1730, Title I, Sec. 104.
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of tank barge traffic and thus reduce the threat of coastal oil spills in Rhode
Island.281
The provisions of the OPA 90 Improvement Act, though not as strong in
language and intent ofmany of the provisions of the Rhode Island law, 282 were
nonetheless considered to offer real possibilities for improving the federal Oil
Pollution Act. Early drafts ofS.1730 were extremely aggressive, and contained
a provision which sped up the timetable for implementation of double hull
requirements for every month that the Coast Guard lagged behind on issuing
final rules for single-hulled vessels. However, many of the most aggressive
provisions of the Improvement Act were removed from the version of the OPA
90 amendments which were ultimately adopted by Congress.283 The OPA 90
improvement provisions were signed into law by President Clinton in October
of 1996 as part of the Coast Guard Authorization Act.284
281 For the duration of the Rhode Island legislative response to the North Cape spill, the
dredging issue came up as a possible "solution." Proposals to dredge the Providence River
channel have been fiercely debated in the State of Rhode Island for over two decades. Due
to a high level of contamination in the sediments in Upper Nan-agansett Bay, the problems
associated with siting these toxic dredge spoils has repeatedly slowed the progress of
dredging projects. Proponents of dredging attempted to use the North Cape oil spill as
further evidence of the need to dredge, citing as a reason the fact that petroleum products
must come into Rhode Island via tug and barge because the channel depth is too shallow to
allow navigation of tankers. However, this argument has been countered by many who
assert that oil is transported along the Northeastern coast by tug and barge for purely
economic reasons, because they are cheaper to operate than tankers, and regardless of
whether the Upper Narragansett Bay is dredged to accommodate tankers, tug and barges
will continue to dominate oil transportation in the Northeast. See Mooney, "Senate
commission opens hearings on oil spills," Providence Journal 3 February (1996): Al.
282For example, manning and anchor requirements in S. 1730 were weaker than the Rhode
Island bill, and S.1730 offered incentives for double hull implementation, but did not
provide for a speed up of phase-in periods, as did the Rhode Island law.
283 Odell, "Draft outline of OPA Oil Spill Prevention, Enhancement and Response
Improvement Bill," February (1996), photocopied.
284 S.1004 (1996).
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The Coast Guard Authorization Act
The legislative response of the United States Congress to the North
Cape oil spill was initially quite impressive. Between the provisions of the
Reed-Kennedy towing vessel and tank barge bills, and the OPA improvement
provisions in Senator Chafee's legislation, many of the provisions of the Rhode
Island oil spill act were addressed, in some form, by these federal legislative
proposals. Had all three bills been adopted in their original forms, towing
vessels transiting Rhode Island waters, as well as the territorial waters of all
other U.S. states, would be forced to carryon board basic navigational
equipment as wen as functional fire suppression equipment. Likewise,
adoption of the Barge Safety Act would have ensured that all tank barges
entering Rhode Island waters either carried crew aboard, or were equipped with
double hulls. All tank barges would carry operable anchors. The Chafee
amendments to the on Pollution Act of 1990, as originally drafted, provided
incentives for early implementation of double-hulled vessels, and would have
forced the Coast Guard to complete rulemaking requirements in a timely
manner.285
Unfortunately, rather than enacting each of the three bills described
above separately, and thus providing several additional layers of oil spill
prevention at the federal level, these three bills were fused and incorporated
into the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1990. During the process of
combining these legislative proposals, many of the most important prevention
measures contained in each bill were removed.286 The oil spill prevention
285 See discussion of contents of these three bills in previous sections of this chapter.
286 John Torgan and Steve Odell, personal communication, September, 1996.
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measures which we mco orate . to t e oast nard Authorization Act of
1996 are, inreality, quite minim al.
e ator Chafee announced the ado tion of the oil spill prevention
1m. rovement measures in the Coast Guard Authorization Act with the
following statements,
"On the prevention side... PA can, and sho be
strengthened so that we can avoid having to re Onl
to an oil s ill at all. e recent spills have only served.
to underscore the need for mo e effective ~revention
measures.. " though the best way to prevent s ills
from vesse s is to e uip them with double hulls, it is
quite expensive 0 build a new double- :un vessel or
to retrofit a single hull vesse with a second hull. "287
Senatol' C afee also state a: because of the considerable costs associated
with implementation of double hulls, when Congress enacted OPA 90, they
instructed the Coast Guar 0 issue rules which wo d increase safety
measures on existing single-hulle vessels. '!he Senator then explained that,
although t e provisions originally writte into teO improvement act,
which would have penalized. the Coast Guard for no meeting new rul.em.aking
dea . es, were not resen in the Coast Guard Authoriza .on Act, there is a
firm ex ectation in Washington that the Coast uard will honor its
commitment to implement rules fa' structural safe y meaSlU'es on board
single-hulled tank vessels b December, 1996.288
e assortment oflegislative provisions origin present in the Towing
Vessel and Barge Safety Acts, and in the Oil ill Prevention and Res onse
1m rovement Act were reduced to two major oil sp' prevention provisions
incorporated into the Coast Guard Authorization Act, First, the Coas Guard
287 ong. Re '., 28 p (1996); 1l 795.
288 Ibid.," 79
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A t re uires at tank. esse oper III in U.8. W LeI'S - eQwlPped ·t.h
ei' her an opel-able anchor and crew to d 10 " " 0 an e ,erg cy retrieval
t '.' " " nnt'l " ..... '1 ~ur "y5 em WILn 110 crew WJoaru L 1 JJarge,.=A7\J or a C-OmpaiClO e m as e llch
will 0 ct ag . at groW1Wng of tl e barge. 291 TIm. 19uage .is fair: vague,
and rtairu Wls shor' of' posing i her an aetnal anoing re uirement 0
an anchor re uirement. Tank barges may continuE:: to upe ate:in U. 8. waters if
the are fi.:'!:,te ., t' , t nrv:-. 'le '1 na e J:1eYaL S S eu""'''' o' comparao measur. 1 e sec-ona
majo oil ollution revention provision con ained in he Coast G ard
Auth ization Act reads, "1 e ecr tary require...the use of a fire
su ression syst m or ot er measures to provide adequate asistance so that
a e on oard a to' ve se th .s towing a no - elf-pro eUed tank vessel
can be su esged under reasonabl fo -ese ab circumstances."29(3
'Ib.e federal legislative t·o osal drafted' es onse t the North Cape
oil spill were effectively reduced .from doubl hull in entiv s and mannin
equirement8 to a requireme t for a fire
of barge r tri aI. The en
1996, the effe t8 'ttl cane in t e am..ewor
governing oil s ill even'on.
289 . 1004, Sec 01 a)(l)
tem d some etho
d Authorization Act of
f e era! r~.--.tio s
290 Ibid., . 901(a)(2).
291 Ibid., ....ee. 902 ().
292 R tri v may oft n b a ~ .~ 1e as an a to lin .. g off a barge in a
maUl' l -b that it may be a . _ by ana her tug in an m gelley situation. I i~
d.i cult to imagine how such a m ham could be consi ered effecti e as n anchor in
• lowing th progre - ofa runaway bar fl, especially since a retrieval evice of any sort
uirehe presenc'€! a anoth-r ve.sel mploy.
293 . 1004, ec. 902( ( )
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IX. J DI 101 AL NFLICTS IN POLLUTIO PREVENTIO
ENVIRONME TAL OR MARITIME LAW.
Admiral risdiction, eemption, an the Oil Pollution Act of1
he Federal Ad,II.iJ·alty JUJ'isdic 'on
e United States Constitution bestows u on the federal court system
'm.isdiction over "all admil.·alty and maritime cases."294 The U.S. legal system
has historicall recognized the ne for "harmony and mriformity" of national
m8.1itime law, and for this reason the United States Congress possesses the
timate authority to establish nation maritime aw and policies. 5 When
the Congress as not legislated on a partie ar maritime issue, the federal
courts oft ecome e source 0 maritime la: 296
Although it is well-recognized that a state-based scheme for admiralty
uris .ction would tlueaten the uniform nature of maritime law and thus
intelfere "th interstate commerce, states are not comp etely precluded from
enacting laws which effect maritime commerce. While he onstitution
rovides for the exclusivel federal nature of admiralty jurisdiction, the U.S.
court system as recognized., through a long history of case holdings, that there
are occasions where a state may legally regulate or legislate with regard to
issues ofmaritime aw.QS7
294 ec.2.
295Eubank, 156.
296 Ibid.
297 'I'hi . law, wru·h in Lud ut i' no Limi d to Cooley u. Board ofWardens, 3 U.
299 ( 851); Kell~ u. Washington. 8 2 .". 1 (1987); Huron Cement v. Detroit, 36.... U .. 4 0
(l 60)' and Askew u. merican Waterways Operators, U.S.32 (1973); will pI S nted
in fi l" hcoming . ections of le te f tiris papet·
7
Despite the existence of . e of case aw, which serves to protect the
ability of the state to regulate its intel'ests in areas generally reserved for
admir :ty jurisdiction, a great deal ofcon oversy continues to ffiIITOund
the question of where and when state egulatory powers should yield to
admiralty 'urisdiction, and. where this ederaljurisdiction should efer to state
aw. Critics of the preemption exce tions contained in the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 ave ex-pressed the view that by rotecting state aw from federal
preemption under OPA, the constitutional foundation for maintaining
admiralty jurisdiction as strictly fe eral is being undermined. One aut or
writes that 'while OPA 90 thus contributes to the uniformity of environmental
law, it tlll'eatens the general harmony an uniformity' of national maritime
law."298
Preanption
In order to underst the implications of the non- reem tion
provisions which were ultimately incorporated into the Oil ollution Act of
990, a rief exp ation of the octrine of preemption, as it relates to
maritime law and pollution prevention, is appropriate. The United States
Constitution299 grants wer to the ongress to preempt state laws in order
298 E bank, 153.
299 Artiel 6, th upr lause. i generally r cognized a th >l0' C ofpreemptive
powe-t. Ho rever, I'here do s e•. s a disparity f opinion, 8110ng 1 gal scholal s, about this
fac with certain authors citing ilia omrn rce lanse i aetna y the portion of the
Constitution fron which pt mptioJl po.. r i rived. This conflic of opinion i duly n 1,
however it i beyond th op of thi ~ work to addres'" thi disparity. For a more tho oug
dbcu 'on of U e.:-e j . ues, s e St.even A Gardbaum, '"TI nature ofpreempLion," ornelJ
L Re °e 7: 768-77 (1994.
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to reserve consistent and effective national standards.300 The existence of
r-eem tion in a given area of law is determined b Congl'eSB in one of three
generally recognized ways. Preemption ma be indicated by direct
CongTessional intent, by implied intent, or through "conflict preemption." In
the first ca e, Congress will explicitly state that it intends for certain
legislation to preempt all state law in that area '!be second condition, implied
intent, has also been called "field preemption." Field preemption occurs when
federal legislation in a certain area is so com rehensive that it does not allow
roo for an state legislation in that area. Conflict reem tion occurs when
state and federal laws conflict in a given area. In such an instance, the
Constitu 'on rovides for federal preemption of state law.SOl
Conflict preemption is an extension of the doctrine of federal supremacy.
Both principles provide for a resolution of any potential conflicts which might
occur as the result of concurrent federal and state jmisdictions. The first two
forms of preemption, e ress and implied intent, do not involve any direct
conflict between state and federal policies. Rather, these two preemptive
conditions reflect a general deprivation of state power to legislate at all in a
articular area.
3OOGal'db um 76
301 Gardbaum, 76
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TIle OPA 90 Preemption Deba e
"Later today, I will be offering an amendmen to rotect
the rig t 0 State governments to maintain their own
oil pollution liabili and com ensation laws. I will do so
because it simp ymakes no sense ... to preempt the right
of State governmen s to rotec their own people;
to protect their own propert and their own environment
in the wa that the feel is best."302
''-Preemption is needed. to ensure that there is one unified.,
simple comprehensive system available to finance full
cleanup an pay y for damages. ithout preem tion,
we are left with the existing atchW01"k ofconfusing and
sometimes competing Federal and State laws which cause
de1a s in cleanup and further damage to the environment. 303
The preemption debate which surrounded the passage of OPA 90
primarily concerned liability issues. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control
ct (Clean ater Ac or F C 304 ,one of the federal aws which governed
oil ollution before OPA, individual states maintained the right to establish
se arate liabili ~visions, including unlimited liability Man states
fought adamantly to ensm"e that these state liability schemes would not be
ll"eempted by OPAr which provided a cap on federal liability which could only
302 Repre entative rry \'udd, inlroducing
Response. Liability. all Cor en~ation Act of
tate liabili la . by the act which would ev
H 7954 ( 989).
tUJ" OP
lendment to th Oil Pollution P en ion.,
989. which would PI' nt pI 11 tion of
ually b· kno a P 90. 135 ong. Rec.
dd' mend.ment which
H 7 54 (l 89).
304 tat. 816 (1972)
305 33
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be ex:cee m msn e5 of gro s egligence. 306 ........,..... "'fo e, t e 'ee tion
debate w 'ch en ued on Ca ital Hill, as the Oil Poll Ition Act of 990 was
ated in ongress, was centere on rotecting the right of tate 0 dJ velop
their own ility sc eme, unafIec ed y 0 A's lia ..ty limits 3fYl
'Ih no -preem tio rovi ions in t e ollttio Act were origin y
attach d 0 the Senate version ofth OPA bill308. 'This bill assed the Senate
with no -p eemption intact, but issue was extremely controversial in the
House. 309 However, after a great de of deba e, the Miller-Studds
en ents to 6 310 were mco orate into t e Hous version of
OPA, and the illwhich left the onti ence commi ee 0 be signed by President
George u "doe not emov e rights of States 0 take wha ever additio al
action they believe is necessary to rotect their waters from oil spills."311
306 ,.00, e.g., 5·0 g. Rec H 9=- 4 ( 9 9). 1 6 _.ong. Rer. S 11-
H 6920 (19 0), 36 .Jong. .Rec. 6':33 (9 ).
307 Ibid.
c.
bill . 14 5; Hou~e bill.R 1
310 n .roduced in joint s sion of ouse
311 8ta:em' f enat.e Majority e
for t (' il Poll tion Act of 1990. 136
2
4 ( 9 9
_.onfi r n e Report
Although the non-preemption provisions in OPA 90 were introduced
primarily to protect state liability laws,312 in the years since this federal
legislation was enacted, many states have developed oil pollution prevention
legislation which accomplishes far more that merely expanding liability limits.
Led by west coast states such as California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska,
a trend has begun to emerge in this country which suggests that the most
aggressive arena for oil spill legislation is far removed from OPA 90. These
west coast states and others are attempti.ng to accompHsh what critics charge
that OPA 90 has been unable to do;313 to enact effective, proactive regulations,
which will reduce the likelihood of spills in U.S. coastal and inland waters by
regulating the industries which transport oil through these waters.314
Gaps in Federal Regulations Governing the Coastwise Transport of
Petroleum Products
Traditionally, the federal government has reserved exclusive jurisdiction
over all issues which impact upon interstate commerce, including standards
and operating procedures for all U.S. vessels. The Ports and Waterways
312 As of August, 1992, 36 states had imposed unlimited liability limits. Morgan, 10.
313 There is a general consensus, among marine pollution experts nationwide, that the most
effective attributes of OPA 90 have been in the arena of improving response and cleanup
protocol. However, the exceedingly long phase-in periods for double hull standards, and the
failure of the U.S. Coast Guard to implement its rulemaking responsibilities in a timely
fashion, have led to a common criticism among experts in the field that OPA 90 has largely
failed in its attempt to prevent spills by regulating the industries involved in oil
transportation. See, for example, prepared testimony of Natural Resources Defense Council
before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (March 27, 1996). See also
Morgan, p. 16, supra note 67.
314 Beaver,Butler, and Myster, 794.
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Safety Act(PWSA) of 1972315 delegates authority to the Secretary of
Transportation to regulate the design standards of U.S. vessels. This Act
further designates the U.S. Coast Guard as the federal agency responsible for
enforcement of these regulations. Therefore, the Coast Guard is responsible
for carrying out all of the rulemaking mandates in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
which involve vessel construction and design standards. Many of these
rulemaking mandates specified in OPA involved the promulgation of
regulations effecting the operation and structure of the considerable fleet of
single-hulled vessels which would continue to transport oil through U.S. waters
during the twenty to thirty year double-hull phase-in periods which OPA
established .316 However, the U.S. Coast Guard has failed to developS17 many
of the standards for single-hull vessels which were mandated in OPA 90, and
has been years behind in meeting many of the OPA-mandated rulemaking
deadlines.318
31546 U.S.C. 3703 (994).
316The phase-out period for single-hulled vessels which is contained in the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 has been criticized by marine safety expertsas far too liberal. The final deadline for
implementation of double hull requirements is 2010 for tank vessels and 2015 for tankers.
P.L. 101-380, sec. 4115 (c), 4116 (b), 4111, 1006 (e).
317 The Coast Guard did, in 1993, submit a notice of proposed rulemaking which would
raL'3e safety standards and equipment requirements on uninspected towing vessels, however
this notic.e was eventually withdrawn, and the new rules were never implemented. The
COl'H~t.Guard aomitted that. t.his effOl-t. wa~ ~ut. ~hort. due t.o ext.reme indll~t.ry oppositio.n See
60 Fed. Reg. 55904. In June, 1996 a Final Rule was issued by the Coast Guard on
Navigation Safety equipment for towing vessels. See Fed. Reg. vol. 61 no. 129 (June 3). In
July, a final rule was issued regarding operational procedures for towing vessels. See Fed.
Reg vol. 61 no. 147. (July 30).
318 Several environmental protection organizations have brought suit against the Coast
Guard and NOAA for failing to implement OPA mandates according to statutory
requirements. See amended complaint No. CV-94 4892 (RJD): Natural Resources Defense
Council et. al. v. United States Coast Guard et al.
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One of the factors which has contributed to the shift in arenas for oil
pollution prevention from the federal to the state level is a general sense of
. frustration, among state governments, toward the slow progress which has
been made toward developing effective pollution prevention laws at the federal
level. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 itself was debated, in one form. or another,
for fourteen years before the Exxon Valdez and three other smaller spill finally
spurred its passage. 319 Likewise, efforts to require double hulls on tank
vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances began almost twenty years
before the federal Oil PoUution Act was finally signed into law.
On December 24, 1971, the Coast Guard issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking320 on prevention of oil spills. One of the measures proposed was
to require double hulls on all inland barges built after Dec. 31, 1972. After a
series of hearings on the issue, the Coast Guard suspended implementation of
double hull requirements pending completion of a study by the Maritime
Administration. The primary reason cited by the Coast Guard for stalling this
initiative was the strong opposition ofthe industry. 321 In the face of the 1971
double hull proposal, 25 years ago, the barge industry based their objection to
double hulls on two reasons. First, they argued against the severity of cost. In
retrospect, when one compares the cost of implementing double hulls in 1972
with the cost of the several catastrophic oil spills which have occurred in U.S.
319See discussion oflegislative history in introduction to this paper.
320 26 Fed. Reg. 24 (1971):960.
321 Alcock, "Ecology Tankers and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990," Ecology Law Quarterlv 19
no. 1(1992): 117.
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waters since that time322 , it would seem that the price of implementation
might have been more than made up during the past 24 years in the amount of
oil which could have been prevented from spilling.
In 1972, the barge industry also argued there was not enough evidence
which supported the effectiveness of double hulls_ Today t hat e viden ce
exists,323 yet they still argue against the implementation of double hulls.
Cleady, the issue, then, is not the effectiveness of double hulls in oil pollution
prevention, but rather industry resistance to double hull implementation is
primarilyfinancial.324
The sizable gaps in Coast Guard oil spill prevention regulations
have allowed many oil transportation industries, such as the coastal and inland
tug and barge industry, to operate in a virtually um-egulated climate.325 The
failure of the Coast Guard to implement vessel safety standards as mandated
by the Oil Pollution Act has provided an incentive for individual states to
attempt to assume responsibility for oil pollution prevention in their local
waters.326 Local governments are often left to deal with the initial response to
322 For example, the natural resource damages caused by the Exxon Valdez, World Prodigy,
North Cape, and dozens of other spills of smaller magnitude which have occurred in U.S.
waters total millions upon millions of dollars.
323 A 1992 study by the National Research Council and the U.S. Coast Guard, entitled
"Interim Report on Tank Vessel Designs," concluded that double hulls are the most effective
way to prevent oil spills caused by groundings. See Peter Britton, "New designs for oil
tankers," Popular Science 242 no. 6 (1993): 28. U.S. Coast Guard casualty data for the flrst
district indicates that 50% of the marine casualties which have resulted in oil spills over the
past five years were caused by groundings. Personal communication, CAPT Eric Williams,
USCG, (21 October, 1996).
324 Alcock, 118.
325 Dennis Nixon, formal testimony before the Rhode Island Special Senate Commission
investigating the North Cape Oil spill. Providence, R.I.: (February 2, 1996), unpublished.
326 Alan Abrams, "Industry fears spill's impact on Capitol Hill," Journal of Commerce 23
January (1996), A7.
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an oil spill, and certainly a spill represents a localized hazard, therefore in the
wake of a serious spill, local governments are often left feeling dissatisfied with
the level of oil spill protection provided by the government. 327 Many states,
particularly in the wacke of serious spills which impact state waters, have
attempted to fill in the gaps in federal tank vessel safety regulations by
enacting state laws regulating safety standards on these vessels. The
majority of vessels involved in the coastwise transportation of petroleum
products in the U.S., including oil tankers, tank barges and towing vessels, now
confront a situation where state requirements or standards often exceed those
standards established by U.S. Coast Guard regulations. 328 Indeed, this is now
the case in the State ofRhode Island.
Although it is interesting to speculate about the legal stature of these
aggressive state-level oil pollution regulations, it is ultimately the role of the
federal court system to determine the constitutionality of these statutes. The
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)
recently filed suit against the State of Washington, based on the provisions of
that state's oil pollution prevention statute.329 Intertanko claimed that
certain Washington State statutes and regulations relating to oil tankers
operating in state waters were unconstitutional. Intertanko challenged these
provisions of the Washington oil spill prevention laws claiming that they were
327 David Fische_r and Louis Martinet, "Local government response to the American Trader
oil spill of 1990: Implications for policy," Ocean and Coastal Management 19 (1993): 59-73.
328 For example, Washington has enacted a pollution prevention program which establishes
"Best Achievable Protection" standards for tank vessels operating in state waters. These
standards contain several provisions, such as crew requirements, technology requirements,
and bar crossing procedures which are more stringent than Coast Guard requirements. See
discussion in subsequent sections of this text. WAAdmin. Code 317-21-345).
329Intertanko v. Lowry, case no. C 95-1096 was filed on July 17, 1995, in the United States
District Cow1;, Western District of Washington at Seattle. The case went to trial in October,
1996, and a decision was rendered by Judge John C. Coughenour on November 18, 1996.
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preempted by federal law and they violated the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.
When this thesis was first drafted, the Intertanko case had not yet been
decided. The following section of this thesis contains a collection of Supreme
and Federal Court decisions regarding the extent to which a state may legally
regulate vessel traffic in order to prevent oil pollution in state waters. Many of
these cases were examined by the court which recently decided the Intertanko
case. A summary of Intertanko v. Lowry is included with these cases, and
although the decision may yet be appealed to a higher court, the court's
reasoning in the Intertanko case builds upon many of the principals
established in earlier case law. The Intertanko case also presents a thorough
analysis of preemptive issues related to oil pollution prevention. This analysis
is especially significant to the consideration of the oil spill law in Rhode Island
and in other states, because it is the first time a court has attempted to
interpret the preemptive doctrine since the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. This thesis has asserted that the non-preemption language in OPA 90
would make it difficult to establish federal preemption of most state oil
pollution prevention laws. The Court's decision in Intertanko supports this
assertion.
Although the Intertanko decision is most directly relevant to the legal
stature of the Rhode Island oil spill prevention law and other, similar legislative
initiatives, it is important to understand the progression of decisions which
have been rendered by the Federal Court system regarding the jurisdictional
boundaries between state and federal regulatory authority. In reading the
following case summaries, it is useful to bear in mind the two factors which the
court, in each case, is attempting to balance: the right of the state government
to protect its local environment against the threat of vessel-borne oil pollution,
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and the priority of maintaining national consistency and uniformity in
maritime law, particularly those laws which impact upon vessels involved in
interstate commerce.
Legal Precedents for State Regulation of Commercial Maritime
Industries: An Analysis of Relevant Supreme and Federal Court
Decisions
Aaron B. Cooley v. the Board ofWardens ofthe Port ofPhiladelphia330
Cooley v. Board of Wardens is the first Supreme Court decision to
recognize that federal protection of interstate commerce does not preclude the
passage of certain state laws which might impact upon maritime commerce.
Th_is case was not specifically concerned with oil pollution; rather it involved a
vessel owner challenging a Pennsylvania law which required pilotage in state
waters. This law obviously impacts navigation, and as such it was argued that
it violated the sections of the U.S. Constitution which govern uniformity of
interstate commerce regulations.331 The court wrote that "the mere grant of
the commercial power to Congress, does not forbid the States from passing
laws to regulate pilotage. The power to regulate commerce includes various
subjects; upon some of which there should be a uniform rule, and upon others
different rules in different localities. The power is exclusive in Congress in the
former, but not so in the latter class."332
330 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
331 The Pennsylvania law was challenged as violating the first and third clauses of the
eighth section, first article; the first and second clause of the tenth section, article one; and
the fifth clause of the ninth section of article one.
332 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
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Cooley. v. Board of Wardens suggests that there are times when local
concerns may be important enough to outweigh the need for uniform rules
governing interstate commerce, and that in such cases a state may develop
regulations which are specific to the waters of that state. This decision
provides a building block for later cases, where the courts begin to define more
clearly the circumstances under which a state may be justified in developing
discrete regulations that directly impact interstate commerce.
Kelly, director, et ai. v. Washington ex rei. Foss Co.333
In Kelly v. Washington, the Supreme Court considers whether a
Washington State regulation, which requires inspection of the huBs and
machinery of motorized tugs, are legal and valid. At the time of this decision,
no federal law or regulation existed which addressed the inspection of this class
ofvessels. The Washington law334 was challenged based on the assertion that
it interfered with interstate commerce. In deciding this case, the court
identified three situations in which state regulation of interstate commerce
should be considered invalid: (1) if the state regulation conflicts with an express
regulation by Congress; (2) if the subject at hand requires uniformity of
regulation so that state action is completely inappropriate in the absence of
federal action, or (3) where federal regulation already exists. The court, in this
decision, determined that because there was no provision in federal law which
addressed the inspection of the hull and machinery of motorized tugs, that the
state was free to legislate in that area in order to insure safety and determine
seaworthiness of vessels. In this decision, however, the court attempted to
333 302 U.S. 1 (1937)
334 Washington Laws of 1907, Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 9843 et seq.
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differentiate among situations where state regulation should be considered
permissible, and those situations where rule- making should occur at the
federal level. The language of the decision, however, leaves open for future
consideration the issue ofdetermining exactly when a state regulation might be
inappropriate:
"...the State may protect its people without waiting
for federal action, providing the state action does not
come into conflict with federal rules. If, however, the
State goes farther and attempts to impose particular
standards as to structure, design, equipment and operation
which...may...pass beyond what is plainly essential to
safety and seaworthiness,...such requirements, ifimposed
at all, must be through the action ofCongress...Whether
the State in a particular matter goes too far must be left
to be determined when the precise question arises."335
The ambiguities in this language are addressed further in subsequent
Court holdings.
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City ofDetroit et ai.336
The Huron Cement decision holds that a state may enact and enforce
pollution prevention statutes which impact upon industries involved in
interstate commerce when that state is exercising its police power to prevent
ship-to-shore pollution. At issue in this case were the criminal provisions in the
city of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code. The Huron Portland Cement
Corporation challenged the legal stature of these provisions after two of the
corporation's ships were charged with violations of the Detroit ordinance. The
two ships in question discharged smoke while docked in Detroit during the
course of cleaning the boilers on board. The duration and density of the smoke
335 Justice Hughes, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
336 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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emitted violated the Smoke Abatement Code, therefore the two ships were
charged with violations.
Huron Cement challenged the Detroit law based on the fact that the
boilers and equipment on board the two ships which discharged the smoke were
approved and licensed according to federal standards for interstate commerce.
Huron Cement further claimed that the Detroit ordinance unduly burdened
interstate commerce. However, the Supreme Court viewed the Detroit
ordinance, which was enacted solely to protect the health and welfare of the
city's residents, as a clear expression of local police power. Justice Stewart
wrote that, "In the exercise of that [police] power, the states and their
instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and
maritime activities, concurrently with the federal government."337
The concept of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over issues of
interstate commerce and general maritime law is extremely important in the
field ofmarine pollution prevention. Justice Stewart further elaborates on this
concurrency, maintaining that although the Constitution gives Congress power
to regulate interstate commerce, the States are not precluded from legislating
on issues which impact the health, safety, and life of their citizens, even when
such legislation might indirectly impact upon commerce. Lastly, the Huron
Cement decision establishes that the mere possession of a federal license does
not remove a ship from the jurisdiction ofStates and municipalities. Federally
licensed ships must still respect local acts of police power, including local
pilotage laws,338 local quarantine laws339 , local safety inspections 340 , or the
337 Ibid.
338 Cooley v. Board ofWardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
339 Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board ofHealth, 118 U.S. 455.
340 Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
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local regulation ofwharves and docks.341
Askew v. American Waterways Operators 342
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case which involved an
industry challenge of one state's attempt at preventing oil pollution. In 1970,
the state of Florida enacted the Florida Oil Spill Pollution Prevention Act 343 •
This law required that additional gear requirements for tankers operating in
Florida waters, and imposed strict liability for oil spill damages within that
State. This law was challenged by the American Waterways Operators, an
organization of U.S. tank vessel operators. The Supreme Court overturned a
District court ruling and held that there existed no Constitutional or statutory
impediment which would prevent Florida from enacting such a law to protect
its waters from the danger of oil spills. The language of this decision was quite
clear in stating that federal admiralty jurisdiction should not overpower a
state's ability to prevent oil spills. The court wrote:
"we find no constitutional or statutory impediment
to permitting Florida...to establish any 'requirements
or liability' concerning the impact ofoil spills on Florida's
interests or concerns. To [do so] ... is to allow federal
admiraltyjurisdiction to swallow most ofthe police power
ofthe States over oil spillage--an insidious form of
pollution of vast concern to every coastal city."344
341 Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559.
342411 U.S. 325 (1973)
343 Fla. Laws Ch. 90-54.
344 Ibid.
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Ray, Governor ofWashington, et al. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al. 345
The 1978 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (Arco) decision results from an
industry challenge of the Washington Tanker Law346 which regulated the size,
design, and movement of oil tankers in Puget Sound. This law included a
pilotage requirement for all tankers over 50,000 DWT (dead weight tons); a
requirement that all tankers between 40,000 and 125,000 DWT meet certain
design and safety standards including minimum shaft horsepower, double
bottoms, two radars, and navigational position location systems; a
requirement that all tankers which do not satisfy these requirements use an
escort tug; and a ban on the operation of all tankers over 125,000 DWT in
Puget Sound. In this case, the Court held that the State was free to require
state-licensed pilots and tug escorts 347 , but that the State was preempted
from enforcing state tanker design standards and from establishing maximum
tanker size limits because these regulations interfered with the jurisdiction
conferred upon the Coast Guard by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972.
In the Ray decision, Justice White recognizes that, in considering
whether a state's police power is preempted by federal law, it is important to
determine whether Congress clearly intended that the states be prohibited
from regulating the subject matter in question. The Court, in Ray, applies a
two-stage analysis to determine whether state law is preempted in any given
area. The first step is to consider whether Congress either implicitly or
345 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
346Ch. 125, 1975 Wash. Laws, Wash. Rev. Code sec. 88.16.170 et seq.
347 Although in the case of tug escorts, the Court notes that the Washington law is valid
only unless and until the Secretary of Transportation establishes tug escort provisions for
Puget Sound.
94
explicitly declared that the States are prohibited from regulating a certain
issue. Congress may imply preemption by regulating an area so pervasively
as to allow no room for state regulations. 348 The second step in determining
whether preemption applies is to determine whether the state law conflicts
with any federal law. If such a conflict occurs, federal law wiu preempt any
state law which might serve as an obstacle to implementation or enforcement
of the federal statute.
In Ray) the Court determined that specific sections of the Washington
Tanker Law were preempted because Title II of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 expressed the intent of Congress that a uniform federal
regime be established to control the design of oil tankers. This provision of the
PWSA establishes the clear intent of Congress that construction and design
standards for oil tankers be an issue of exclusively federal control. The Ray
decision also discusses other considerations which might affect the analysis of
state law preemption. In justifying the legitimacy of the tug escort provisions,
the Court notes that such requirements, regardless of the fact that they may
vary from port to port, do not impede the "free and efficient flow of interstate
and foreign commerce."349
Chevron U.s.A. v. Hammond350
In Chevron v. Hammond, a Federal Court of Appeals reviewed an
Alaska statute which prohibited the discharge of ballast water from tankers
348See Ricev. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
349435 U.S. 151 (1978).
350 726 F.2d. 483 (1984).
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into the waters of Alaska. Chevron challenged this law, based on the fact that
the tankers were in compliance with Coast Guard design standards which
provided that the ballast discharge was "clean" by federal and international
standards. However, the Court held that it was not physically impossible for a
vessel to comply with both the Alaska statute and the relevant Coast Guard
regulations, and that there is no conflict between the two laws.
This decision recognizes that state regulations may apply to vessel
equipment, such as ballasts, if the regulations are intended for environmental
protection. The court in this case considers the elements of preemption, as
well as precedents such as Ray v. Arco, in making the following determination:
"While design standards need to be uniform nationwide
so that vessels do not confront conflicting requirements
in different ports and so that the Coast Guard can
promote international consensus on design standards,
there is no corresponding dominant national interest
in uniformity in the area ofcoastal environmental
regulation. Here, in fact, the local community is more
likely competent than the federal government to tailor
environmental regulations to the ecological sensitivities of
a particular area."351
In the Chevron decision, the court is recognizing that a concurrent
jurisdiction exists, whereby Congress intended that stricter state standards for
oil pollution be enforced in state waters, in addition to Coast Guard regulations
issued under the PWSA. The court here is suggesting that not only are the
states not preempted from enacting pollution prevention regulations, there is a
Congressional intent that such regulations be left to the states to enact, and
that as long as no direct conflict exists between such laws and federal
commerce laws, states are expected to legislate in the area of ship-borne
pollutionprevention legislation.
351 Ibid.
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The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko) v. Mike Lowry, et al.352
Intertanko v. Lowry is the only case summarized herein which was
decided after the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This fact is
important because Intertanko v. Lowry involves a preemptive chaUenge of the
Washington State Best Achievable Protection Standards (BAPS), a series of
vessel standards and regulations which effect oil tankers operating in
Washington State waters, asserting that these laws and regulations are
preempted by federal law. This challenge leads the court to focus directly upon
the non-preemption clause in OPA 90, which was discussed in previous
sections of this thesis.353 Intertanko also claims that the Washington oil spill
laws violate the Commerce Clause and the Foreign Affairs Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Intertanko complaint charges that sixteen of the regulations
promulgated by the Washington Office of Marine Safety as pm..t of the BAPS
are invalidated by federal law. These regulations include state-level
requirements for event reporting, watch standing practices, navigational
safety, engineering and monitoring practices, tests and inspections, shipboard
emergency drills, written voyage plans, personnel training, drug and alcohol
policies, personnel evaluation, work hour limits for crew members, language
requirements for crew members, record keeping, management practices,
navigational technology, and notification ofpotential onboard safety hazards.
Intertanko asserted that these requirements of the Washington law
improperly intruded into an area controlled by the federal government, which
establishes through the U.S. Coast Guard specific standards and requirements
352 Case No. C95-1096C. Decided November 18,1996, United States District Court,
Seattle, WA.
353 See discussion page 76.
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for t~nkers operating in U.S. waters. The court tests this claim by analyzing
the boundary between s~te and federal regulatory al,lthority as it has been
determined thrQugh past court rulings. The Intertanko court looks to the Ray
~. Arco decision for direction, and includes the following quote from that 1978
Supreme Court ruling;
"[W]hen a State's exercise of its police power is challenged
under the Supremacy Clause, 'we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."'354
Because the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 explicitly allow for concurrent
jurisdiction of the state and federal government in the field of oil spill
prevention, the court in Intertanko reasons that neither implicit nor explicit
preemption of state regulatory authority may be inferred. The court continues
with this reasoning and asserts that conflict preemption of a state law, which
occurs when compliance with both a state and federal law or regulation is
impossible, also does not apply in Washington State. The Intertanko court
closely analyzes not only the wording of the non-preemption language in OPA
90, but also the placement of this clause within the legislation. The court
reasons that because OPA 90 contains provisions for personnel qualifications,
manning standards, vessel operation, design, and construction, the inclusion of
an explicit non-preemption clause in the Act allow for concurrent state
jurisdiction in all of these areas. The Oil Pollution Act clearly provides the
opportunity for states to add to any area of the body of existing federal
legislation, as long as such state regulations do no conflict with any provisions
ofexisting federal law.
354 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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The Intertanko decision provides clear reasoning to support the validity
of the Washington State oil pollution prevention standards. One important
clarification made by the Intertanko court, which leaves an important question
unanswered, relates to the distinction between design standards and
operational requirements. The court notes that in the Conference Report for
OPA 90, it was stated that the new law was not intended to eradicate the
holding in Ray v. Areo. The Intertanko court interprets this as suggesting that
state-level design and construction standards may still be preempted by
federallaw.355 However, the Ray decision, and the subsequent Chevron v.
Hammond holding, are interpreted by the Intertanko court as indicating that
although "state regulation of oil tanker design and construction is impliedly
preempted by federal law,"356 "State regulation of tanker operations 'arising
from the peculiarities of Iocal waters ...' is not subject to implied field
preemption."357
The Intertanko decision concludes that the Washington oil spill
prevention statutes and regulations are constitutionally valid, and are not
preempted by federal law. It is very likely, however, that the Intertanko
decision will face an appeal in the near future.
355 See Supra note 5, lntertanko v. Lowry. Although the Intertanko court does note that the
non-preemption language in OPA 90 may not specifically clear the way for state-level
promulgation ofvessel design and construction standards, there are other portions of the
Intertanko decision which may be interpreted as suggesting that a state-level double hull
requirement could be upheld if it were presented in a certain manner. Overall, the
Intertanko decision suggests that many of the provisions of the Rhode Island oil spill act
would likely be upheld in a similar court challenge. However, despite the speculative
language in the Intertanko case, a federal court has not yet ruled on a state-level double hull
requirement such as that in place in Rhode Island, in light of the non-preemption clause in
OPA 90.
356 Ray, 435 U.s. at 164-64.
357 Ray, 435 U.S. at 171.
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Environmental Law meets Maritime Law
In attempting to delineate the boundaries between state jurisdiction for
the purpose of pollution prevention and federal admiralty jurisdiction, one
author notes that state laws which "contravene the uniform maritime law of
the United States may run afoul of the U.S. Constitution."358 It is this very
conflict between the need for uniformity in maritime law, and the transfer of
regulatory authority to state governments in issues of environmental law
which make these boundaries so difficult to demark. The "polluter pays"
principle is central to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 as well as several other
environmental laws, and indeed this concept has been characterized as "the
crux of environmental policy as it has evolved in the United States."359
Polluter pays policies, which focus on punishing the polluter by attaching
considerable liability and penalties to the individual or company responsible for
a pollution event, relies heavily on state regulatory authority. Traditionally,
environmental legislation which uses this approach delegates a great deal of
authority to the state government, and does not preempt states from adopting
environmental policies which are more stringent than federal standards.36Q
The problem with oil spill legislation is that while the impacts ofoil spills
are localized, prevention of oil pollution requires regulation of potential sources
of pollution. These potential sources are primarily vessels involved in
interstate and often international commerce.361 The need for effective
358 Eubank, 149.
359 Jean R. Cameron, "States and Provinces: Standing at the crossroads of environmental
and maritime law," presented to the Tanker Legislation Conference '95 (Washington, D.C.:
September 1995).
360 Cameron, 3.
361 Ibid.
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pollution prevention; coupled with the fact that the state government is
commonly the source of the most aggressive pollution prevention statutes,
suggests that states should adopt policies which target those industries which
pose the greatest threat of spilling oil local waters. However, the need for
consistency in maritime law suggests that the federal government is the
proper arena for promulgating regulations governing vessels involved in
interstate commerce.362
In the words of Jean Cameron, Executive Director of the BC/States Oil
Spill Task Force and national authority on oil spill prevention,
"The authority of our national government derives from
[the] states, and that federal relationship is made even
more salient by current political trends. Not only is increased
authority for regulation and policy implementation being
returned to the states by this Congress, but the sitting
Supreme Court is considered to be strongly supportive
of states' rights and conservative in its interpretation
ofthis Constitutional relationship...IfCongress reduces federal
authority under the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act, and reduces the budgets available to the
programs that remain, state ocean management authority,
both within and beyond three nautical miles...assumes
greater prominence as the governing legal authority." 363
With this discussion of blurred jurisdictional boundaries and dueling
state and federal interests in mind, this thesis will now examine the contents of
various pollution prevention statutes which have been enacted in several
states. Many of the regulations and policies contained in these statutes are
subject to two forms of interpretation. They may be interpreted as intruding
upon federal admiralty jurisdiction and threatening the uniformity of maritime
law. Alternately, such provisions may be considered as a reasonable extension
362 Eubank, 163.
363 "States and Provinces: Standing at the crossroads of environmental and maritime law,"
presented to the Tanker Legislation Conference '95 (Washington, D.C.: September 1995).
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of state regulatory authority for the purpose of preventing vessel-source oil
pollution.
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x. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED STATE OIL
POLLUTION PREVENTION STATUTES
In the nearly six years since the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted
as U.S. law, numerous coastal states, as well as several states adjacent to
inland waterways, have introduced, and in many cases passed, oil spill
prevention and response legislation. To adequately present and analyze the
contents of each state's strategy is beyond the scope of this project. However,
it is appropriate to this discussion to provide an overview of the policies in
place in several states, focusing on those provisions within the state laws
which supplant or surpass federal standards or regulations for oil spill
prevention and response. Upon consideration of the oil spill legislation
currently in place in selected U.S. States, it will be possible to identify
commonalities among pollution prevention approaches taken in various states.
Likewise, this description ofthe most aggressive pollution prevention policies in
place in various states win be useful to later discussions regarding whether the
Rhode Island oil spill legislation may be considered as a continuation of a trend
begun in other states.
Washington
Washington State has established one of the most progressive and
comprehensive strategies for state-level prevention of oil pollution.
Historically, Washington has been a frequent leader in the promulgation of
proactive state regulations, as evidenced by Supreme Court decisions such as
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Ray v. Arco and Kelly v. Washington. 364 In response to four significant oil spills
which occurred in this state's waters during 1993,365 Washington developed a
"Best Achievable Protection" program,366 which is administered through the
state's Office of Marine Safety.367 The Office of Marine Safety (OMS) was
designated by the state legislature in 1991, in response to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill.368 The Best Achievable Protection (BAP) program, which was developed
by the OMS in cooperation with the state's Department of Ecology, requires
that vessel operators submit detailed oil spill prevention plans outlining
specific uses of procedures and technologies which a vessel must employ before
it is allowed to operate in Washington waters. Although other states require
submission ofoil spill response plans, 369 Washington is the only state thus far
to require that vessel plans also include preventative standards and policies.370
364 Each of these cases involve lawsuits challenging pollution prevention laws in Washington
State based on their perceived severity by the oil transportation industry. See summary of
court cases presented in Chapter IX.
365During 1993, four spills OCCUlTed in Washington waters. Three were bunker spills: the
NOASC Forest spill in Tacoma, the Excellence in Seattle, and the Central in Longview. A
fourth spilLl resulted when the tank barge Tidewater leaked oil into the Snake River.
366 Washington Administrative Code 317-21-345).
367Unfortunately, the Office of MaIine Safety may have a short future in the State of
Wisconsin. The OMS is currently running without funding, and the Washington legislature
recently voted to eliminate the OMS altogether by 1998. There has as yet been no
published information to indicate whether the recent victory of this office and the State of
Washington in the Intertanko lawsuit will have any bearing upon the fate of the OMS.
368 S. Doughton, "Critics threaten oil-spill prevention efforts; lawsuit, lawmakers target
safety office as memories of disasters dim," News Tribune Dec. 17: A-1, (1995).
369 For example, California, Alaska, Oregon and Florida, all of which are cited in
subsequent sections of this text.
370 Doughton, A-l.
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The BAP standards, which were recently upheld by a Federal District
Court in Washington after being challenged by the industry group
Intertanko,371 target four areas of vessel operations: operating procedures,
personnel policies, management practices, and technology requirements. The
BAP program outlines various requirements in these four categories, all of
which must be satisfied by vessels operating in state waters. Vessel operators
must include in their vessel plans various forms of records which document
compliance with the BAP standards. 372 The State may take administrative
action against vessels not in compliance with the BAP programs, or against
vessels whose contingency plans do not satisfy the BAP specifications. 373
There are several requirements included in the Best Achievable
Protection standards which exceed federal standards, and these requirements
were among the targets of the Intertanko lawsuit. There are at least two
instances where crew requirements specified in the BAP standards exceed U.S.
Coast Guard rules. For example, three licensed officers must be on deck of all
vessels engaged in coastal tow in Washington waters outside of pilotage
areas.374 The Coast Guard requires that only two such officers be present.
Likewise, in Washington State, two crewmen must be onboard the tank barge
371 Intertanko, or the International Association ofIndependent Tanker Owners, is a
Norway-based trade group which represents approximately 300 shipping company owners.
Intertanko's membership represents approximately 80 percent of the world's independently
owned tanker fleet.
372WAC 317-21-140.
373WAC 317-21-500.
374WAC 317-32-315 (2).
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during topping-offprocedures, 375 while the Coast Guard mandates that only
one crew member be onboard the barge at this time. The former requirement,
for the extra deck officer, was one of the targets of the Intertanko suit.
Industry representatives charged that such a requirement will only lead to
quicker fatigue of those officers, and will actually serve to increase the danger
of unsafe coastal navigation.376
Other provisions of the Washington program which exceed federal
standards are bar crossing procedures, which require crew numbers and
positioning in excess of Coast Guard standards.377 Likewise, BAP standards
require more frequent shipboard drills,378 and equipment requirements which
specify navigational and towing equipment,379 all of which are more stringent
than federal standards. One of the most controversial requirements of the
BAP program. is mandatory drug and alcohol testing of all crew members on all
vessels, foreign and domestic, who enter state waters. The Coast Guard only
tests offices on U.S.-registered vessels.38o
375 Topping off is part of the process whereby oil is transferred between the barge and
another storage facility.
376 Doughton, A-l. The court in the Intertanko suit did not rule on the effectiveness of this
or other provisions of the Best Achievable Protection Standards. Rather, the focus of the
cowi,'s analysis was on whether the oil prevention statutes and regulations included in the
BAPS represented a legitimate exercise of state regulatory authority. The court upheld the
laws in their entirety as an appropriate expression of the state's police power to protect
against environmental degradation. See pages 93-94 of this thesis.
377WAC 317-21-305 (2).
378 WAC 317-21-230 (5).
379WAC 317-21-265.
380 Doughton, A-l.
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Washington is one of four U.S. states and one Canadian province which
participates in the British Columbia/States Task Force, which is a consortium
of west coast states dedicated to developing effective oil pollution prevention
standards. The Task Force exists primarily as an information-sharing forum
among the pollution prevention agencies of each of these five political bodies,
and it has allowed the four U.S. states which participate to develop similar
approaches toward oil spill prevention legislation and policies. This agreement
among state agencies has been largely successful in promoting the
development of laws and policies which are consistent among west coast
states.381
California
Although Washington is often heralded as the west coast leader for
progressive oil spill prevention legislation, California was actually the first west
coast state to introduce comprehensive oil spin prevention legislation in the
post-OPA 90 era. This legislation, the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spin
Prevention and Response Act of 1990,382 was actually the model which was
used by Washington State in developing their own legislation. 383 This Act
accomplished a number of objectives, many of them resulting from the
establishment of the State Interagency Oil Spill Committee (SIOSC). This
body is responsible for the development and review of all guidelines related to oil
381 Jean Cameron, Executive Director BC/States Task Force, composite information from
phone conversation with the author, February-March, 1996.
382Cal. Govt. Code, Title 2, Sec. 8670.
383 Mike Lynch, Washington Marine Safety Office, phone conversation with the author,
January, 1996.
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spill contingency planning and response.384 This act also created an
Administrator position within the Department of Fish and Game.385 This
individual acts at the direction of the Governor to implement state activities
related to oil spill issues.386
California has developed oil spill contingency plan requirements, vessel
operating standards, and financial responsibility requirements which are all on
par with the requirements in Washington State. 387 Although the California
statute does not venture as far beyond federal standards as the BAP program
in Washington, the California law does assert that the state may require tug
escorts for any tankers operating in state waters, at the discretion of the
Administrator.388 The California contingency planning requirements 389 also
mention "best achievable protection," a phrase which originates in the
California statute but was later adopted by the State ofWashington.
The California law confers upon the Administrator the authority to
"inspect or cause to be inspected" any vessel transiting state waters. The
Administrator is Required to evaluate Coast Guard inspection programs, and
report to the state legislature any shortcomings. If shortcomings are found to
exist, the Administrator is required to implement state regulations for vessel
384Cal. Govt. Code, 8670.5, 8574.10 (a).
385 Cal. Govt. Code, 8670.4.
386 Ibid, 8670.5.
387 Beaver et at, 804.
388 Cal. Govt. Code, 8670.17.
389 Contingency plans involve vessel-specific procedW"es which are to be followed in the event
of an oil spill. Contingency plans may specify that a vessel carry certain types of oil removal
or safety equipment, and may provide for the periodic conducting of drills.
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inspection, which are not to duplicate any aspect of the Coast Guard
program.390 The Administrator is also required to develop a Vessel Traffic
Service System, in consultation with the Coast Guard.391
Additionally, the California statute provides for financial responsibility
requirements,392 criminal and civil liability penalties,393 and provisions for
recovery of claims against the responsible party.394 While none of these
provisions of the California law could face reasonable challenge based on
federal preemption, the expansive and comprehensive nature of California's oil
pollution statute certainly provides evidence to the theory that the body of
state law which governs oil pollution issues concurrently with OPA 90 is at
least as comprehensive and arguably more effective than the federal statute.
Alaska
It is the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)
which has been charged with protecting the state's vast natural resources
from the threat of oil pollution. 395 However, in the aftermath of the Exxon
Valdez spill, this agency received a great deal of criticism which led to
significant revision of Alaska's pollution prevention laws.396 ADEC is now
390 Cal. Govt. Code, 8670.16-24.
391 Ibid, 8670.21.
392 Ibid, 8679.37.
393 Ibid, 8670.65
394 Ibid, 8670.56.5, 8670.67.5.
395 Alaska Stat. 46.03.010Ca).
396 Beaver et aI., 794.
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responsible for preparing and annually reviewing a statewide master oil spill
plan.397 The master plan requirements include review of new technologies
available for oil spill prevention and cleanup,398 the scheduling ofunannounced
oil spill response drills,399 and annual review and approval of the plan by the
Alaska State Emergency Response Commission.400
The State ofAlaska also has discharge prevention and contingency plan
requirements, oil spiU response requirements, and financial responsibility
requirements.401 Once again, these response, contingency, and financial
responsibility requirements are extensive, and in the case of Alaska many of
these requirements are directly related to the size of the vessel and amount of
cargo on board.402 Lastly, Alaska's statute contains provisions for
containment and cleanup of spills,403 claims procedures,404 and civil penalties
for responsible parties.405
397 Alaska Stat. 46.04.200 (a).
398 Ibid, 46.04.200(c)(1).
399 Ibid, 46.04.200 (c)(4).
400 Ibid, 46.04.200(c)(5).
401 Ibid, 46.04.030(a)-(h).
402 For example, response capability requirement and financial responsibility increase as
vessel size and cargo capacity increase. See Alaska Stat. 46.04.040 (c),(e).
403 Alaska Stat. 46.04.020 (b).
404 Ibid, 46.03.760, 46.03.780, 46.03.822.
405 Ibid 46.03.760.
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Wisconsin
"...In limited areas of the law, Midwestern states are
now preparing to move forward with legislation designed
to supplement section of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990...
[by] preparing legislation to require tank vessels
operating on the Mississippi River in State waters to
be ofdouble hull construction under state law.''406
In the 1995 legislative session, an important bill was introduced into the
Wisconsin House of Representatives.407 Although Wisconsin is not a coastal
state, the Upper Mississippi River provides this state with several extremely
active ports, and thus with the perpetual threat of oil pollution from the
frequent tank barge traffic in that area. Wisconsin's legislation was not
preceded by any catastrophic spill; it was introduced as a truly preventative
measure in response to serious concern that Wisconsin might experience a
tank barge grounding or spill akin to those which have occurred in other U.S.
ports.
The Wisconsin bill has a double hull requirement for tank barges which
mandates that all vessels under 5,000 gross tons which enter state waters
must be of double hull construction. The two exceptions to this provision are
vessels in danger seeking refuge, or single-hulled vessels accompanied by an
escort tug. The bill also prohibits the open burning of refuse on commercial
vessels. This activity has posed a significant water and air pollution problem
in and along the Upper Mississippi River, and this provision, which allows for
the assessment of penalties against violators, was designed to limit this
406 Steven DeWald, "Environmental Risks in the Midwest from commercial navigation,"
presented at the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 1994 Annual Meeting,
November 16, 1994, New Orleans, LA.
407 Wisconsin General Assembly, AB495, (1996).
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undesirable practice.
On April 25, 1996, AB495 passed the Wisconsin General Assembly and
was signed into law by that state's governor, making Wisconsin the first state
to enact a double hull provision for vessels under 5,000 gross tons. Although
there have been no lawsuits filed against Wisconsin on the basis of this
requirement, it is likely that the double hull provision will withstand legal
challenge due to the fact that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 does not include
vessels under 5,000 gross tons in its double hull phase-in requirements.
Likewise, an examination of the line of case law presented in Chapter VIII
suggests that Wisconsin's double hull provision could withstand preemptive
challenge.
Relationship Between Oil Pollution Prevention Statutes enacted by
West Coast States and Wisconsin and the Legislative Response to the
North Cape Spill in the Northeast
The admittedly brief summary of pollution prevention statutes which
are currently in place in selected U.S. states is presented in this text to
demonstrate several points. Most importantly, these summaries are intended
to provide a better understanding of the extent to which state pollution
prevention statutes are truly comprehensive legislative strategies, addressing
virtually all of the aspects of oil spill prevention, liability, and response which
are contained in OPA 90 and even, as in the case of Washington state,
legislating in areas where OPA has not. Many other states have developed oil
pollution statutes, the contents of which are beyond the scope of this analysis.
However, an examination of the laws currently in place in Texas, Oregon, New
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York, Maine, Virginia, and Florida, among others, would yield summaries
similar in nature in content to the four states' law summarized above.
Of the four states outlined above, Washington is generally considered to
have the most comprehensive program for prevention of vessel-source oil
pollution. The Best Achievable Protection Standards in place in that state
force vessel owners to comply with a variety of operating requirements which
are much more specific than any federal regulations. Several components of
the BAP Standards are closely mirrored in the contents of the Rhode Island oil
spill law. These include reporting requirements, drug and alcohol testing
requirements, and watchstanding practices. Both Washington and Rhode
Island require that towing vessels have an extra licensed mate onboard, and
this exceeds the federal requirement. The BAP Program was, in fact, used as a
model during the drafting of the Rhode Island law. 408 The Rhode Island bill,
however, focuses specifically on specific aspects of the coastal tug and tank
barge industry, whereas the Washington Best Achievable Protection
Standards are more broadly focused. Nonetheless, the outcome of the recent
Intertanko lawsuit suggests that Rhode Island's newly enacted oil pollution
statute stands an excellent chance of surviving preemptive challenge should
the new law result in future litigation. However, although the new Rhode,
Island law borrows many of its provisions and approaches from the Best
Achievable Protection Standards which were recently upheld by a Federal
District Court, there are several components of the Rhode Island legislation,
such as the double hull and tug escort requirements, which are even more
aggressive than the components of the Washington oil spill prevention statute.
408 Robert Bromley, Rhode Island Senate Fiscal and Policy Office, personal communication,
JanuarylFebruary 1996.
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The legislation which was enacted in Wisconsin and Rhode Island during
the past year directly impacts upon the industries involved in the coastwise
and inland transport of oil in this nation. More so than even the Washington
Best Achievable Protection Standards, the Rhode Island and Wisconsin laws
target specific structural improvements on vessels which transport oil. In a
sense, then, these strategies may be considered as representing the next step
in a trend toward state oil spill prevention strategies which take far stronger
regulatory action than the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The next chapter
reexamines- the provisions of the Rhode Island Oil Pollution Prevention and
Control Act to determine the extent to which that law, as well as the recently
enacted oil barge law in Wisconsin and the legislative proposals in Connecticut
and Massachusetts, may be considered as a continuation of a trend begun in
states such as California and Washington.
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XI. ANALYSIS OF RHODE ISLAND'S OIL SPILL LAW:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTRUSION OR CONTINUATION OF A
TREND?
Can the R.I. law withstand a legal challenge?409
Any discussion of the legal stature of legislation such as the Rhode
Island Oil Spill Act necessarily leads back to the non-preemption language
contained in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The following statement is contained
in a summary and analysis of the Oil Pollution Act prepared by a Washington,
D.C. law firm shortly after the law was enacted.
"The non-preemption provision may open the door
to state regulation ofvessel pollution equipment, or,
arguably, open it even wider to state regulation ofdesign,
construction, equipment and manning standro·ds.
For instance, the state of California has recently
enacted legislation that includes provisions for state
enforcement of the federal Act's requirement for
double hulls and imposing navigation equipment
and other technical requirements for tankers
operating in state waters."410
The author of this statement was speculating that one of the implications of
the non-preemption language in OPA 90 would be the broadening of state
regulatory authority over vessels equipment standards and operating
409 The text contained in this section was drafted several weeks previous to the Intertanko
decision. This analysis has not been substantively changed since the rendering of this
decision, however it should be noted that not only does the Intertanko decision provide
support for the conclusions drawn based on the analysis in this section, but the reasoning
process presented in the text of the Intertanko decision is strikingly similar to the analysis
of preemption pl'esented herein.
410 Dyer, Ellis, Joseph, and Mills, "Summary of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990," Washington,
D.C., (1990): 11-12.
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procedures. This forecast has indeed proved accurate, as evidenced by
legislation such as the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act, the double hull barge bill in
Wisconsin, and the legislative proposals for double hull requirements in
Massachusetts and Connecticut during the 1996 legislative session.
The possibility still remains that the Rhode Island oil spill law, like the
Washington Best Achievable Protection Standards, will face a court challenge
from the tug and barge industry as the implementation date for the manning
and double hull requirements approaches. The analyses presented in this
thesis, regarding the non-preemption language in OPA 90 and the line offederal
court decisions supporting states' rights to implement pollution prevention
laws, suggest that the Rhode Island law will likely withstand a preemptive
challenge. However, further consideration of this question is relevant to the
broader question of how, and to what extent, state regulatory authority over
the oil transportation industry has expanded in the wake ofOPA 90.
Implications of non-preemption language in OPA
When the inclusion of non-preemption language in the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 was debated in Congress, the Exxon Valdez spill was fresh in the minds
of most Americans, and Congressional leaders were committed to developing a
bill which would provide for the highest degree of oil spill prevention at both the
state and national leve1.411 Non-preemption was widely embraced as a
~
mechanism for ensuring that this level of protection was attained, and
representatives of the coastal states, the administration, and environmental
411 See, for example, 135 Congo Rec. H 7954 (1989), 136 Cong Rec S 11536 (1990), 136
Congo Rec. H 6920 (1990), 136 Congo Rec. 6933 (1990).
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groups joined with Congressional Leaders such as Senator Mitchell and
Representative Studds in opposing preemption of state oil spill laws by the
federal Oil Pollution Act. 412 The primary supporters of preemption of state
laws by OPA were, not surprisingly, representatives of the oil industry. The
primary concerns of these proponents of preemption were ensuring that a
uniform code exist for oil spill prevention and response, in order to avoid
overlappingjurisdiction, extensive litigation, and potential confusion during the
response to a Spill.413
Referring back to the discussion of preemption presented earlier in this
thesis,414 there are essentially three mechanisms for federal preemption of a
state law or regulation: field or implied preemption, explicit preemption, and
conflict preemption. The non-preemption language in OPA 90 effectively
eliminates the possibility for two of these three scenarios. The inclusion of the
non-preemption clause precludes the likelihood that OPA can be viewed as
preempting state oil pollution legislation on the basis of either implied or
explicit preemption. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the Oil
PoUution Act of 1990, which was intended by Congress to provide a
comprehensive, national framework for oil pollution prevention, liability, and
response, could be interpreted by the courts as providing for field preemption of
all state oil spill laws. Field preemption occurs when a federal law or laws in a
given area are so comprehensive as to not allow for the imposition of additional
412 Bowen Brown, " Preemption and other obstacles to oil spill liability legislation,"
Waterlog 9 no. 2 (1989): 9.
413 Michael Donaldson, "The Texas Response to Oil Pollution," St. Mary's Law Journal 25
no. 2 (1994):5559-560.
414 See Chapter IX.
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laws at the state level. However, because OPA 90 explicitly provides for non-
preemption of state law, it is impossible to interpret OPA as providing for field,
or implied preemption. Likewise, the Oil Pollution Act contains no language
which would assert explicit preemption; on the contrary, the Act provides for
explicit non-preemption. Therefore the possibility for explicit preemption of
state laws by OPA is nonexistent.
There is one final test for establishing preemption of state laws, and
that is the test for conflict preemption, whereby a state law or regulation is
necessarily preempted by federal law if that state law conflicts with or
contravenes a federal statute or regulation. When considering a hypothetical
court challenge of a state oil spill statute such as the Rhode Island Oil Spill
Pollution Prevention and Control Act, the court would likely test for conflict
preemption, and attempt to determine whether there are any elements of the
Rhode Island law which directly conflict with provisions ofthe Oil Pollution Act.
Consideration of conflict preemption would involve a two-tiered approach.
First, the provisions of the Rhode Island oil spill law must be compared to
existing federal oil spill regulations in order to determine areas of overlap and
potential conflict. Once these areas of potential conflict have been identified,
the court would likely consider past federal court decisions regarding state laws
which venture into the traditionally federal realm of vessel-source pollution
prevention. This analysis of case law is important because court holdings play
an important role in establishing and interpreting principles ofmaritime law.415
415 Refer to discussion in Chapter IX. See also Eubank, 156.
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Analysis of Case Law and Relevance to the Fate of the Rhode Island
Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act
There are several important distinctions which are established by the
line of cases presented earlier in this thesis,416 all of which are relevant to the
interpretation of existing and proposed state oil pollution statutes. This case
law helps to resolve many of the preemption issues which arise in the context
of state pollution prevention, and it also presents a set of "guidelines" which
enumerate the types of state regulations the courts have generally upheld.
These distinctions are extremely important to states as they attempt to draft
and implement oil spill prevention legislation.417
As the case law presented in Chapter IX clearly demonstrates,
Congressional intent is central to determining whether state legislation is
preempted in a particular area. All of the cases cited in this paper occurred
before the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This Act, which is
extremely broad and addresses issues ranging from vessel design and
construction standards to contingency planning for oil spills and natural
resource damage assessment protocol, might easily be interpreted by the
courts as implying preemption of state laws. However, as the previous
discussion of the non-preemption language illustrates, OPA explicitly provides
for the maintenance ofconcurrent state jurisdiction.
416 See discussion offederal court decisions, Chapter IX.
417For example, when the state of Wisconsin developed and introduced an oil prevention
statute into the Wisconsin House of Representatives (AB 495), the Bureau of Legal Services
in that state developed a legal analysis, which contained requirements such as double hulls
and tug escorts. This analysis relied heavily on the decisions in Ray v. l\rco and Chevron v.
Hammond, both of which address situations where state regulations effect commercial
vessels. See Michael A. Lutz, "Legality of Legislation Requiring Double Hulls," unpublished
memorandum, Wisconsin: Feb. 8, 1995, 8 pp.
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The Oil Pollution Act, in many ways, follows suit with other pieces of
federal environmental legislation, such as the Superfund Act and the Clean
Water Act, both of which have set federal standards as minimum levels for
environmental quality, and have allowed individual states to enact stricter
standards as they see fit.418 However, this characteristic of many federal
environmental statutes has led to a situation where federal preemption of
state laws (or the threat of preemption) has begun to occur more and more
frequently in this country. In the history of our nation, less than 500 total
state laws have actually been preempted by the federal government.
However, nearly half of these preemptions have occurred within the past two
decades, and many of these have involved environmental issues where state
regulations have moved considerably beyond federal standards.419
With respect to oil pollution prevention, OPA 90 explicitly allows for
states to develop their own liability schemes, which may allow for unlimited
liability at the state level, as well as for the state to separately determine civil
or criminal negligence in the instance ofspills in state waters. The Oil Pollution
Act also protects a state's right to participate in response and cleanup efforts
when an oil spill effects that state's waters or shorelines. However, the
language of OPA does not establish to what extent state laws may move
beyond OPA standards with respect to preventative measures such as safety
and operational standards aboard vessels involved in the interstate transport
of oil. In such an instance, where Congress has not legislated with respect to
this issue of state-federal jurisdiction, the federal courts become an important
418 E. Perlman, "The gorilla that swallows state laws; federal preemption sounds like a
technical term," GoverningMagazine Aug (1994) 82.
419 Ibid.
120
source of insight. 420 Again, any interpretation of the legal status of state oil
pollution legislation leads back to a consideration of the Supreme and Federal
Court decisions cited herein.
The line of case law which was presented in Chapter IX provides insight
as to where, according to the federal court system, the line between federal
supremacy and state police power should be drawn. These delineations, as
determined by the courts, should be considered as the foundations for
determining the legal stature of the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act and other,
similar, state legislative actions. In Chapter VII of this text, three provisions
of the Rhode Island Act were identified as most likely to lead to an industry
challenge ofthe law: the double hull provisions, the manned barge requirement,
and the safety and navigational equipment requirements.
In order to make some assessment of the likelihood that the Rhode
Island oil spill law would withstand preemptive challenge, these three
provisions will be examined. The double hull provision in this bill requires that
by January 1, 2001, all tank vessels entering state waters either be of double
hull construction or be escorted by an additional tugboat. However, in
situations of "limited visibility," all single-hulled vessels operating in state
waters after June 1,1997, must be accompanied by a tug escort. The Rhode
Island bill also requires that all tank barges operating in state waters carry at
least two crew members onboard at all times, unless such manning is
determined by the captain to endanger the lives of the crew. All tank barges
operating in Rhode Island waters must also satisfy several equipment
requirements which, at the time the bill was drafted, exceeded Coast Guard
420 Eubank, 156.
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standards.421 For example, working GPS (global positioning system) receivers,
both a magnetic and a gyrocompass, and two working VHF radios must be
onboard all towing vessels. Although a Coast Guard final rule issued July 3,
1996,422 imposes federal requirements for navigational equipment such as a
magnetic compass,423 an echo depth-sounding device, 424 an electronic
position-fixing device,425 and various charts and maps426 to be carried
onboard, there are still elements of the Rhode Island navigational equipment
requirements, such as the redundant VHF radio requirement or the
requirement for two types of compass, which exceed even these new federal
standards.
Another controversial component of the Rhode Island legislation is the
requirement that aU tank barges operating in state waters must have an
operable anchor system which may be manually deployed by a crew member
in case of an emergency. Again, at the time the bin was drafted, the Coast
Guard had developed no such requirement for tank vessels operating in U.S.
waters. However, the Chafee Amendments to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 do
contain an anchoring provision. This new federal requirement, however,
specifies that tank barges must carry onboard either a crew and an operable
anchor, or a retrieval system or other "comparable measure", whereas Rhode
421 On July 3, 1996 a final rule was issued by the Coast Guard regarding navigational
equipment aboard towing vessels. This rulemaking renders several of the Rhode Island
navigational equipment requirements redundant with federal law.
422 Fed. Reg., vol. 61, no. 129.
423 33 CFR part 164.72(a)(4).
424 33 CFR part 164.72(a)(5).
425 33 CFR part 164.72(a)(6).
426 33 CFR part 164.72(b)(1).
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Island specifically requires an anchor and crew or, in certain circumstances, a
retrieval device. The adoption of this provision at the national level, however,
will probably work to the benefit of the State of Rhode Island, because the
manning and anchor requirement in that state may be viewed as simply
"choosing" which federally mandated barge anchoring/retrieving system must
be employed by vessel operators in Rhode Island. There is nothing in the
Rhode Island manning and anchoring requirement which may be viewed as
directly conflicting with the new federal standard.
An analysis of the double hun requirements in Rhode Island suggests
that this provision is also very likely to withstand legal challenge. The
justification for the double hull provision is as follows. In the Rhode Island
legislation, the double hull provision is clearly intended as an environmental
protection measure, rather than a design or construction standard.427
Referring back to the courts' rulings in cases such as Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Ray v. Area, and Chevron v. Hammond, the courts have
held that the federal interest in environmental protection is not so dominant as
to preclude the enforcement of state pollution prevention laws. In fact, more
recent decisions, such as Chevron, indicate that the courts expect that states
will develop pollution prevention standards more stringent than federal laws in
order to protect coastal waters.428
The Rhode Island double hull provision is further strengthened by the
fact that the state will still allow single-hulled vessels to operate in state
waters if they are accompanied by an escort tug. The holding in Ray v. Area
427 The section in the Rhode Island law which contains the double hull requirement is
actually entitled "environmental protection measures aboard tank. vessels." R.I.G.L. ch. 46-
12.5-24(a).
428 See discussion in Chapter IX .
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supports the tug escort provisions in the Rhode Island law, and suggests that
such a requirement would be upheld if challenged in the courts. This fact would
make it even more difficult to assert that the Rhode Island double hull
provision is a design or construction standard. In determining whether conflict
preemption might allow for the Rhode Island double hull provision to be
overturned, the tug escort alternative to the Rhode Island double hull
requirement will likely play an important role in determining whether the state
requirement for and earlier phase-in ofdouble hulls than required by OPA 90 is
preempted by the federal law. Federal requirements for double hulls set the
absolute deadline for phase-in of double hulls in most vessel classes as 2015.
The Rhode Island requirement that after January 1,2001, single-hulled vessels
operating in state waters be accompanied by an escort tug does not directly
contravene the intent or effectiveness of this federal standard. Based on an
analysis of federal case law as well as the doctrine of preemption as it has been
interpreted in the U.S. legal system, it would appear that the double hull
requirement in the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act should survive a challenge of
conflict preemption.
The manned barge provision in Rhode Island Act and the provision for
an extra officer onboard towing vessels in both Rhode Island and Washington
State have not been directly challenged in the federal court system to date,
however the extra officer provision is one of the causes for the Intertanko suit
against Washington. Intertanko claims that this provision is disruptive to
interstate commerce and also would likely lead to hastened fatigue and
therefore make towing vessel operations less safe. In determining whether
either of these crew requirements, for the towing vessel or the barge, are
preempted by federal law, an analysis of Coast Guard crew requirements for
such vessels will be necessary. The Coast Guard clearly regulates crew size
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and qualifications aboard both towing vessels and tank barges. In fact, a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued recently by the Coast Guard429 will
impose more stringent licensing requirements for masters and mates aboard
uninspected towing vessels. However, in considering whether these Coast
Guard regulations preempt state action, the Courts must determine whether
crew issues are so pervasively regulated by the federal government as to
indicate field preemption and thus allow no room for state requirements.
The non-preemption language in OPA 90 suggests that Congressional
intent was to allow for concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal governments
over all aspects of pollution prevention. The promulgation of crew
requirements by state governments, then, must be demonstrated as primarily
environmental regulations. Also, the previous discussion of the anchoring
requirement in the Rhode Island law and its relationship to the Chafee
Amendments demonstrated that the manning requirements in the Rhode
Island law, when analyzed in the context ofthese recent changes in federal law,
may be considered as a mere expression of state preference regarding certain
pollution prevention standards which are sanctioned by the federal
government.
This discussion regarding the legal stature of various provisions in the
Rhode Island Oil Spill Act is purely speculative, although it is quite similar to
the discussion and analysis provided by the court in the Intertanko decision.43o
429A final rule on licensing and training requirements for towing vessel crew members is due
out in December, 1996. The contents of the proposed rule concentrate more on licensing and
training than on actual watch procedures onboard vessels. This may be interpreted as
allowing room for state legislation in that area.
430 Again, it should be noted that the analysis presented in this thesis was drafted before
the Intertanko decision was rendered, and that it is pure coincidence that the reasoning
process utilized by the court in that decision includes many of the same conclusions drawn in
this thesis. See supra note 409, page 115 of this chapter.
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Based on the analysis presented above, it seems as if there is no specific
provision in the Rhode Island Oil Spill Prevention and Control Act which
directly contradicts or conflicts with existing federal law. This fact, more than
any other, should be taken to indicate that a preemptive challenge of any
aspect of the Rhode Island law would very likely prove unsuccessful. The
courts have held that a state law may affect maritime commerce and still
survive preemptive challenge providing that law satisfies three conditions. It
must not conflict with the purpose of a Congressional enactment. A state law
must not directly conflict with or undermine characteristic features of
maritime law, and it must not interfere with the "harmony and uniformity" of
the federal jurisdictional scheme.431 The court in the Intertanko suit has
determined that although the provisions of the Washington State oil pollution
statute do tangibly impact upon industries involved in interstate and
international commerce, the potential threat to the uniformity of maritime
law is, in that case, not sufficient to overrule the police power of the state to
protect against environmental degradation. Should the Rhode Island oil spill
law ever face a legal chaUenge contesting the statute's constitutionality, the
court will be forced to examine many of the same issues as confronted by the
Intertanko court to delineate where the state's authority to protect against
vessel-source pollution must yield to the need for federal consistency in laws
governing maritime commerce. This is a distinction which involves far more
than the provision-by-provision analysis of preemption and constitutionality
presented above. However, because the Rhode Island law contains double hull
and tug escort provisions which were not considered in the Intertanko decision,
a court ruling on the new Rhode Island oil spill law would further refine the
431 "State's oil spill remedy scheme isn't preempted by federal maritime law," The United
States Law Week 63 no. 1030 (1994):2124.
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continually evolving standard for state regulatory authority over tank vessels
transporting petroleum.
One author has described this need to strike a balance between
environmental protection and unifOl'mity in maritime law as such:
"Protecting the environment is an area where the federal
government and state governments should both be able
to legislate. Other environmental laws follow this concept
and include provisions that there should be no preemption
[of state environmental protection laws] unless there is an
overridingpublic need."432
In considering the legal stature of the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act or the
Washington Best Achievable Protection Standards, it will be left to the courts
to decide whether the public need for environmental protection overrides the
need for supremacy offederal law in areas effecting interstate commerce.
The Rhode Island Oil Spill Law as a Continuation ofa Trend begun on
the West Coast
"This bill makes Rhode Island tougher on the barge
industry than are the federal government and
other East Coast states, and puts it in league
with Wisconsin and Washington, which have also
passed comprehensive oil-barge regulations."433
The local newspaper article which reported the singing ofthe new Rhode
Island oil spill law contained the quote printed above, made by Rhode Island
432 Brown, 10.
433 Statement of Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond at signing ceremony for the Rhode
Island Oil Spill Pollution Preemption and Control Act, 9 August, 1996. See Rowland,
"Rhode Island toughens oil-barge rules," AI.
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Governor Lincoln Almond. This statement indicates that there is a feeling
within Rhode Island government that the new law is following in the footsteps
of other states with proactive pollution prevention policies, such as Wisconsin
and Washington. That same newspaper article also noted that Rhode Island
officials had already been contacted by representatives of other New England
States requesting copies of the law, in the interest of adopting similar
standards in other states. Connecticut and Massachusetts, in particular,
reported to Rhode Island officials that their states were interested in
implementing regulations which were as stringent as those now in place in
Rhode Island.434
The Rhode Island Oil Spill Act , and the Wisconsin double hull law may
be considered as a continuation of a trend which began on the west coast
shortly after the Exxon Valdez spill. Even as the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was
being debated in U.S. Congress, states such as California, Washington, and
Alaska had already begun to draft their own comprehensive legislative
response to the Valdez spill. Summaries of various state laws addressing oil
pollution prevention were included in the text of this thesis to illustrate the
extent to which many states have enacted oil spill statutes which are at least
as comprehensive and effective as OPA 90. This proliferation of state laws
continues today, and the example of the Rhode Island legislation described in
Chapter VII may be taken to indicate that the characteristics of state oil
434 Oil pollution prevention bills were introduced into the General Assemblies ofboth
Ml'!~~fl('hl1!'p.t.t"find Connecticut during the 1996legisJative session, however nether bill
pl.lssed. According to staff members from each states' legislature, part of the reason that no
spill bills were pushed through these two states was the feeling that they would wait to see
what the fate of the Rhode Island bill would be. The fate of the Rhode Tshmn hill Wll!':
considered important not only in terms of its value as a precedent, but also so the
Massachusetts and Connecticut could design legislation which would be consistent. wit.h the
final provisions of the Rhode Island law. Martin Suuberg, General Counsel for Mass.
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, personal communication, May, 1996.
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pollution statutes are becoming more targeted and aggressive. Although the
Rhode Island Oil Spill Act is not as broad in scope or as comprehensive in
nature as oil spill statutes in place in California and Washington, the Rhode
Island Act, as well as the Wisconsin legislation, build upon many of the most
aggressive components of west coast pollution prevention laws, and then move
a step beyond in attempting to require double hu1ls on tank barges.
Attempts to Block Implementation of the Rhode Island Oil Spill
Pollution Prevention and Control Act: the Regional Risk Assessment
Team
The formation of a Regional Risk Assessment Quality Action Team, at
the initiative of the tug and barge industry, provides perhaps the most
convincing evidence that the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act is considered likely to
withstand legal challenge and, more importantly, is likely to encourage other
New England states to legislate in kind. The American Waterways Operators,
together with the U.S. Coast Guard First District Office and the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, sponsored a towing vessel and tank barge
safety workshop in early June, 1996. The purpose of this conference was to
identify effective safety improvements which cou1d be made within the tug and
barge industry, and to "educate" state legislators from the New England states
and New York about the "flaws" in legislative proposals such as the Rhode
Island Oil Spill Act.435
435 See Proceedings of Tank Barge/Towing Vessel Safety Workshop, Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, June 5·6, 1979, sponsored by United States Coast Guard,
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, American Waterways Operators, and the Northeast
States, Tab 2.
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The workshop was held before the Rhode Island legislation had been
enacted. Although representatives of the Rhode Island Senate Fiscal and
Policy Office were invited to attend the conference, the event was orchestrated
by the AWO and Coast Guard, and panel members -represented primarily
industry interests. The topics of discussion at the workshop did not directly
address the contents of the Rhode Island bill as such, however discussion
topics mimicked the contents of the Rhode Island law very closely, including
issues such as manning of tank barges, anchoring systems, and double
hulls.436 Representatives of state governments from Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, and Maine were all in attendance at the meeting.437
Approximately 85% of those in attendance at the workshop represented
either the oil industry, the tug and barge industry, or the United States Coast
Guard. The recommendations developed by the group, then, called primarily
for additional study and discussion of all issued identified.438 The outcome of
the workshop was the creation of a Regional Risk Assessment Quality Action
Team, composed of representatives of the Coast Guard, AWO, the
environmental community, and state governments.439 The Risk Assessment
Team (RRAT) is headed by a Steering Committee of four individuals: CAPT
Eric Williams, from the First Coast Guard District Office in Boston, MA; Linda
436 Ibid, Tab 4.
437 Ibid, Tab 20.
438 Ibid, Tab 18.A generally accepted stall tactic, with many industry groups who are
fighting increased regulation, is the call for additional research or study on an issue before
regulations are adopted. Although research should certainly playa large role in all policy
decision-making, environmentalists generally cite the fact that, with respect to such
structural improvements as double hulls or anchoring requirements, industry
representatives have historically called for more and more study. This argument, as it
pertains to double hulls, has continued for 25 years. See Alcock, 125-140.
439 Lord, "Task force set up to look at barge safety," Providence Journal, Bl.
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O'Leary, Vice President of the American Waterways Operators; John Torgan,
Narragansett Baykeeper for Save the Bay in Providence, R.I.; and Stephen
Morin, head of the emergency response team for the Rhode Island Department
ofEnvironmental Management. The purpose of the RRAT is to:
"identify the risks ofpetroleum transportation in the
New England/New York area and institute mechanisms
and derive measures to reduce those risks with a holistic
approach that meets the needs of the industry, state
governments, environmental concerns and the public."44o
Although there is nothing in the charter for the Regional Risk Assessment
Team which specifically addresses the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act, it is the
opinion of several participants at the Tank BargelTowing Vessel Safety
Workshop as wen as of members of the Steering Committee, that the primary
purpose of the RRAT is to develop recommendations for regional towing
vessel/tank barge safety standards which may be implemented in lieu of the
Rhode Island oil spill legislation, and which will preclude the development of
similar statutes in other New England states or New York.441 A newspaper
report which described the formation of the RRAT noted that, "it appeared
clear that the Coast Guard and industry experts are finally acting on safety
issues both because of the recent oil spills and their fears about the slew ofnew
legislation that they feel may impose expensive and unnecessary rules."442
The Regional Risk Assessment Team was formed at the June workshop,
however the Steering Committee did not commence with meetings until
September 12, 1996, a few weeks after the Rhode Island legislation was signed
440 Ibid, Tab 20.
441 John Torgan, Save the Bay, personal communication with author, 20 October, 1996.
442 Lord, "Task force," B4.
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into law. According to at least one member of the Steering Committee for the
RRAT, this time delay was due to the fact that the contents of the Rhode
Island legislation, as passed, were central to the agenda developed for the
RRAT meetings.443 The Steering Committee as well as the full Risk
Assessment Team has been meeting periodically since September 12, and the
final meeting of the Steering Committee was held on October 28, 1996. At
this time, a draft outline was developed for the final report which is to be issued
by the Committee on December 2, 1996.444 This report is to contain
recommendations for safety standards to be implemented within the
framework of a specially regulated navigation area (RNA), which would allow
for regional standards to be implemented by the Coast Guard and apply
throughout the New England/New York area.445
It is the intention of the Steering Committee for the RRAT to submit a
final draft of their recommendations to state legislatures throughout New
England in order to discourage state governments from hastily implementing
oil spill laws such as the Rhode Island Act. The Steering Committee also
intends to offer the report to the Rhode Island legislature in hopes that, once
assured that a regional initiative for tug and barge safety has been
undertaken, Rhode Island will repeal its recently enacted legislation. 446 As
unusual as this proposal may appear, Stephen Morin of the Rhode Island DEM
has assured members of the Steering Committee that such a scenario win
443 John Torgan, personal communication, 20 October, 1996.
444 Ibid, 30 October, 1996.
445 Ibid.
446 Ibid.
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likelyoccur. 447 However, the recommendations which have been developed by
the RRAT are viewed by the environmental stake holders in New England as
deficient, and certainly the provisions in the RRAT recomm.endations are
weaker than the double hull and manning standards currently in place in Rhode
Island.448
The outcome of the RRAT process remains to be seen. However, the
mere formation of the group suggests that the towing vessel and tank barge
industry view the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act as a threat, and realize that
similar legislative action win likely occur in adjacent states unless action is
taken to improve regional or national standards. Ifa regulated navigation area
is indeed implemented in the Northeast for the purpose ofpollution prevention,
it will be the first time that such an area has been proposed on such a large
scale.4'49 Again, this fact speaks to the significant impact which the Rhode
Island oil spill legislation has had on the oil transportation industry. More
importantly, the formation of the RRAT suggests that the Coast Guard and
industry alike are beginning to recognize that the trend toward proactive
pollution prevention legislation at the state level will likely continue until
significant efforts are made to improve the current regulatory framework on
the regional or national level.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid. For example, the RRAT recommendations advocate following the OPA 90 double-
hull phase-in schedule. They also recommend that tug escorts not be required, and that
manning standards be weakened such they only apply to certain tank barges which are
being towed astern dwing calm weather.
449 Implementation of an RNA would require a federal rulemaking, a process which
generally requires at least one year from the time a proposed rule is issued to the time a
final rule is developed. Although RNA's exist throughout U.S. waters, they are generally
very small and specific in nature. The implementation of an RNA throughout the first
district for as broad a purpose as oil spill prevention would be a first, and members of the
environmental community have expressed concern regarding enforceability and likelihood of
timely implementation.
133
XII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Successes, Failures, and
Suggested Improvements
The proliferation of state oil pollution prevention statutes439 which have
been proposed or enacted in the wake of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 may be
interpreted in several ways. This abundance of comprehensive state laws may
indicate a fundamental shortcoming in OPA, and may indicate that this law
needs serious revision or strengthening. Alternately, this trend toward stricter
state policies governing oil pollution may indicate that the state government is
the more appropriate arena for promulgation of pollution prevention laws. If
this second scenario holds true, perhaps the federal government should assume
a less prominent role in oil pollution prevention, as they have traditionally done
in areas of environmental law, developing standards which serve as minimum
levels for state governments to satisfy, and allowing states to implement more
stringent requirements. Of course, the federal government must playa special
role in monitoring state level oil spill laws, in order to provide for some level of
consistency in laws governing interstate commerce. One possible mechanism
for developing a more effective national pollution prevention scheme might be
narrowing the role of the federal government so that the state becomes the
primary arena for development of pollution prevention standards while the
federal government acts only to ensure that some level of conformity exists so
439 States which have enacted pollution prevention statutes or amended existing statutes in
the years since OPA 90 was enacted include California, Washington, Oregon, Alaska,
Wisconsin, Texas, Maine, Rhode Island, and Virginia. States which have introduced
pollution prevention legislation which has yet to be enacted include Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Michigan.
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as not to impede the flow of maritime commerce.
Redesigning the jurisdictional paradigm governing oil spill prevention
might be considered as an overly ambitious or unrealistic goal, however if the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is to remain the primary statute governing prevention
and clean up of oil spills in this country, then the law must be amended to more
adequately address the concerns of coastal states. One of the most important
issues which has been raised in this thesis is that of where federal jurisdiction
should yield to state regulatory authority. The situation which currently
exists, and the trend which has been documented herein, suggest that in the
years since OPA 90 was enacted, individual states have continued to develop
and enforce pollution prevention statutes which exceed the standards
established in OPA 90 and which, some argue, undermine the Congressional
intent to develop a national law which provides for a comprehensive, unified
approach to oil spill prevention and response. In order for OPA 90 to satisfy
this goal, it must address the pollution prevention concerns of coastal states
such that the these states are not compelled to enact increasingly
comprehensive and aggressive pollution prevention statutes.
In the months following the North Cape oil spill, U.S. Senator John
Chafee held a series of oversight hearings which were focused on identifying
mechanisms for improving OPA 90.440 One of the goals of these hearings was
to strengthen the federal law so that it would more directly address the
concerns recently voiced within the New England states. The State of Rhode
Island, in the weeks following the North Cape spill, identified the lack offederal
regulations governing the coastal tug and barge industry as a major
contributing factor to the causes of the spill. Clearly, then, this was one area
440See discussion, Chapter VIII.
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where the federal law could be improved and in the process remove the need for
Rhode Island and other states to legislate concurrently with the federal
government.
The Chafee amendments to the Oil Pollution Act and the Rhode Island
Oil Spill Act moved through the U.S. Congress and R.I. General Assembly
simultaneously. As the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act moved through the General
Assembly, members of the Rhode Island legislature closely monitored the
contents and progress of the Chafee amendments, realizing that the fate of the
federal bill would have a significant impact on the need for enactment of the
Rhode Island law. 441 The Rhode Island Oil Spill Act was enacted several
weeks before the Chafee amendments to OPA were signed into law by
President Clinton. Although the possibility existed that amendments to OPA
might have rendered several of the provisions of the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act
redundant of federal law, the improvements to OPA which were ultimately
signed into law did little to improve the federal regulatory structure governing
spill prevention within the tug and barge industry. The following section ofthis
thesis compares the contents of the OPA 90 amendments which were enacted
as law in October, 1996, to the contents of the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act, as
well as selected components of oil spill laws in place in other states, in order to
identify areas in which the federal law must still be improved to adequately
address the pollution prevention concerns ofU.S. states.442
441 Bromley, personal communication.
442 See also Appendix C: " Legislative Comparison Between Selected Provisions of Rhode
Island Oil Spill Act and CUlTent Federal regulations for Tank BargesITowing Vessels
Operating in the Northeast"
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The Chafee Amendments to OPA 90 and Recent Coast Guard
Rulemakings: Do they Adequately Address the Issues of Concern to
Rhode Island and
Other Coastal States?
Chapter VII of this thesis discussed the Coast Guard Authorization Act
of 1996,443 which absorbed the OPA 90 Improvement Act introduced by
Senator Chafee. Likewise, both the Towing Vessel and Tank Barge Safety
legislation introduced by Representatives Kennedy and Reed were partially
incorporated into the Coast Guard Authorization Act. However, the pollution
prevention provisions which survived, from all three pieces of legislation, and
were enacted as U.S. law, are considerably less aggressive than the original
contents of all three oil spill prevention bills introduced into the second session
of the 104th Congress.444
The Coast Guard Authorization Act contains two oil spill prevention
measures: an anti-grounding provision which requires either a crew member
and operable anchor445 or a retrieval device446 on board tank vessels, and a
fire suppression system on board towing vessels.447 Although the Rhode Island
law also contains provisions for manning of tank barges, anchor requirements
on tank barges, and fire suppression equipment onboard towing vessels, the
OPA improvement provisions do not render the Rhode Island law completely
443 S.1004.
444 See Conference Report on S.1004, Congo Rec., 28 Sept (1996): S11795-S11803.
445 S. 1004, Sec. 901(a)(1).
446 Ibid, Sec. 901(a)(2).
447 Ibid, Sec. 902(£)(1).
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duplicative or unnecessary. Although the fire suppression system requirement
now contained in the federal effectively removes the need for a similar
provision at the state level, the manning and anchor requirements in the Coast
Guard Authorization still fall short ofthe requirements in the Rhode Island law.
Specifically, in Rhode Island waters all tank barges must now be manned with
operable anchor systems, which the federal government still allows for the
operation of unmanned barges with no anchoring system, as long as they carry
a retrieval device or "comparable measure." Likewise, the OPA amendments
contain no incentives for implementation of double-hulls, 448 which is perhaps
the most effective prevention measure, and clearly a concern of coastal states
such as Rhode Island.449
The recent Coast Guard final rule for navigational equipment on board
towing vessels also overlaps, to some degree with the Rhode Island Oil Spill
Act. Again, however, the Rhode Island law is stricter in several respects, such
as the requirement for redundant compasses and VHF radios, and the
requirement for both working radar and GPS.450 There are other examples of
where the Rhode Island law, and others like it on the West Coast exceed federal
standards, even with the recent amendments to OPA 90 and the long overdue
issuance of Coast Guard rules for towing vessels and single-hulled tank barges.
It is reasonable to assume that within other New England states, and perhaps'
nationwide, this trend toward more aggressive state oil spill laws will continue
either through enactment of individual laws on a state-by-state level, or
448 Such incentives were included in the original version of S.1730. Se discussion Chapter
VIII.
449 See Alcock, "Ecology Tankers," for discussion of effectiveness of double hulls in preventing
oil spills.
450 See Appendix C.
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through some regional initiatives. However, even without any speculation
regarding future legislative initiatives within state legislatures, it is reasonable
to assume that all of the pollution prevention concerns of coastal states are
not addressed within the existing body of federal oil spill laws. A comparison
between the provisions contained in the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act and the
recent improvements to the federal law governing oil pollution indicates that
the federal government still lags behind Rhode Island, as it does behind
Wisconsin and Washington, in the promulgation of aggressive oil pollution
prevention regulations.
Mechanisms for Improving the Regulatory Framework Governing Oil
Pollution Prevention in the United States
There are essentially two mechanisms which may' be used to improve
the current regulatory framework governing oil pollution prevention such that
the jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal regulatory authority
are more clearly delineated. Federal regulations governing oil pollution
prevention must be strengthened such that they accommodate more directly
the concerns of the states, or increased regulatory authority must be explicitly
provided to the states.
The discussion in the previous section suggests that, even after recent
improvements and rulemakings, there are areas in which the federal
regulatory structure governing oil pollution prevention is still less aggressive
than existing state laws. There is no reason to believe that states will not
continue to enact oil spill prevention laws which exceed federal standards,
unless the federal standards continue to be raised. In considering mechanisms
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for strengthening existing federal regulations, the discussion must turn to a
consideration ofwhether the body offederal oil spill prevention law can ever be
comprehensive and aggressive enough to address all of the regionally-specific
concerns of various states. Wisconsin's recently enacted double-hull barge law
is directly related to specific navigational considerations on the Upper
Mississippi River. Tug escort provisions which have been enacted in West
Coast States such as California and Washington are a response to the threats
posed by the large oil tankers which transit those waters. A federal law which
took into account such regional concerns would be exceedingly comprehensive
and likely extremely complex.
Many would assert, however, that it is not at all the role of the federal
government to legislate in this regard. This assertion leads back to the
distinction between maritime and environmental law, which is essential to this
discussion. Environmental laws have traditionally set the minimum standard
for protection, and state governments have created additional layers of
protection above that minimum standard. Such state standards may account
for regionally specific concerns, and afford a more effective level of
environmental protection than one comprehensive national standard. Oil
pollution prevention laws, however, exist in a gray area between maritime and
environmental law, and as such must satisfy the often contradictory goals of
protecting against pollution locally and regionally, while ensuring a conformity
ofmaritime law nationally.
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Conclusions
Rhode Island's legislative response to the North Cape oil spill represents
a continuation of a trend begun in California, Alaska, and Washington State
even as the non-preemption language in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was being
debated in Congress. The ultimate inclusion of non-preemption language into
the Oil Pollution Act is critical to the fate of the Rhode Island law, and should
this legislation be challenged in federal court, an analysis of OPA 90 and
relevant court rulings suggest that the Rhode Island oil spill law will be upheld.
However, the existence of state level oil spill laws such as that recently
enacted in Rhode Island lead to the larger question of whether, by allowing for
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, OPA has failed to satisfy its purpose
of streamlining the regulatory framework governing oil pollution in this
country. Indeed, the non-preemption clause may have created an impossible
situation whereby OPA cannot at once provide a comprehensive, unified,
federal code for pollution prevention while still allowing for concurrent state
jurisdiction. This thesis has examined only a portion of the state. level oil spill
prevention legislation enacted since OPA 90, and this examination indicates
that many state laws rival the Oil Pollution Act with respect to
comprehensiveness, and as such certainly detract from the status of the
federal Act as a unified, national standard.
The presence of Rhode Island as a regulatory authority within the tug
and barge industry has been greatly expanded as a result of the legislative
action in that state. More importantly, the passage of Rhode Island Oil Spill
Act has allowed the issue of towing vessel and tank barge safety to assume a
more prominent role on the agendas of the United States Coast Guard and the
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tug and barge industry. It seems likely, then, that the impact of this new
Rhode Island law will reach far beyond the waters of the smallest state.
Whether the Rhode Island law encourages other New England states to
legislate in kind, or whether it leads to the establishment of a regional safety
initiative targeting the oil transportation industry, the on Spill Pollution
Prevention and Control Act has effectively expanded the role of state
governments as promulgator and enforcer ofoil pollution prevention standards.
One author writes that "the establishment of preemption was animated
by similar concerns about the need for effective national regulatory powers."451
It is difficult to argue against the need for national consistency, particularly in
an area which involves interstate commerce. However, the State of Rhode
Island and many other coastal states have determined that, in the field of oil
pollution prevention, national regulatory powers have not provided effective,
preventative legislation. Therefore, perhaps the question here becomes one of
providing for a shift in jurisdictional boundaries such that the priority of
national consistency is balanced with the need to effectively protect the ocean
commons from the continued threat of oil pollution. The decision as to where
this boundary shall be drawn is in the hands of U.S. Congress and the federal
courts, however the outcome of this decision is of paramount importance to
residents of coastal communities throughout the United States who fear the
effects of future catastrophic oil spills.
451 Gardbaum, 809.
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XIII.
ABS:
ADEC:
AWO:
BAPS:
CLF:
DEM:
EDC:
EOEA:
FWPCA:
MSD:
NOAA:
NRDA:
NRDC:
OCSLA:
OMS:
OPA:
OPA90:
PWSA:
QAT:
RRAT:
SLLA:
TAPAA:
TSAC:
TVSA:
USCG:
APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS
American Bureau ofShipping
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
American Waterways Operators
Best Achievable Protection Standards
Conservation Law Foundation
Department of Environmental Management (Rhode Island)
Economic Development Corporation (Rhode Island)
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (Massachusetts)
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act)
Marine Safety Detachment (Coast Guard)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Natw'al Resources Defense Council
Outer Continental ShelfLands Act
Office of Marine Safety (Washington State)
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Ports and Waterways Safety Act
Quality Action Team
Regional Risk Assessment Team
Shipowners' Limitation ofLiability Act
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
Towing Safety Advisory Committee
Towing Vessel Safety Act
United States Coast Guard
143
XIV. APPENDIX B: LEGISLATIVE COMPARISON BETWEEN SELECTED PROVISIONS OF
RHODE ISLAND OIL SPILL PREVENTION ACT AND CURRENT FEDERAL REGULATIONS FOR
TANK BARGESrrOWING VESSELS OPERATING IN THE NORTHEAST
Statutory reuuirement
1. MANNING TANK BARGES
2. NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT
3. FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
4. TANK BARGE ANCHOR
5. DOUBLE HULLS
R.I. Law
YES
2 crew m8mbers except
in life-threattming situations
YES
A. working radar
B. GPS
C. 2 VHF radios
D. magnetic and gyro compasses
YES
operable under "reasonably
foresef~ablecircumstances"
YES
working anchors on ALL
TANK BARGES
YES
by January 1, 2001, ALL
TANK BARGES in RI must
have double hulls or be accompanied
by a tug escort
Federal Law
OPA AMENDMENTS
crew aboard OR
retrieval device
COAST GUARD FINAL RULE
(7/3/96)
A. working radar OR GPS
OR loran
B. 1 VHF radio
C. magnetic compasses only
OPA AMENDMENTS
similar wording to R.I.
OPA AMENDMENTS
working anchor and cr'ew
OR retrieval device
OPA 90 UNCHANGED
by January 1, 2015, ALL
TANK VESSELS in U.S.
waters must have double hulls
(with a few exceptions)
qo
qo
.--i
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